Oakwood v. Clark Oil Refining Corp.

7 Citing cases

  1. Penewit v. Spring Valley Bd. of Zoning Appeals

    2019 Ohio 3200 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019)

    {¶ 26} Under established law, a "village can lawfully restrict the use of land within its boundaries by reasonable, non-arbitrary, legislatively created zoning ordinances." Village of Oakwood v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 33 Ohio App.3d 180, 182, 515 N.E.2d 1 (8th Dist.1986), citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926). However, a village "cannot create new zoning regulations or conditions which prevent a landowner from continuing lawful activities that began before the village changed its zoning code."

  2. Crestmont Cleveland Partnership v. Ohio Department of Health

    139 Ohio App. 3d 928 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 91 times
    Holding that appellate review of a trial court's decision to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is de novo

    State ex rel. Pitz v. Columbus (1988), 56 Ohio App.3d 37, 45. Appellate courts also do not address issues that the trial court declined to consider. Oakwood v. Clark Oil Refining Corp. (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 180, 183-184; Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 84, 89 (where a trial court declines to consider one of the arguments raised in support of a motion, but granted the motion solely on the basis of a second argument, the first argument is not properly before the court of appeals). In such a situation, the appellate court should reserve judgment until such time as the undecided issues are considered by the trial court and that decision is appealed.

  3. Root Outdoor Advertising v. Bd., Zoning

    CASE NUMBER 1-2000-38, 1-2000-39 (Ohio Ct. App. Sep. 27, 2000)

    We also note that, generally, the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply to prevent local governments from enforcing a zoning regulation. See Ghindia v. Monus (June 14, 1996), Trumbull App. No. 95-T-5326, unreported; Halluer v. Emigh (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 312; Oakwood v. Clark Oil Refining Corp. (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 180. This rule has been consistently applied where there was alleged to be detrimental reliance upon the representations or official acts of governmental agents. Williamsburg v. Milton (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 215.

  4. GAUL v. BD., PK. COM., CLEVELAND METRO.

    Nos. 75529, 75530, 75531, 75532, 75540, 75541, 75542, 75543, 75544, 75545, 75546, AND 75547 (Ohio Ct. App. Jun. 8, 2000)

    Appellate courts generally refrain from deciding issues the trial court did not consider. See Ross v. Maumee City Schools (1995), 103 Ohio App.3d 58, 66; Village of Oakwood v. Clark Oil Refining Corp. (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 180, 183-184. Because we have determined that the trial court correctly awarded the Metroparks a summary judgment for the absence of any benefit to these parcels, it is unnecessary for us to consider an issue the trial court did not decide.

  5. BP Oil Co. v. City of Dayton Board of Zoning Appeals

    109 Ohio App. 3d 423 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 30 times
    Holding that the "authority to regulate uses of land cannot be extended to include the authority to restrict uses not clearly proscribed in the ordinance."

    Zoning boards usually do not have the authority to place conditions on a permitted use, because the legislature already determined that the use is not detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare when it passed the ordinance. Laird v. McKeesport (1985), 88 Pa. Commw. 147, 151-153, 489 A.2d 942, 944; Oakwood v. Clark Oil Refining Corp. (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 180, 515 N.E.2d 1 (Administrative bodies cannot impose conditions on a permitted use which are not present in the zoning code itself.). It is important for us to note here that conditions may be placed on permitted uses in zoning ordinances.

  6. Lakota Loc. School Dist. v. Brickner

    108 Ohio App. 3d 637 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 132 times
    Finding that the covenant of good faith is part of a contract claim and does not stand alone as a separate cause of action from a breach of contract claim

    Generally, appellate courts do not address issues which the trial court declined to consider. Oakwood v. Clark Oil Refining Corp. (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 180, 183-184, 515 N.E.2d 1, 4-5, In Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 84, 89, 585 N.E.2d 384, 389-390, the Supreme Court of Ohio specifically noted that where the trial court declined to consider one of the arguments raised in a motion for summary judgment but granted the motion for summary judgment solely on the basis of a second argument, the first argument was not properly before the court of appeals. Accordingly, we will not address those aspects of this case that were not considered by the trial court in reaching its decision.

  7. Ross v. Maumee City Schools

    103 Ohio App. 3d 58 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 8 times
    In Ross v. Maumee City Schools, 658 N.E.2d 800 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995), Ohio's Court of Appeals for the Sixth District applied these principles to the case of a teacher's assistant assigned to serve as the sole classroom aide to a fourteen-year-old boy who was severely mentally retarded and suffered other handicaps. It became apparent that the boy was prone to sudden violent outbursts.

    Generally, appellate courts do not address issues which the trial court declined to consider. Oakwood v. Clark Oil Refining Corp. (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 180, 183-184, 515 N.E.2d 1, 4-5. In Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 84, 89, 585 N.E.2d 384, 389-390, the Supreme Court of Ohio specifically noted that where the trial court declined to consider one of the arguments raised in a motion for summary judgment, but granted the motion for summary judgment solely on the basis of a second argument, the first argument was not properly before the court of appeals.