Opinion
July 13, 2000.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Alice Schlesinger, J.), entered October 26, 1998, which granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously modified, on the law, defendant's application for statutory sanction granted and the matter remanded for appropriate assessment, and otherwise affirmed, with costs to defendant payable by plaintiffs.
Patrick J. Murphy Pro Se, for plaintiffs-respondents.
Andrew P. Saulitis, for defendant-appellant.
Before: Williams, J.P., Wallach, Lerner, Andrias, Saxe, JJ.
Defendant expelled plaintiff Nyitray and his attorney, co-plaintiff Murphy, from membership in 1995, after internal disciplinary hearings. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully challenged their expulsion in legal proceedings, alleging that it amounted to retaliation for their charges of defendant's financial mismanagement. Plaintiffs thereafter commenced a series of actions in State and Federal courts, all dismissed with the imposition of some form of costs or sanctions. Most recently, plaintiffs have sued in Federal court, alleging that they had been defamed by the publication of these disciplinary charges. That action resulted in dismissal (Nyitray v. Johnson, 1998 U.S. Dist LEXIS 1791 [SD NY], affd 166 F.3d 1201 [2nd Cir, reported in full 1998 U.S. App LEXIS 31458]), and the subsequent imposition of $1,398.50 in costs and $30,000 in fees (1999 U.S. Dist LEXIS 179 [SD NY], affd 205 F.3d 1324 [2nd Cir, reported in full 1999 U.S. App LEXIS 32545]).
The instant action was also for defamation. The IAS court dismissed on the grounds of collateral estoppel and res judicata,inter alia, citing the similar disposition in the Southern District, but was reluctant to grant the application for sanctions because the Federal court had not yet ruled on that question. Three months later, Judge Mukasey issued his ruling, holding these plaintiffs jointly and severally liable (Murphy's share to be borne by his firm, as well), citing their conduct as "part of a years-long campaign of harassing and duplicative litigation" against this defendant and its former president, "engaged in not only with knowledge of its lack of legal and factual basis but also for the improper purpose of harassing defendant and increasing the cost of litigation."
CPLR 8303-a calls for the award of "costs and reasonable attorney's fees not exceeding ten thousand dollars" against a party, his attorney, or both, who are found to have brought a frivolous action in bad faith or as a means of "harass[ing]" ; the successful adversary. A similar alternate imposition of costs and financial sanctions is available under the Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts for frivolous conduct in pursuit of such litigation (22 N.Y.CRR Subpart 130-1). Once there is a finding of frivolousness, sanction is mandatory (Grasso v. Mathew, 164 476,lv denied 78 N.Y.2d 855), especially in the wake of frivolous defamation litigation (Mitchell v. Herald Co., 137 213, appeal dismissed 72 N.Y.2d 952). We find, as did Judge Mukasey under the Federal Rules, that the conduct on the part of both these plaintiffs amounted to nothing more than harassment, thus satisfying the condition for imposing sanction under the CPLR (see, Smullens v. MacVean, 183 1105, lv dismissed 85 N.Y.2d 995;cf., Rittenhouse v. St. Regis Hotel Joint Venture, 180 A.D.2d 523).
The Supreme Court judgment was rendered without benefit of the later ruling by Judge Mukasey. Accordingly, this matter is remanded to Supreme Court for a determination of the amount of costs and reasonable counsel fees (Grasso v. Mathew, supra).
Motion seeking to enlarge record to perfect cross appeal denied, with costs.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.