Opinion
1711-05.
Decided June 6, 2006.
THE BIGGERSTAFF LAW FIRM, L.L.P., Attorneys for Plaintiffs, (Robert E. Biggerstaff, Esq. of Counsel), Delmar, New York.
HON. ELIOT SPITZER, ATTORNEY GENERAL, Attorney for Defendants, (Jane A. Conrad, Esq., Assistant Attorney General of Counsel), Rochester, New York.
Plaintiffs commenced the instant action for a declaratory judgment seeking a determination and declaration that 18 city school districts are so substantially underfunded that they are unable to provide a sound basic education to their students as required by Article XI § 1 of the New York State Constitution (Education Article). Plaintiffs consist of an association of city school districts, the members of the boards of education of 18 school districts in their official, individual and citizen-taxpayer capacities, and a number of parents and students in four of the 18 school districts.
The original defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the original plaintiffs did not have capacity to sue and for failure to state a cause of action under the Education Article. Following service of the motion, plaintiffs served an amended complaint adding additional plaintiffs, additional defendants and additional factual allegations. Defendants have elected to have the motion to dismiss applied to the amended complaint, as supplemented by additional submissions ( see Sage Realty Corp. v Proskauer Rose LLP, 251 AD2d 35, 38).
A school district, as a creation of the state, does not have capacity to sue the state, except in certain limited circumstances not applicable herein ( City of New York v State of New York, 86 NY2d 286, 290-291). Such lack of capacity to sue is equally applicable to the members of the boards of education ( id. at 291). Plaintiffs have attempted to circumvent this rule by having an association of school districts sue, claiming that the not-for-profit group has a constitutional capacity to sue and be sued, citing New York State Constitution, article X, § 4. However, the fact that the association has general capacity to sue does not confer standing. The association has not alleged that it sustained an injury in fact and an organization lacking standing to sue in its own right has standing to sue only if one of its members has standing ( see Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761, 775). Here, because the association members lack capacity to sue, the association cannot rely on its members interest to establish organizational standing (see Grumet v Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist., 187 AD2d 16, 19). Consequently, the New York State Association of Small City School Districts lacks standing to bring this challenge.
Plaintiffs have attempted to circumvent this lack of capacity and standing to sue by also alleging a citizen-taxpayer action pursuant to State Finance Law § 123-b. There is no allegation that the association is a taxpayer, and as such, it does not have standing to maintain a citizen-taxpayer action ( see Grumet v Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist., 187 AD2d at 19). Moreover, while the members of the various boards of education have capacity and standing to maintain a citizen-taxpayer action, the amended complaint fails to state such a cause of action. State Finance Law § 123 provides that the legislative purpose of article 7-A is to offer a means whereby individual citizens and taxpayers may prevent the improper disposition of state funds and property. The statute is clearly intended to apply to improper expenditures, not to the failure to make allegedly necessary expenditures. The statute may not be used to challenge alleged unwise spending ( see Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v Pataki, 100 NY2d 801, 813) or mismanagement or improper distribution of funds ( see Kennedy v Novello, 299 AD2d 605, 607). Inasmuch as the complaint alleges only that insufficient funds have been provided to the subject school districts, rather than that funds have been or are about to be actually expended unlawfully, it fails to state a cause of action under State Finance Law § 123-b.
Accordingly, the action should be dismissed with respect to the New York State Association of Small City School Districts and the members of the various boards of education. This leaves only the claims with respect to the Albany, Jamestown, Newburgh and Beacon School Districts brought by the parents and students enrolled in such districts.
"In considering the sufficiency of a pleading subject to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211(a)(7), our well-settled task is to determine whether, accepting as true the factual averments of the complaint, plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the facts stated' ( People v New York City Tr. Auth., 59 NY2d 343, 348; see, Jiggetts v Grinker, 75 NY2d 411, 414-415; 219 Broadway Corp. v Alexander's, Inc., 46 NY2d 506, 509). We are required to accord plaintiffs the benefit of all favorable inferences which may be drawn from their pleading, without expressing our opinion as to whether they can ultimately establish the truth of their allegations before the trier of fact ( see, 219 Broadway, supra, at 509; Underpinning Found. Constructors v Chase Manhattan Bank, 46 NY2d 459; Morone v Morone, 50 NY2d 481). Only recently we recognized the right of plaintiffs to seek redress, and not have the courthouse doors closed at the very inception of an action, where the pleading meets a minimal standard necessary to resist dismissal of a complaint.' ( Armstrong v Simon Schuster, 85 NY2d 373, 379; see also, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88, supra [court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'].) If we determine that plaintiffs are entitled to relief on any reasonable view of the facts stated, our inquiry is complete and we must declare the complaint legally sufficient ( see, 219 Broadway, supra)." ( Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 86 NY2d 307, 318), (hereinafter CFE I)
The complaint need not allege evidentiary detail (Siegel, NY Prac § 207, at 343 [4th ed]). However, the court is not required to accept as true legal conclusions ( see McNeary v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 286 AD2d 522, 524; Ferran v Belawa, 241 AD2d 841, 843) and a complaint which alleges legal conclusions as the elements of its causes of action is insufficient ( see McNeary v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 286 AD2d at 524; Schulz v McCall, 220 AD2d 984, 984-985).
The New York State Constitution at Article XI, § 1, provides "[T]he Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated." The Court of Appeals in CFE I set forth the elements of a valid cause of action under the Education Article of the Constitution. The first element is a failure to provide adequate facilities, teaching staff and instrumentalities of learning.
"The state must assure that some essentials are provided. Children are entitled to minimally adequate physical facilities and classrooms which provide enough light, space, heat, and air to permit children to learn. Children should have access to minimally adequate instrumentalities of learning such as desks, chairs, pencils, and reasonably current textbooks. Children are also entitled to minimally adequate teaching of reasonably up-to-date basic curricula such as reading, writing, mathematics, science, and social studies by sufficient personnel adequately trained to teach those subject areas." ( CFE I at 317.)
The constitutional mandate is met when minimally adequate physical facilities, teaching staff and instrumentalities of learning are provided. Moreover, it does not appear that there is any additional requirement that the educational facilities, instrumentalities and teaching staff provided be effective if they are fiscally adequate ( see Paynter v State of New York, 100 NY2d 434, 437-438). The second element is causation; the inadequate teaching staff, facilities and instrumentalities must be caused in part by inadequate funding.
The Court of Appeals, in Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York ( 100 NY2d 893), (hereinafter CFE II), affirmed the trial court finding that the New York City schools failed to provide a sound basic education in violation of the Education Article, and further that the violation was caused by the under funding of the schools, for which the legislature was ultimately responsible. The Court in CFE II relied on the following levels of teacher quality, facilities and instrumentalities of learning in determining that students were not receiving a sound basic education: 17% of the teachers were either uncertified or taught in areas for which they were not certified; 25% were novices with less than three years of experience; the teachers had a 40% failure rate on content specialty certification tests: There was significant encroachment of ordinary classroom activities into specialized areas such as libraries or auditoriums; there were no science labs in 31 high schools; more than half of the students were in classes of more than 26 students with many in classes of over 30 students: The libraries had only nine books per student; the books were old and not integrated with current curricula; there were only half as many computers per student as the New York State average; the computers were old and could not support currently available software.
The Court in CFE II stated that a sound basic education means a meaningful education. It found that performance of the school system was inadequate where only 50% of high school students graduated in four years, 30% never graduated or received a GED and 30 to 40% of the students were below the state reference point, when only 10% were below statewide. The Court further found that causation could be proven by evidence that increased funding can provide better quality teachers, facilities and instrumentalities of learning leading to better student performance.
The amended complaint contains numerous allegations that teacher quality, facilities and instrumentalities of learning are insufficient and are below state averages. Such allegations, however, amount to legal conclusions and fail to meet plaintiffs' pleading burden. Nonetheless, the complaint also contains specific factual allegations that many class sizes exceed 30 students, that between 25 and 50% of the teachers are novices with less than three years experience and no masters degree, that as many as 11% are uncertified, that library books average 50 years old, and that there are fewer computers per student than state averages and the computers are older and often incompatible with current software. The complaint also alleges that the schools experience low high school completion rates, that 50% of the fourth grade English language arts and 35% of the fourth grade math test results are unsatisfactory, that 75% of the eight grade English and math test results are unsatisfactory, that drop out rates are two to three times the state average and that suspension rates are twice the state average. The complaint also alleges that the current financial aid system leads to inadequate "inputs" ( i.e. teachers, facilities and instrumentalities).
The public education system in this state is organized into local school districts which make the basic decisions on funding and operating their own schools ( Paytner v State of New York, 100 NY2d 434, 442, quoting Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v Nyquist, 57 NY2d 27, 46). State funding, which is alleged to be the cause of the problems asserted, is determined on a district-by-district basis (Education Law § 3602). Given those considerations, challenges to the adequacy of the funding scheme have been limited to the quality of education provided by a particular district (see New York Civil Liberties Union v State of New York ,4 NY3d 175, 182, claim under the Education Article must be pleaded as a failure at the district level).
The factual allegations in the amended complaint, however, are based on statistical inputs and outputs related to schools in the "Plaintiff's Districts". There are no factual allegations regarding deficiencies in any particular district. Plaintiff's simply assume that all plaintiff-districts experience all the problems reflected by the aggregate statistics. Although the truth of the statistics is assumed for the purposes of this motion, those statistics fail to provide any insight into the sufficiency of education as provided at the district level. Consequently, the amended complaint fails to conform to the established pleading standard for a cause of action based on the Education Article. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is granted and the amended complaint is dismissed.
This memorandum shall constitute both the decision and the order of the Court. All papers, including this decision and order, are being returned to counsel for defendants. The signing of this decision and order shall not constitute entry or filing under CPLR 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable provisions of that section relating to filing, entry and notice of entry. IT IS SO ORDERED!