Opinion
06-05-2024
Richard Cardinale, Brooklyn, NY, for appellant. Geoffrey P. Berman, Larchmont, NY, for respondent. Twyla Carter, New York, NY (Dawne A. Mitchell, Claire V. Merkine, and Briana Fedele of counsel), attorney for the child.
Richard Cardinale, Brooklyn, NY, for appellant.
Geoffrey P. Berman, Larchmont, NY, for respondent.
Twyla Carter, New York, NY (Dawne A. Mitchell, Claire V. Merkine, and Briana Fedele of counsel), attorney for the child.
COLLEEN D. DUFFY, J.P., PAUL WOOTEN, BARRY E. WARHIT, JANICE A. TAYLOR, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b, the mother appeals from an order of fact-finding and disposition of the Family Court, Queens County (Joan L. Piccirillo, J.), dated June 6, 2023. The order of fact-finding and disposition, after fact-finding and dispositional hear- ings, found that the mother permanently neglected the child, terminated the mother’s parental rights, and transferred custody and guardianship of the subject child to the petitioner and the New York City Administration for Children’s Services for the purpose of adoption.
ORDERED that the order of fact-finding and disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b to terminate the mother’s parental rights to the subject child on the ground of permanent neglect. Following a fact-finding hearing, at which the mother testified, and a dispositional hearing, in an order of fact-finding and disposition dated June 6, 2023, the Family Court found that the mother had permanently neglected the child, terminated the mother’s parental rights, and transferred custody and guardianship of the child to the petitioner and the New York City Administration for Children’s Services for the purpose of adoption. The mother appeals.
[1, 2] "In a proceeding to terminate parental rights because of permanent neglect, the agency must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it has fulfilled its statutory duty to exercise diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parent-child relationship" (Matter of Alexis M.B. [Jaclyn R.P.], 224 A.D.3d 679, 680, 205 N.Y.S.3d 147 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Navyiah Sarai U. [Erica U.], 211 A.D.3d 959, 960, 180 N.Y.S.3d 259). "Once the agency demonstrates that it made diligent efforts to strengthen the parental relationship, it bears the burden of proving that, during the relevant period of time, the parent failed to maintain contact with the child or plan for the child’s future, although physically and financially able to do so" (Matter of Alexis M.B. [Jaclyn R.P.], 224 A.D.3d at 680, 205 N.Y.S.3d 147; see Matter of Navyiah Sarai U. [Erica U.], 211 A.D.3d at 961, 180 N.Y.S.3d 259). "A parent who has only partially complied with his or her service plan and. who has not gained insight into the issues that caused the removal of the child has not planned for the child’s future" (Matter of Shimon G. [Batsheva G.], 206 A.D.3d 732, 733, 167 N.Y.S.3d 811; see Matter of Alexis M.B. [Jaclyn R.P.], 224 A.D.3d at 681, 205 N.Y.S.3d 147).
[3] Here, the petitioner met its burden of establishing that the mother had permanently neglected the child. Contrary to the mother’s contention, the petitioner demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that it made diligent efforts to strengthen the parent-child relationship by forming a service plan that served the needs of the mother, scheduling parental access, and providing referrals to programs for the mother (see Matter of Alexis M.B. [Jaclyn R.P.], 224 A.D.3d at 681, 205 N.Y.S.3d 147; Matter of Navyiah Sarai U. [Erica U.], 211 A.D.3d at 961, 180 N.Y.S.3d 259). The record shows that, despite the petitioner’s diligent efforts, the mother failed to maintain contact with the petitioner and failed to plan for the child’s future, as she only partially complied with her service plan (see Matter of Phoenix E.P.-W. [Fehcita P.], 225 A.D.3d 875, 877, 208 N.Y.S.3d 260; Matter of Alexis M.B. [Jaclyn R.P.], 224 A.D.3d at 681, 205 N.Y.S.3d 147). Accordingly, the Family Court properly found that the mother permanently neglected the child.
[4, 5] The evidence adduced at the dispositional hearing established that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the child (see Matter of Phoenix E.P.-W. [Felicita P.], 225 A.D.3d at 877, 208 N.Y.S.3d 260; Matter of Abbygail H.M.G. [Eddie G.], 205 A.D.3d 913, 914, 166 N.Y.S.3d 560). Contrary to the mother’s contention, a suspended judgment would not be in the child’s best interests, as such a disposition would "only prolong the delay of stability and permanenc[y]" in the child’s life (Matter of Elizabeth M.G.C. [Maria L.G.C.], 190 A.D.3d 730, 732, 138 N.Y.S.3d 207; see Matter of Abbygail H.M.G. [Eddie G.], 205 A.D.3d at 914-915, 166 N.Y.S.3d 560). Further, the record supports the Family Court’s determination that the child’s best interests would be served by freeing her for adoption by her foster mother and aunt, with whom the child has bonded and resided over a prolonged period of time (see Matter of Phoenix E.P.-W. [Felicita P.], 225 A.D.3d at 877, 208 N.Y.S.3d 260; Matter of Abbygail H.M.G. [Eddie G.], 205 A.D.3d at 915, 166 N.Y.S.3d 560).
The mother’s remaining contention is without merit.
DUFFY, J.P., WOOTEN, WARHIT and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.