Opinion
B157525.
10-1-2003
KANAYOCHUKWU NWORJI, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RIO HONDO COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT et al., Defendant and Respondent.
Law Offices of Anthony O. Egbase & Associates and Anthony O. Egbase for Plaintiff and Appellant. Gibeaut, Mahan & Briscoe, Gary Robert Gibeaut and John W. Allen for Defendant and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
After being attacked by an adult student at Rio Hondo Community College District (the District), Kanayochukwu Nworji, also an adult student, filed his civil action for damages against the District stemming from its negligence as a landowner because the attack was foreseeable. The case was resolved in the trial court by summary judgment entered in favor of the District on the ground it owed no duty as a matter of law. In his ensuing appeal, Nworji contends prior similar incidents rendered the attack on him reasonably foreseeable. We hold, as a matter of law, that the undisputed facts present no basis for a duty the District owed to Nworji. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
There is really no dispute about the factual predicate in this case and so the only disagreement is about the legal implication of the undisputed facts. The trial courts minute order recites the following factual scenario: "[O]n November 10, 1999, plaintiff and Dettmer were fellow adult students at [the District]. They had never spoken with one another but evidently worked at the same desk during separate classes. Dettmer approached plaintiff in a computer classroom, asked him to follow Dettmer into another classroom, and complained angrily to him about the claimed messy state of the common work area. Plaintiff left the area followed by Dettmer, the volume of whose voice attracted an instructor, who eventually stopped the verbal argument. The instructor spoke to Dettmer regarding his concerns while plaintiff returned to the computer classroom. Some 10-15 minutes later, Dettmer again approached plaintiff and asked him to come with Dettmer so Dettmer could show him something. Plaintiff followed Dettmer through two classrooms and then outside where Dettmer attacked him." Nworji lost consciousness and was taken to a hospital for emergency treatment.
Nworji filed his complaint for damages for his personal injuries against both Dettmer and the District. Nworji alleged as the basis for negligence, the Districts duty as a landowner, and the Districts "knowledge" that prior to this incident, [Dettmer] had committed assault on the said premises and thus he has a propensity to commit the act of assault." The District generally denied the allegations of the complaint and set up as an affirmative defense that it was immune from suit and that it owed no legal duty to supervise Nworji or Dettmer, who are adult students.
Nworjis complaint against Dettmer was for damages for assault and battery. Nworji has since obtained a default judgment and judgment against Dettmer in the amount of $108,819.47 in general and special damages, plus $25,000 in punitive damages on March 25, 2002.
Eventually, the District moved for summary judgment. Reading Nworjis vaguely worded complaint to allege a single cause of action against it for negligent supervision, the District asserted there were no disputed facts and as a matter of law (1) it did not owe Nworji a duty to prevent adults from engaging in a fight, and (2) the allegation that the Districts actions caused Nworjis injuries was too speculative and abstract to satisfy the element of causation. Second-guessing a prior disciplinary action, the District asserted, is not appropriate under Education Code section 48904.5, which requires a school district to consider alternatives before expelling a student.
Nworji countered that his complaint alleged, in addition to the Districts failure to supervise, its "general negligence." Nworji produced the disciplinary reports, records, and complaints maintained in Dettmers District file to show the existence of prior similar incidents putting the District on notice of Dettmers violence. The redacted version of Dettmers records indicate:
(1) In June 1998, Dettmer verbally assaulted an instructor who gave him a grade Dettmer did not like. The instructor blocked Dettmer from returning to the classroom while another instructor held Dettmer in a bear hug. Although the assaulted instructor declined to pursue the matter formally, that instructor did lodge an incident report with the Dean of Student Retention and Success, who gave Dettmer a verbal warning that any future problem could result in disciplinary action.
(2) On September 2, 1998, Dettmer started a fight with a fellow student in Biology Laboratory class. Dettmer did not like the way the other student was staring at him. The District suspended Dettmer for the duration of the Fall 1998 semester.
(3) Nworji also presented evidence in the form of an excerpt from a deposition transcript of one Caesar Hernandez that Dettmer "head butted" another student.
Nworji also argued the Districts decision not to discipline Dettmer for his verbal attack on the instructor "creat[ed] the circumstances for [Nworjis] injuries."
The District countered that Dettmers record of one prior incidence each of verbal and physical violence, after which Dettmer was suspended, was not enough to put the District on notice.
The trial court agreed and granted the Districts motion for summary judgment. The court explained, inter alia, that the foregoing factual scenario coupled with "Dettmers known record fail[ed] to show that it was reasonably foreseeable to the District that Dettmer posed a particular harm to plaintiff requiring the District to warn or protect him." (Italics added.) Nworjis timely appeal followed.
The record indicates Nworjis appeal followed entry of the minute order and preceded the entry of judgment. Although it was filed prematurely, we deem the appeal to be timely. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2(d).)
CONTENTION
Nworji contends the trial court erred in failing to regard Dettmers prior attacks as prior similar incidents rendering the attack on Nworji reasonably anticipated.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of review.
Summary judgment is properly granted when no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) "We review the trial courts grant of summary judgment de novo, `considering all of the evidence the parties offered in connection with the motion (except that which the court properly excluded) and the uncontradicted inferences the evidence reasonably supports. [Citation.] In the trial court, once a moving defendant has "shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established," the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue; to meet that burden, the plaintiff "may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings . . . but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action . . . ." [Citations.] Where the plaintiff fails to satisfy this burden, judgment in favor of the defendant shall be granted as a matter of law." (Lopez v. Baca (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1014, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
2. The District does not owe Nworji a duty to protect him from an adult student.
"An action in negligence requires a showing that the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, that the defendant breached the duty, and that the breach was a proximate or legal cause of injuries suffered by the plaintiff. [Citations.]" (Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 673.) "Duty, being a question of law, is particularly amenable to resolution by summary judgment. [Citation.]" (Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 456, 465.)
Nworji argues that the District was responsible for protecting and warning him because its knowledge of Dettmers history of violence on campus made Nworjis injuries foreseeable.
"[I]t is well established that public entities generally are not liable for failing to protect individuals against crime. [Citations.]" (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126.) Potential liability the District may have for Nworjis personal injuries arises under the California Tort Claims Act.
Nworji posits two bases for the Districts liability. First, Nworji seems to suggest that the Districts duty is based on a special relationship between the District and its students. The contention fails.
" `As a general rule, one owes no duty to control the conduct of another, nor to warn those endangered by such conduct. [Citation.] A duty to control the conduct of another or to warn persons endangered by such conduct may arise, however, out of what is called a `special relationship[] . . . . Such a duty may arise if ` " `(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third persons conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives the other a right to protection. " [Citations.] " (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1129; Crow v. State of California (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 192, 208.)
Here, no special relationship on the part of the District exists merely because Nworji and Dettmer were students there. An adult students affiliation with the California State University system does not create a special relationship imposing a duty of care on the university. (Ochoa v. California State University (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1300, 1305-1306, and Crow v. State of California, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 208.) In Ochoa, a college student playing in an intramural soccer game was punched by a member of the rival team. The Appellate Court relied on Crow to hold institutions of higher education have no duty to their adult students to protect them against the criminal acts of third persons. (Ochoa v. California State University, supra, at p. 1305.) As both Dettmer and Nworji were mature adults, the District had no duty to supervise their activities.
Given our conclusion here, we reject Nworjis argument the District had a duty under Government Code section 815.6. That statute declares, where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by statute to protect against a specific harm, the entity is liable for that kind of injury caused by the entitys dereliction of its mandatory duty. As explained, the District owed no duty to supervise adult students such as Dettmer. Therefore, it cannot be liable for breach of such a duty.
Nworji also contends the District had a duty as landowner to protect him from the unlawful acts of others. Nworji argues all of Dettmers earlier altercations occurred on the Districts premises and constitute prior incidents that put the District on notice of Dettmers violent disposition, thus creating a duty to warn and protect Nworji. Nworji argues the court erred when it ruled that the prior incidents did not indicate to the District that Dettmers attack on Nworji could reasonably be anticipated.
In this context, public entity liability is statutory. Government Code section 835 "imposes a duty on public entities not to maintain property in a `dangerous condition. " (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1134.) However, " `third party conduct by itself, unrelated to the condition of the property, does not constitute a "dangerous condition" for which a public entity may be held liable. [Citation.]" (Ibid.) While a "public entity may be liable if it `maintained the property in such a way so as to increase the risk of criminal activity or in such a way as to `create[] a reasonably foreseeable risk of . . . criminal conduct [citation]," (id. at pp. 1134-1135) liability against a public entity is only imposed "when there is some defect in the property itself and a causal connection is established between the defect and the injury." (Id. at p. 1135, italics added.)
Thus, for example, in Crow v. State of California, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d 192, the defendant college did not create a dangerous condition of the property under Government Code section 835 by failing to supervise and control a violent student. (Crow, supra, at pp. 204-205.) That is, third party criminal conduct is not in and of itself a dangerous condition of property " `absent some concurrent contributing defect in the property itself. " (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1135.)
Here, Nworji does not allege or provide evidence that Dettmers conduct is coupled with a specific defective condition of the Districts property. Nworji fails to make the connection between some defect of the property itself and Dettmers injurious criminal conduct, or to allege that a condition of the property itself increased or intensified the risk of injury from Dettmer. Stated otherwise, there is no liability for Nworjis injuries caused solely by acts of third parties (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1135) and the District did not create a dangerous condition of the property under Government Code section 835 by failing to punish, supervise, or control an adult student.
Nworjis reliance on Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1181, and Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, supra, 6 Cal.4th 666, is unavailing. Sharon P. and Ann M. involved the duty of private landlords. (Sharon P., supra, at p. 1189, disapproved on another ground in Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853, fn. 19; Ann M., supra, at p. 674.) Here, as explained with respect to the duty of a public entity, Nworji has failed to demonstrate under Government Code section 835 that a defect of Districts property itself increased or intensified the reasonably foreseeable risk of attack from Dettmer. (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1135; Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist., supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 812.)
Although not explained in his brief on appeal, in opposing the summary judgment motion, Nworji cited Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 799, for the proposition that the District owes a duty to warn of foreseeable criminal conduct. He asserts, where the District knew of Dettmers prior assaults, and even declined to expel Dettmer, that it created a situation in which it was foreseeable that Nworji would be assaulted.
In Peterson, untrimmed trees with thick foliage bordering a parking lot stairway was a dangerous condition of the property because it facilitated criminal activity against students. Additionally, the risk of crime was reasonably foreseeable in Peterson because the school was aware of prior assaults. (Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist., supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 812-813.) Once having concluded that the District owed Peterson a duty of care, the Supreme Court then ruled that there was no immunity for failure to warn. (Id. at p. 815.)
Even conceding that the risk of harm was foreseeable here because of the Districts awareness of Dettmers violent history (Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist., supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 813), as we have explained, Nworji does not allege some dangerous condition of the Districts property that facilitated Dettmers conduct. (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1135.) Given there is no duty on the part of the District, we need not reach the question of the Districts immunity or lack of immunity for failing to warn Nworji of the risk Dettmer posed. (Peterson, supra, at p. 815.)
Given Nworji has not demonstrated a basis for any duty on the part of the District to warn or protect him from Dettmers conduct, we need not address whether any negligence on the part of the District caused Nworjis injuries.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: KLEIN, P.J. KITCHING, J.