However, we have also emphasized that, when "the legislature uses different terms in related statutes, it likely intended them to have different meanings." Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. City of Gresham, 359 Or. 309, 323, 374 P.3d 829 (2016) (emphasis in original). Thus, a focus on the term "meet," in isolation, does not resolve what the legislature intended ORS 192.630(2) to prohibit.

Context, for purposes of statutory interpretation, includes prior versions of the statute and existing case law, together with extant circumstances that give rise to the need for legislation. State v. McNally , 361 Or. 314, 325, 392 P.3d 721 (2017) (prior versions of same statute); Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. City of Gresham , 359 Or. 309, 322-23, 323 n. 7, 374 P.3d 829 (2016) (presuming legislative awareness of relevant case law, prior statutes, and extant dispute between city and utility). Shortly after the Court Reform Act went into effect, then-Chief Justice Lent filed a declaratory judgment action disputing the extent to which the legislature intended OJD to have to mandatorily bargain under PECBA, as well as the constitutionality of any requirement that it must. Id . at 402, 664 P.2d 1110.

Further, although the concept of a privilege tax is not well defined, the Supreme Court has routinely recognized that right-of-way usage fees, to the extent that they constitute taxes, are privilege taxes. See Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. City of Gresham , 359 Or. 309, 324-27, 374 P.3d 829 (2016) (holding that right-of-way usage fee, to the extent that it was a tax with respect to certain utilities, was a privilege tax); US West Communications v. City of Eugene , 336 Or. 181, 187, 81 P.3d 702 (2003) (distinguishing between city's ability to charge "privilege tax" for using public rights of way and other types of fees and taxes). For these reasons, ORS 307.090(1) does not exempt plaintiff from paying the challenged right-of-way usage fee, even if that fee is, in some sense, a tax.

The Oregon Supreme Court upheld the city's powers under the charter and found for the first time that home rule authority includes the general authority to tax. Id. at 7–8 ; see also Nw. Nat. Gas Co. v. City of Gresham , 359 Or. 309, 374 P.3d 829, 836 n.5 (2016). But the court also stated that this authority lies with a city's voters; not the city government itself.

As discussed above, if the exclusion for claims subject to ORS chapter 656 were meant to narrowly encompass solely insurance claims for workers' compensation benefits (which, as noted, do not include noneconomic damages), it is difficult to imagine why the legislature would put it in a statute that concerns only noneconomic damages. See, e.g. , Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. City of Gresham , 359 Or. 309, 338, 374 P.3d 829 (2016) (concluding that most plausible interpretation was the one that posed the least textual difficulties). And, a broader understanding of the exception fosters the reimbursement and distribution system in ORS chapter 656 for proceeds of third-party claims, like the one plaintiff has brought here.

Even defendant acknowledges the significance that this court would typically attribute to the legislature's use of the verb "are," rather than "are alleged," to describe the requirement that joined offenses are related in one of the ways that permits joinder. See, e.g. , Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. City of Gresham , 359 Or. 309, 323, 374 P.3d 829 (2016) (court generally presumes that, when the legislature uses different terms in a statute or related statutes, "it likely intended them to have different meanings"). See also ORS 174.010 (in construing statutes, courts are charged "not to insert what has been omitted or omit what has been inserted").

Moreover, the legislature's use of the distinct term "report" in ORS 162.375(1) suggests that the legislature intended to describe something different from a "statement." See also Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. City of Gresham , 359 Or. 309, 323, 374 P.3d 829 (2016) ("[I]f the legislature uses different terms in related statutes, it likely intended them to have different meanings." (emphasis in original.)).

2001, ch. 865, § 1 (amending definition of a "preexisting condition," in ORS 656.005(24)(a), to distinguish between the meaning of that term as used "[i]n claims for an initial injury or omitted condition" and in "claims for a new medical condition"); id. at § 3 (providing for different calculation of disability benefits if worker provided notice of employment in multiple jobs "within 30 days of receipt of the initial claim"); id. at § 10 (specifying that "[c]laims properly initiated for new medical conditions and omitted medical conditions related to an initially accepted claim shall be processed pursuant to ORS 656.262"); id. at § 14 (addressing payment for medical services "in response to an initial claim for a work-related injury"). Given those repeated references to an "initial claim" elsewhere in S.B. 485, the legislature's failure to qualify the term "claim" in that way in ORS 656.019 strongly suggests that it did not intend the term "claim" to refer to only an "initial claim." SeeNorthwest Natural Gas Co. v. City of Gresham, 359 Or. 309, 323, 374 P.3d 829 (2016) ("[I]f the legislature uses different terms in related statutes, it likely intended them to have different meanings." (Emphasis in original.)).

Having given the statute's text its ordinary meaning, this court then would turn, for context, to other statutes that, like ORS 742.524(1)(a), are part of the Insurance Code. See Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. City of Gresham , 359 Or. 309, 322, 374 P.3d 829 (2016) (quoting PGE , 317 Or. at 611, 859 P.2d 1143 ) ("The context of the statute includes ‘other provisions of the same statute and other related statutes.’ "). ORS 731.008 provides that "the Insurance Code is for the protection of the insurance-buying public," and ORS 731.016 provides that the Insurance Code "shall be liberally construed."

We next turn to the context of the statute, which includes other provisions of the same statute as well as other related statutes. Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. City of Gresham , 359 Or. 309, 322, 374 P.3d 829 (2016). The legislature's use of the same term throughout a statute indicates that the legislature intended the term to have the same meaning throughout.