After holding a three-day bench trial, the trial court signed a judgment denying Carroll's request for a declaratory judgment that the Gilley line is the boundary between the two school districts, granting Northwest's request for a declaratory judgment that the school districts' common boundary line is the line retraced by surveyor Wilson (known as the White line) and therefore that the disputed territory between the White and Gilley lines is in Northwest, and awarding Northwest attorneys' fees. The prior appeals in the order in which they were decided are as follows: Carroll ISD v. Nw. ISD (Carroll I), 245 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied); Nw. ISD v. Carroll ISD (Carroll II), 441 S.W.3d 684 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. denied) (op. on en banc reconsideration); and Carroll ISD v. Nw. ISD (Carroll III), 502 S.W.3d 919 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.) (en banc). In its sixth amended petition, Carroll added Northwest superintendent Karen G. Rue and Northwest trustees Josh Wright, Mark Schluter, Devonna Holland, Judy Copp, Ann Davis-Simpson, Mel Fuller, and Lillian Rauch, suing each in his or her official capacity only.

In three opinions on en banc reconsideration, we affirmed the trial court's denial and, in a corrected judgment, remanded the case to the trial court for trial "regarding the meaning of the orders and judgments creating the actual boundary location between the two school districts." Nw. ISD v. Carroll ISD , 441 S.W.3d 684, 694–96 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2014, pet. denied) (ops. on reconsideration) (Carroll II ). The opinions consisted of (1) a lead opinion, authored by Chief Justice Livingston and joined by Justices McCoy and Meier; (2) a concurring and dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Gardner and joined by Justices Walker and Gabriel; and (3) a concurring and dissenting opinion authored by Justice Dauphinot.

In three opinions on en banc reconsideration, we affirmed the trial court's denial and, in a corrected judgment, remanded the case to the trial court for trial "regarding the meaning of the orders and judgments creating the actual boundary location between the two school districts." Nw. ISD v. Carroll ISD , 441 S.W.3d 684, 694–96 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2014, pet. denied) (ops. on reconsideration) (Carroll II ). The opinions consisted of (1) a lead opinion, authored by Chief Justice Livingston and joined by Justices McCoy and Meier; (2) a concurring and dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Gardner and joined by Justices Walker and Gabriel; and (3) a concurring and dissenting opinion authored by Justice Dauphinot.

Describing them as non-profit organizations comprised of qualified voters as opposed to qualified voters themselves, McCarty may have displaced the organizations from the category of those allowed to attack the results of a constitutional amendment election. See Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Carroll Indep. Sch. Dist., 441 S.W.3d 684, 691 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g) (en banc) (holding that a school district is not a "qualified voter" under § 233.002). Yet, Nelson did not raise this particular topic below.

Gristafi could not have asserted the trial court's failure to recognize it as error or to seek relief on that basis. See Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Carroll Indep. Sch. Dist., 441 S.W.3d 684, 692 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2014, pet. denied). The appellate record on review from a default judgment such as this1 is limited to what was before the trial judge at the time he entered judgment. Armstrong v. Minshew, 768 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ)

Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Carroll Indep. Sch. Dist., 441 S.W.3d 684, 688 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2014, pet. denied) (op. on reh'g en banc).

SeeNw. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Carroll Indep. Sch. Dist. , 441 S.W.3d 684, 688 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. denied) (en banc) (holding that decision on question of law in earlier, interlocutory appeal was "law of the case" in subsequent appeal from final judgment). The law-of-the case doctrine is defined as "that principle under which questions of law decided on appeal to a court of last resort will govern the case throughout its subsequent stages."

Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (West 2013) ; see also In re Smith, 333 S.W.3d 582, 588 (Tex.2011) (orig.proceeding). Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Carroll Indep. Sch. Dist., 441 S.W.3d 684, 690–91 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2014, pet. denied) (en banc). “In enacting a statute, it is presumed that ... a just and reasonable result is intended....” Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.).

A direct attack on a judgment, conversely, is an attempt to change that judgment in a proceeding brought for that specific purpose, such as an appeal or a bill of review." Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Carroll Indep. Sch. Dist., 441 S.W.3d 684, 692 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. denied). Because the County was joined in the lawsuit filed by the Reids, the 2012 agreed judgment between the County and the Reids cannot constitute a collateral attack on the 2011 resolution.

Although Martin held that a boundary dispute must be resolved through a trespass to try title action instead of a declaratory judgment, 133 S.W.3d at 265, that opinion was later superseded by an amendment to Section 37.004, which specifically permits resolution of boundary disputes through declaratory judgment actions. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.004(c); see also Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Carroll Indep. Sch. Dist., 441 S.W.3d 684, 689 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. denied) (explaining that "the state legislature overruled Martin by adding Subsection (c) to Section 37.004 of the Declaratory Judgments Act" and, in doing so, "simply removed the prohibition, based on the supreme court's construction of the [Declaratory Judgments] Act in Martin, against using the Act to determine boundaries."). Thus, Salesi was permitted to seek resolution of her property dispute through a declaratory judgment action, through which attorney's fees could be awarded.