Opinion
Civil Action 19-310E
06-05-2022
NUR QADR, also known as JEFFREY PRATT, Plaintiff, v. EMPLOYEE YOUNT, EMPLOYEE TREMINE, and EMPLOYEE GIL, Defendants.
Susan Paradise Baxter District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE: ECF NOS. 46, 48, 51 AND 53
MAUREEN P. KELLY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE'JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Nur Qadr, also known as Jeffrey Pratt (“Plaintiff'), an inmate incarcerated at State Correctional Institution at Forest (“SCI-Foresf '), brings this pro se civil rights action arising out of allegations that Defendants Employee Yount (“Yount”), Employee Tremine (“Tremine”), and Employee Gil (“Gil”) (collectively, “Defendants”) violated his constitutional rights by prohibiting his access to certain religious items. ECF No. 11.
There are four motions presently before the Court: (1) Motion for Summary Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Plaintiff (“Motion for Summary Judgment”), ECF No. 46; (2) Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment on the Pleadings (“Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment”) filed by Plaintiff, ECF No. 48; (3) Motion for Default Judgment filed by Plaintiff, ECF No. 51; and (4) Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants, ECF No. 53.
For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 53. The Court should deny Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Default Judgment, ECF Nos. 46, 48 and 51.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Plaintiff's Allegations
Defendants Yount, Tremine and Gil are prison officials at SCI-Forest. Plaintiff claims that Defendants did not allow him to have his kufi or prayer rug while he was housed in disciplinary custody in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) for thirty days. ECF No. 11; ECF No. 46 ¶¶ 56. As a result, he claims that he was unable to pray five times a day, which is required by the Islamic faith. ECF No. 46 ¶¶ 5-6.
Plaintiff does not specifically identify what religion he practices in his Amended Complaint or the pending dispositive motions. However, he refers to practices mandated by the Islamic faith and relies on an exhibit in which he states that his “faith practice” is Islam. ECF No. 48-2. .
2. DC-ADM819
Under the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections' (“DOC”) Religious Activities Policy, DC-ADM 819, “prayer rugs may be purchased and possessed by inmates of Muslim faith, as verified by the FCPD/Imam/Muslim Chaplain.” DC-ADM 819 § 3(5)(a). While Muslim inmates may have prayer rugs if they are housed in general population, inmates are not permitted to have prayer rugs if they are housed in disciplinary custody status. Id., Attachment 3-B.
The DOC's policies are available on their website, at www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Pages/DQC-Policies.aspx (last visited May 2, 2022); see also ECF No. 48-4 at 1-77.
Inmates are permitted to wear religious headgear in all areas of the facility, unless there is a documented hygienic, safety or security concern. Id. § 3(4)(d). Male Muslim inmates may wear a white kufi while housed in either general population or disciplinary custody status. Id. Attachment 3-B.
3. Plaintiffs Complaints
a. Grievance No. 813953
Plaintiff submitted Grievance No. 813953 on July 23, 2019 relative to Defendants' refusal to provide him with his prayer rug. ECF No. 55 ¶ 12; ECF No. 56-1 at 3-4. In his grievance, Plaintiff reported that on July 15, 2019, he was taken to inventory his property in the property room. ECF No. 56-1 at 3. Upon arrival, he noticed that his property was “strewn about” and a number of items were missing. Id.
Yount and Tremine told Plaintiff that he could only take paperwork and publications with him. Id. at 4. Plaintiff placed religious publications in a box, along with his “religious article prayer rug for the practice of [his] faith.” Id.
Yount and Tremine told Plaintiff that he could not have his prayer rug. Id. Plaintiff protested, telling them there was a religious directive that allowed him to have a prayer rug. Id. Yount and Tremine still refused to allow him to have the prayer rug. Gil then entered the room, and he also did not give Plaintiff his prayer rug. Id.
Yount and Tremine then “tried to force [Plaintiff] to sign the personal property inventory sheet, ” which Plaintiff refused to do. Id. As a result, Yount and Tremine told him he was not allowed to have any property. Id.
On July 25, 2019, Plaintiff's grievance was rejected for the first time because he did not provide certain documents for review regarding his alleged missing property. Id. at 6. He later resubmitted this grievance on August 8, 2019, saying that he did not have the documents requested, and noting that he complained about his failure to receive grievance and appeal forms. Id. at 5. On August 9, 2019, his grievance was rejected for a second time because it was untimely. Id. at 2.
b. Inmate Request to Staff
On August 19, 2019, Plaintiff submitted a request to the Facility Chaplain Program Director, Reverend Shaffer. ECF No. 48-2. Plaintiff reported that Tremine and Yount refused to give him his kufi and prayer rug, and that he had notified the Major of Unit Management. He said, “I am requesting that you have my prayer rug and kufi given to me so that I am no longer refused the exercise of my faith practice (Islam).” Id.
Rev. Shaffer responded, “[w]hile in DC-status you are not permitted by policy to have a prayer rug. You are permitted to a white kufi.” Id.
c. Grievance No. 820247
In support of his Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff asserts that he also filed Grievance No. 820247 on August 23, 2019, which was denied based on his failure to present “new evidence.” ECF No. 46 ¶¶ 8-13. He then unsuccessfully appealed this decision to Superintendent Oberlander. Id. The parties have not provided the Court with copies of this grievance or appeal, so it is not clear what Plaintiff specifically grieved.
Plaintiff asserts that these documents are attached as exhibits to his Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 46. However, he did not file any exhibits with his Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff does include exhibits with his Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 48, but those exhibits do not include any materials related to Grievance No. 820247. Defendants include a chart indicating that prison officials received Grievance No. 820247 on August 27, 2019, which broadly describes the grievance as relating to “religion.” ECF No. 56-1 at 59.
4. Procedural History
Plaintiff initiated this action on October 16, 2019 by filing a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Motion”), together with a proposed Complaint. ECF No. 1. After Plaintiff cured certain deficiencies, the Court granted his IFP Motion and directed him to file an Amended Complaint. ECF No. 10. Plaintiff filed the operative Amended Complaint on February 26, 2020. ECF No. 11.
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claimed that Defendants' refusal to permit him to practice his faith violated his First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 2. Plaintiff also claimed that Defendants engaged in “retaliation against a witness or a victim, ” and conspiracy to interfere with a civil right. Id. at 3. As relief, Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that his constitutional rights have been violated; compensatory and punitive damages; and injunctive relief in the form of the DOC ensuring that Muslim inmates are permitted to have their kufis and prayer rugs. Id. at 2-3, 7.
On November 10, 2020, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. ECF No. 19. The undersigned submitted a Report and Recommendation relative to the Motion to Dismiss on April 19, 2021, recommending that the Motion to Dismiss be granted in part and denied in part. ECF No. 37.
On May 19, 2021, United States District Judge Susan Paradise Baxter entered an Order adopting the Report and Recommendation. ECF No. 38. The Court dismissed Plaintiff s claims under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as his claims of retaliation and conspiracy. The Court denied the Motion to Dismiss relative to Plaintiffs First Amendment free exercise claim.
The Court also granted Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint within twenty days to incorporate a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). Id. However, Plaintiff did not elect to amend his complaint. As a result, Plaintiff's sole remaining claim is a First Amendment claim under the Free Exercise Clause.
Defendants filed an Answer to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint on June 9, 2021. ECF No. 40.
The Court then entered a Case Management Order, under which fact discovery was to be completed by September 20, 2021; Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, if any, was due by October 20, 2021; and Defendants' motionfor summary judgment was due by November 19, 2021. ECF No. 41. At Defendants' request, the Court subsequently granted Defendants an extension of time to file their summary judgment motion until December 20, 2021. ECF Nos. 49 and 50.
5. Plaintiffs Pending Motions (ECF Nos. 46, 48 and 51)
a. Motion for Summary Judgment and Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 46 and 48)
Plaintiff filed the instant “Motion for Summary Judgment on the Pleadings” on October 19, 2021. ECF No. 46. Without leave of Court, and after the relevant summary judgment deadline, he submitted a “Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment on the Pleadings” on November 9, 2021. ECF No. 48.
The Court ordered Defendants to respond to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment by November 19, 2021. ECF No. 47. Defendants did not file a Response by this date.
On February 17, 2022, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause, ordering Defendants to show good cause on or before March 8, 2022 as to why Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment should not be granted due to Defendants' failure to respond thereto. ECF No. 59. Defendants filed a Response to the Order to Show Cause on March 8, 2022, indicating that they had intended to rely on their submission in support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and they also incorporated some brief argument in response to Plaintiff's motions. ECF No. 60.
b. Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 51)
On December 7, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Default Judgment based on Defendants' failure to respond to his Motion for Summary Judgment and Pretrial Statement. ECF No. 51.
6. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 53)
Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment, Brief in Support, Concise Statement of Material Facts, and supporting Appendix on December 20, 2021. ECF Nos. 53, 54, 55 and 56.
The Court ordered Plaintiff to file a response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss by January 24, 2022. ECF No. 57. However, Plaintiff did not file a response by this date.
The Court issued an Order to Show Cause on February 14, 2022, ordering Plaintiff to show good cause on or before March 8, 2022 as to why Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should not be granted due to Plaintiffs failure to respond thereto. ECF No. 58.
To date, Plaintiff has not filed a response to the Order to Show Cause or to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
The pending motions are now ripe for consideration.
B. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). An issue of material fact is in genuine dispute if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007) (“A genuine issue is present when a reasonable trier of fact, viewing all of the record evidence, could rationally find in favor of the non-moving party in light of his burden of proof'). Thus, summary judgment is warranted where, “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion ... a party . . . fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Celotex Corp, v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Conoshenti V. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2004). “[W]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts .... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.'” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)).
In deciding a summary judgment motion, a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all doubts in favor of the nonmoving party. Matreale v. N.J. Dep't of Military & Veterans Affairs, 487 F.3d 150, 152 (3d Cir. 2007); Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129, 130 (3d Cir. 2001).
C. DISCUSSION
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 53)
a. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies
In support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to bringing this lawsuit. ECF No. 54 at 6-8. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), requires that a prisoner exhaust available administrative remedies before filing an action challenging prison conditions or experiences. Under the PLRA, “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner, confined in any jail, prison or correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Id.
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained:
The PLRA requires inmates to exhaust prison grievance procedures before suing in court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “[T]o properly exhaust administrative remedies prisoners must ‘complete the administrative review process in accordance with applicable procedural rules,' rules that are defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218, 127 S.Ct. 910 (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006)).Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d 148, 153 (3d Cir. 2016).
DC-ADM 804 provides a three-step process, and an inmate must follow each of the steps in order to exhaust his administrative remedies under the PLRA. See Jackson v. Carter, 813 Fed.Appx. 820, 823 (3d Cir. 2020) (“The DOC has a grievance policy involving a three-step process that an inmate must fully complete in order to properly exhaust his administrative remedies under the PLRA.”). The three steps are: (1) initial review by a grievance officer of an inmate grievance; (2) appeal to the facility manager; and (3) final appeal to SOIGA. Presslev v. Huber, Civ. A. No. 3:08-0449, 2017 WL 1062375, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2017).
If an initial grievance is rejected, the grievance may be resubmitted using the same grievance number within five working days of the rejection notice date. DC-ADM 804 § 1(20). An inmate also may appeal the rejected grievance to the facility manager within fifteen days. Id. § 1(22); § 2(A)(1)(a).
“The burden to plead and prove failure to exhaust as an affirmative defense rests on the defendant.” Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 268 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002)); see also Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove; it is not a pleading requirement for the prisoner-plaintiff”).
In this case, Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not fully comply with this procedure. Although he timely submitted Grievance No. 813953, it was rejected based on his failure to provide necessary documents for review. Because Plaintiff then failed to timely resubmit this grievance within 5 days and did not appeal any decision to final review, Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not properly exhaust administrative remedies and summary judgment should be granted in their favor. ECF No. 54 at 6-8.
Upon review, the Court should only grant the Motion for Summary Judgment on this basis to the extent Plaintiffs claim arises out of Defendants' failure to provide his kufi. In Grievance No. 813953, he complained about prison officials' failure to provide his prayer rug. However, he did not say anything about his kufi. Therefore, he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies relative to any claim involving Defendants' failure to provide his kufi.
As discussed, Plaintiff also refers to Grievance No. 820247 in his Motion for Summary Judgment. However, there is no specific information about the content of this grievance in the record, so the Court cannot determine whether he complained about his kufi in this grievance. Even if Plaintiff did refer to his kufi, however, this grievance was Notably, Moore does not address the specific grievance at issue-Grievance No. 813953, which Defendants admit was submitted between July 15, 2019 and August 4, 2019 and relates to untimely filed under DC-ADM 804 because it was filed more than fifteen working days (August 23, 2019) after the incident (July 15, 2019).
As for claims arising out of Defendants' failure to provide his prayer rug, however, Defendants do not satisfy their burden of proof relative to exhaustion. Plaintiff timely submitted Grievance No. 813953 on July 23, 2019, within fifteen working days of the incident. This grievance was rejected based on his failure to provide certain documents for review. Under DC-ADM 804, he could resubmit this grievance at the initial review level within 5 days, and he could also appeal this rejection to the facility manager within 15 days. It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not timely resubmit Grievance No. 813953.
Although Defendants argue that Plaintiff also did not appeal this grievance to final review, however, the record does not clearly support this finding. Defendants rely on an affidavit from Keri Moore (“Moore”), the DOC's Chief Grievance Officer for SOIGA. ECF No. 56-1 at 16. Noting the August 4, 2019 deadline for Plaintiff to submit a timely initial grievance, Moore stated in her Affidavit:
13. Plaintiff filed six grievances between July 15, 2019 and August 4, 2019: #814834, #814928, #814929, #815157, #815554, #815610. See Ex. B, page 4.
14. These grievances dealt with allegations of sexual harassment, disputes related to dental and health care, and a dispute regarding Plaintiff s purchase of commissary items.
15. SOIGA has not receive an appeal for any of the grievances filed during the timeframe mentioned within this declaration.Id. at 19.
Plaintiffs allegations in this case. Moore's statement is therefore inaccurate, and she does not make any specific representations as to whether Plaintiff appealed Grievance No. 813953 to final review. Based on this record, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff failed to appeal his grievance, such that he did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies relative to his prayer rug.
The Court notes that Defendants also include a chart purporting to list the status of Plaintiff s grievances, which refers to the current status of Grievance No. 813953 as “2nd rejection.” ECF No. 56-1 at 58. However, this chart also incorrectly identifies the date that Grievance No. 813953 was received as August 9, 2019, and Moore cites this chart in support of her inaccurate statement above, raising questions of fact regarding the accuracy of this chart relative to Grievance No. 813953.
For these reasons, the Court should grant the Motion for Summary Judgment relative to Plaintiffs failure to exhaust his administrative remedies to the extent his claim arises out of Defendants' failure to provide his kufi. To the extent that his claim arises out of Defendants' failure to provide his prayer rug, however, the Motion for Summary Judgment based on Plaintiffs' failure to exhaust should be denied.
b. First Amendment claim
Based on the foregoing discussion, Plaintiffs sole remaining claim is a First Amendment Free Exercise of Religion claim arising out of Defendants' failure to provide his prayer rug. In support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs claim fails because the record does not reflect that Plaintiffs use of an in-cell prayer rug was required by any sincerely held religious belief. Even if it was, however, Defendants contend the regulation at issue is valid because it relates to a legitimate penological interest of regulating items that inmates in disciplinary custody may keep in their cells. ECF No. 54 at 3-6.
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . U.S. Const., amend. I. Although Plaintiff is incarcerated, the United States Supreme Court has held that “convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979). “Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, . . . including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (internal citation omitted). However, an inmate “retains [only] those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); see also DeHart v, Hom, 227 F.3d 47, 51 (3d Cir. 2000).
To establish a First Amendment Free Exercise claim, a plaintiff first must show that a constitutionally protected right is at stake. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held, the “mere assertion of a religious belief does not automatically trigger First Amendment protections.” DeHart, 227 F.3d at 51. Rather, “only those beliefs which are both sincerely held and religious in nature are entitled to constitutional protections.” Id. As a threshold matter, then, the Court must consider whether Plaintiff has alleged a belief that is both sincerely held and religious in nature. Id.
If a regulation does impinge on an inmate's constitutional rights, the regulation is nevertheless valid if it is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turnery. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). As set forth in Turner, courts must consider the overall reasonableness of such regulations by weighing four factors:
“First, there must be a ‘valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it, ” and this
connection must not be “so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.” Second, a court must consider whether inmates retain alternative means of exercising the circumscribed right. Third, a court must take into account the costs that accommodating the right would impose on other inmates, guards, and prison resources generally. And fourth, a court must consider whether there are alternatives to the regulation that “fully accommodate[ ] the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests.”DeHart, 227 F.3d at 51 (quoting Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 1999)) (internal citations omitted).
When applying the Turner factors, Defendants first must proffer a legitimate government governmental interest that is alleged to justify the regulation or decision. Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 156 (3d Cir. 2012). Ultimately, however, “the burden is not on the state to prove the validity of the challenged prison regulation but instead is on the inmate to disprove it.” Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 217 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003)). Unless an inmate can point to evidence showing that the policy is not reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage. Jean-Pierre v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 09-266J, 2012 WL 707095, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2012) (citing Beard v. Banks, 548 US. 521, 530 (2006)).
Upon review, the Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted because Plaintiff does establish (1) that his claim arises out of a sincerely held religious belief; or (2) that the regulation at issue (DC-ADM 819) is not reasonably related to a legitimate penological purpose.
(1) Sincerely held religious belief
First, Plaintiff does not establish that his claim arises out of a sincerely held religious belief. Although Plaintiff claims that his faith requires him to pray five times a day, he does not identify any sincerely held religious belief that required him to use a prayer rug to do so. As for Plaintiff s complaint to Rev. Shaffer that he was “refused” the practice of his Islamic faith without his prayer rug or kufi, this broad assertion does not provide the Court with any explanation for the religious requirement for the use of a prayer rug. Because Plaintiff does not show that his use of an in-cell prayer rug was required by his sincerely held religious beliefs, he cannot prove a First Amendment claim under the Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g., Enoch v. Perry, No. 19-00026, 2019 WL 2393783, at *6 (W.D. Pa. June 6, 2019). Therefore, summary judgment should be granted on this basis.
(2) Turner factors
Even if Plaintiff did identify a sincerely held religious belief, the Turner factors do not weigh in Plaintiffs favor. As discussed, it is Defendants' burden to show the first Turner factor- demonstrating there is a rational connection between the regulation at issue and a valid penological interest. Fontroy v. Beard, 559 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2009). “[T]his burden, though slight, must ‘amount to more than a conclusory assertion.'” Wolfv. Ashcroft, 297 F.3d 305, 308 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Waterman, 188 F.3d at 215).
Upon review, this first element is satisfied. Under DC-ADM 819, inmates are not permitted to have prayer rugs in their cells while housed in disciplinary custody. Defendants contend that this regulation arises out of a legitimate penological need to control the contents of inmates' cells while they are in disciplinary custody. Defendants also refer to Presslev v. Beard, 266 Fed.Appx. 216, 218 (3d Cir. 2008), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit similarly considered whether prison officials' confiscation of a prayer rug while under heightened security violated an inmate's First Amendment rights. Relying on evidence that Muslim inmates could practice their faith without access to a prayer rug, and that prayer rugs could be used to hide contraband, the Third Circuit found that this regulation was intended to further “legitimate penological objectives.” Id. Based on this evidence, Defendants satisfy their burden to show there is a rational connection between a legitimate penological interest and the regulation at issue.
As for the remaining factors, Plaintiff proffers no evidence or argument to satisfy his burden to show that the regulation at issue was not reasonably related to a legitimate penological purpose. Instead, Plaintiff incorrectly argues that he was permitted to have an in-cell prayer rug under DC-ADM 819, despite the fact that he was in disciplinary custody. Plaintiff therefore fails to satisfy his ultimate burden of persuasion in support of his First Amendment claim. For these reasons, the Court should grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 53.
2. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on the Pleadings and Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 46 and 48)
Plaintiff also filed a “Motion for Summary Judgment on the Pleadings” and a “Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment on the Pleadings.” ECF Nos. 46 and 48. Although this appears to conflate a summary judgment motion with a motion for judgment on the pleadings, Plaintiff clarifies that he is proceeding under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. ECF No. 46 at 1. Therefore, the Court considers Plaintiffs two motions under the summary judgment standard.
In support of these motions, Plaintiff largely reiterates allegations set forth in his Amended Complaint. He argues that he was unable to perform obligatory prayers because Defendants refused to provide him with his kufi or prayer rug while he was housed in the RHU for 30 days. ECF No. 46 ¶¶ 55-56; ECF No. 48 ¶ 14. Plaintiff contends that he was entitled to have these religious items under DC-ADM 819. ECF No. 48 ¶ 3. Based on this, he argues that Defendants violated his First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and RLUIPA, and that Defendants engaged in conspiracy and retaliation. ECF No. 46 ¶ 4; ECF No. 48 ¶¶ 15-16, 19.
In response, Defendants refer the Court to their arguments in support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 60-1 at 1. Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs submission is simply a recitation of facts set forth in his Amended Complaint without accompanying support, and that he fails to include a Concise Statement of Material Facts, as required under Local Civil Rule 56.1. Id. at 1-2. Based on this, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs motions should be denied.
Upon review, the Court should deny Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment. As for Plaintiff s First Amendment claim, Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment for the reasons discussed above. None of the other claims that Plaintiff refers to are currently pending in this action. Therefore, the Motion for Summary Judgment and Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied.
3. Plaintiffs Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 51)
Finally, the Court considers Plaintiffs Motion for Default Judgment. ECF No. 51. In support of this Motion, Plaintiff argues that judgment should be entered in his favor based on Defendants' failure to respond to his Motion for Summary Judgment and Pretrial Statement. Id. ¶¶ 1-9. He requests that the Court order Defendants to file a response, as well as to enter an order awarding him damages for confiscating his kufi and prayer rug, along with other non-religious items (television and sneakers) that are not relevant to his claims. Id. at 4-5.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 sets forth the procedure for default judgment. First, if the party against whom judgment is sought failed to plead or otherwise defend against the Complaint, the party seeking judgment must seek entry of default by the Clerk. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). Once default has been entered, a party may apply to the Court for a default judgment. See Husain v. Casino Control Com'n, 265 Fed.Appx. 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a)-(b)).
“Default judgments are a disfavored means of resolving lawsuits.” Robinson v. Cnty of Allegheny, No. 09-1066, 2009 WL 2762377, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2009). Moreover, the decision of whether to enter a default judgment is within the discretion of the trial court. Husain, 265 Fed.Appx. at 133.
Upon review, the Motion for Default Judgment is without merit. Plaintiff did not first move for entry of default, and Defendants have not failed to plead or otherwise defend this action. To the contrary, Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss, an Answer to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, and have moved for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 19, 40 and 55. While Defendants' response to Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment was untimely, Defendants explained they intended to rely on their pending summary judgment briefing in response, and they promptly supplemented the record.
To the extent Plaintiff suggests that judgment should be entered in his favor because Defendants did not respond to his pretrial statement or summary judgment motion, this is incorrect. Defendants are not required to file a response to Plaintiffs pretrial statement. Because Defendants filed a pending summary judgment motion, their own pretrial statement is not yet due. See ECF No. 41 (indicting that Defendants must file a summary j udgment motion or, if none filed, a pretrial statement by November 19, 2021).
As for Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants have filed a response. ECF No. 60. Regardless, a party is not entitled to summary judgment simply because the opposing party did not respond. Nunez v. Heere, 438 F.Supp.3d 321, 324 (E.D. Pa. 2020). For the reasons discussed, Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment based on the record. Therefore, the Court should deny Plaintiffs Motion for Default Judgment.
c. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 53, be granted. It is further recommended that the Court deny Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. 46, Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. 48, and Motion for Default Judgment, ECF No. 51.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.
The Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter United States District Judge