Sowell, 693 P.2d at 1224. A cogent statement of the policy reasons for this conclusion is contained in Nunn v. Equitable Life Assur. Society, Etc. (N.D. 1979), 272 N.W.2d 780, which states: The plaintiff is in this case arguing that in effect the person entitled to the proceeds of the policy is whoever the decedent intended it to be, even if not the named beneficiary.

" [DE 19, at 5 (citing Hughes v. Scholl, 900 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Ky. 1995) ("[T]he rights of an insurance policy beneficiary, including the right to receive the policy's proceeds upon the insured's death, are not affected by the mere fact of a divorce between the beneficiary and the insured."); Nunn v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 272 N.W.2d 780, 782-83 (N.D. 1978) ("[T]he rights of a beneficiary are not affected by a divorce between the beneficiary and the insured."))]. Therefore, regardless of whether Kentucky or North Dakota law applies, Decedent and Defendant Robinson's divorce did not affect Defendant Robinson's entitlement to Decedent's Policy proceeds.

In addition, the North Dakota Supreme Court has held that a beneficiary's right to receive the proceeds from an insurance policy is not dependent upon martial status unless the insurance policy conditions receipt upon such status.Nunn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 272 N.W.2d 780, 782-83 (N.D. 1979). The life insurance policy at issue in this case did not condition the beneficiary's receipt of the proceeds on his or her marital status.

In addition, the North Dakota Supreme Court has held that a beneficiary's right to receive the proceeds from an insurance policy is not dependent upon martial status, unless the insurance policy conditions receipt upon marital status. Nunn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 272 N.W.2d 780, 782-83 (N.D. 1979). The policy at issue here did not condition the beneficiary's receipt of the proceeds on his or her marital status.

The result may be unfortunate, but that condition alone no more furnishes justification for the Court to intervene than it would in the case of errors of judgment or frustrated expectations in the case of contracts generally.Eschler , 257 Mont. at 367-68, 849 P.2d at 201-02 (quoting Nunn v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y , 272 N.W.2d 780, 781-82 (N.D. 1978) ). Here, the same considerations apply.

The result may be unfortunate, but that condition alone no more furnishes justification for the Court to intervene than it would in the case of errors of judgment or frustrated expectations in the case of contracts generally.Eschler, 257 Mont. at 367-68, 849 P.2d at 201-02 (quoting Nunn v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 272 N.W.2d 780, 781-82 (N.D. 1978)). Here, the same considerations apply.

4 Russ, Couch on Insurance, supra §§ 59:1, 59:3, and 64:18; 44A Am. Jur.2d, supra § 1683; John J. Michalik, Annotation, Divorce: Provision in Decree That One Party Obtain or Maintain Life Insurance for Benefit of Other Party or Child, 59 A.L.R.3d 9, § 2 (1974). [¶ 10] In Nunn v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 272 N.W.2d 780, 781 (N.D. 1978), this Court considered a claim by an insured's surviving wife against his former wife for proceeds of a group life insurance policy. During their marriage, the insured had designated his former wife as the beneficiary of the group life insurance policy.

This Court has held an insured's failure to change the name of the beneficiary on his life insurance policy from his ex-wife's to his new wife's after his divorce and remarriage did not affect the ex-wife's right to the life insurance proceeds. Nunn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 272 N.W.2d 780, 781 (N.D. 1978). This Court held to the general rule that the named beneficiary is controlling and that intent alone will not effectuate a change of the beneficiary.

The court gave the proceeds of all three accounts to Donald's estate. The trial court analyzed this case under contract law, citing and discussing Nunn v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 272 N.W.2d 780 (N.D. 1978), and Matter of Estate of Leier, 524 N.W.2d 106 (N.D. 1994), rather than looking to the divorce decree. However, since we adopted the doctrine of merger of a settlement agreement into a divorce decree, see Sullivan v. Quist, 506 N.W.2d 394, 399 (N.D. 1993), a trial court should be concerned mainly with interpreting and enforcing the decree, rather than the underlying contract.

Karen nevertheless asserts that the trial court erred in not allowing rescission of Lee's designation of Eldore as beneficiary, contending Lee made a unilateral mistake in not changing beneficiaries after the divorce. Relying on Nunn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 272 N.W.2d 780 (N.D. 1978), she also argues that the effect of the divorce decree terminated Eldore's beneficiary interest in the IRA. In Nunn, this court considered similar contentions in the context of the continued designation of an ex-wife as a beneficiary in her ex-husband's insurance policy.