The defendant appeals. A movant seeking to vacate an order entered upon its failure to appear at oral argument on a motion must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious opposition to the motion (see CPLR 5015[a][1] ; Hobbins v. North Star Orthopedics, PLLC, 148 A.D.3d 784, 787, 49 N.Y.S.3d 169 ; Nunez v. Olympic Fence & Railing Co., Inc., 138 A.D.3d 807, 808, 29 N.Y.S.3d 546 ; Navarrete v. Metro PCS, 137 A.D.3d 1230, 1231, 27 N.Y.S.3d 397 ; Kramarenko v. New York Community Hosp., 134 A.D.3d 770, 772, 20 N.Y.S.3d 635 ). Here, the plaintiff provided a reasonable excuse for its failure to appear for oral argument on the defendant's motion through the affirmations of its attorney and an outside attorney retained to appear on the motion.

Motion to Restore - Discussion The court possesses broad discretion when considering restoring a motion and/or vacating a prior order due to default (see generally Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v Dort-Relus, 166 AD3d 961, 962 [2d Dept 2018]; Nunez v Olympic Fence & Railing Co., Inc., 138 AD3d 807, 808 [2d Dept 2016]; cf. Diamond v Leone, 173 AD3d 686, 687 [2d Dept 2019]). A motion marked off the court's calendar due to a movant's default in appearance may be restored where a) movant presents a reasonable and substantiated excuse for their default, b) there is not a substantial delay between the default and the motion to restore, c) there is no prejudice to the non-moving party, and d) that the movant demonstrates a potentially meritorious position on its motion (see Hobbins v North Star Orthopedics, PLLC, 148 AD3d 784, 787 [2d Dept 2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 913 [2017]).

"A defendant moving for summary judgment in a negligence action has the burden of establishing, prima facie, that he or she was not at fault in the happening of the subject accident" ( Boulos v. Lerner–Harrington, 124 A.D.3d 709, 709, 2 N.Y.S.3d 526 ; seeSage v. Taylor, 195 A.D.3d 971, 972, 146 N.Y.S.3d 496 ). "There can be more than one proximate cause of an accident, and [g]enerally, it is for the trier of fact to determine the issue of proximate cause" ( Chan Pok Kim v. Jurado, 203 A.D.3d 694, 695, 160 N.Y.S.3d 635 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; seeNunez v. Olympic Fence & Railing Co., Inc., 138 A.D.3d 807, 809, 29 N.Y.S.3d 546 ; Shui–Kwan Lui v. Serrone, 103 A.D.3d 620, 620, 959 N.Y.S.2d 270 )

A defendant moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing, prima facie, that he or she was not a proximate cause of the accident (seeSuchit v. Shaikh, 207 A.D.3d 495, 496, 169 N.Y.S.3d 541 ; Boulos v. Lerner–Harrington, 124 A.D.3d 709, 709, 2 N.Y.S.3d 526 ). Thus, the fact that the plaintiff was riding his bicycle on the roadway in the wrong direction did not preclude a finding that the defendants’ negligence also contributed to the accident (seeNunez v. Olympic Fence & Railing Co., Inc., 138 A.D.3d 807, 809, 29 N.Y.S.3d 546 ).

The Supreme Court denied the motion, and the defendant appeals. The defendant failed to establish his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint on the ground of no liability. Although Sanchez was negligent as a matter of law in traveling the wrong way on Irving Avenue (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1234[a] ; see also Espiritu v. Shuttle Express Coach, Inc., 115 A.D.3d 787, 789, 982 N.Y.S.2d 155 ), the transcript of the defendant's deposition testimony, submitted in support of his motion, presented a triable issue of fact as to whether he failed to see what was there to be seen through the proper use of his senses (see Nunez v. Olympic Fence & Railing Co., Inc., 138 A.D.3d 807, 29 N.Y.S.3d 546 ; Palmeri v. Erricola, 122 A.D.3d 697, 698, 996 N.Y.S.2d 193 ; Espiritu v. Shuttle Express Coach, Inc., 115 A.D.3d at 789, 982 N.Y.S.2d 155 ; Lu Yuan Yang v. Howsal Cab Corp., 106 A.D.3d 1055, 1056, 966 N.Y.S.2d 167 ). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant's motion which was to dismiss the complaint on the ground of no liability.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the defendant's motion to vacate so much of the prior order dated August 14, 2013, as marked off the calendar, upon his failure to appear at the court, his motion to dismiss, and thereupon to restore the motion to the calendar. The defendant demonstrated a reasonable and substantiated excuse for his attorney's failure to appear for oral argument on the motion's return date, he moved expeditiously to vacate the default, and there was no evidence that the default was willful or that the plaintiff was prejudiced by the delay (see Nunez v. Olympic Fence & Railing Co., Inc., 138 A.D.3d 807, 808, 29 N.Y.S.3d 546 ; Kramarenko v. New York Community Hosp., 134 A.D.3d 770, 772, 20 N.Y.S.3d 635 ; Montefiore Med. Ctr. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 37 A.D.3d 673, 673, 830 N.Y.S.2d 336 ; Liotti v. Peace, 15 A.D.3d 452, 453, 790 N.Y.S.2d 512 ). In addition, the defendant demonstrated a potentially meritorious position on his motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him for lack of personal jurisdiction (see Montefiore Med. Ctr. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 37 A.D.3d at 674, 830 N.Y.S.2d 336 ; Liotti v. Peace, 15 A.D.3d at 453, 790 N.Y.S.2d 512 ).

Additionally, Empire has failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether its driver acted recklessly and/or failed to exercise due care while backing up into the South Street entrance (see Nunez v Olympic Fence & Railing Co., 138 AD3d 807, 809 [2016]; see VTL 1146 [requiring drivers to exercise due care in operation of vehicle]; VTL 1212 [prohibiting reckless driving]. Accordingly, that branch of Empire's motion seeking to dismiss plaintiff's claims against it as based upon violations of VTL 388, 1101, 1212, and 1146 is denied.

In addition, Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1211 (a) and 1173 impose a duty upon an operator of a motor vehicle emerging from a driveway to not make such movement unless it can be done without interfering with other traffic, and to stop such vehicle immediately prior to entering the roadway (see Nunez v Olympic Fence & Railing Co., Inc., 138 A.D.3d 807, 29 N.Y.S.3d 546 [2d Dept 2016]; Weathers vGrix, 273 A.D.2d 463 [2d Dept 2000]; Lugo v Brentwood Union FreeSch. Dist., 212 A.D.2d 582, 622 N.Y.S.2d 553 [2d Dept 1995]). Plaintiff testified at an examination before trial that prior to the accident he was exiting his driveway in reverse, that he looked to his left and right before reversing out of his driveway and did not see any vehicles traveling either eastbound or westbound on Phelps Lane, that he continued looking eastbound towards the oncoming traffic while backing up and did not observe any vehicles, and that he is able to see approximately 60 to 70 yards down Phelps Lane, all the way to its intersection with Pacific Street where a stop sign is located.

Similarly, in Nunez v. Olympic Fence & Railing Co., Inc., 138 AD3d 807 (2nd Dept. 2016), the court also denied summary judgment in a car-bicycle accident case. In that case, the plaintiff was riding his bicycle the wrong way on a one way street when he was stuck by a forklift which was exiting a driveway onto the street.