Nudi Auto RV & Boat Sales, Inc. v. John Deere Insurance

6 Citing cases

  1. Libertyville Toyota v. U.S. Bank

    864 N.E.2d 850 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)   Cited 11 times

    Dan Pilson, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 620. Libertyville argues that the facts of this case are comparable to the facts of Dan Pilson and Nudi Auto RV Boat Sales, Inc. v. John Deere Insurance Co., 328 Ill. App. 3d 523 (2002). In Dan Pilson, the plaintiff, a motor vehicle dealer, brought an action to recover possession of six vehicles from the defendant, the sheriff of Sangamon County. The plaintiff had entered an oral contract to sell the vehicles to Fleet Automotive (Fleet), another motor vehicle dealer.

  2. Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Acuity

    2016 Ill. App. 153097 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)

    Although "own" is not defined in the insurance policy, we will apply the word as written unless it contravenes public policy. See Nudi Auto RV & Boat Sales, Inc. v. John Deere Insurance Co., 328 Ill. App. 3d 523, 531 (2002); American States Insurance Co. v. Gawlicki & Hussey, Inc., 231 Ill. App. 3d 199, 201 (1992) (noting, the word, "own," has a plain, dictionary definition which can reasonably be given to it in this contract). Illinois defines a vehicle "owner" as "a person who holds legal document of ownership of a vehicle," including a certificate of title. 625 ILCS 5/3-100 (West 2014); Nudi Auto RV & Boat Sales, Inc., 328 Ill. App. 3d at 535.

  3. Pekin Ins. Co. v. Tovar Snow Professionals, Inc.

    2012 Ill. App. 111136 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)   Cited 5 times

    This policy language is similar to that interpreted by our supreme court's decision in Barth v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 228 Ill.2d 163, 174–75, 319 Ill.Dec. 852, 886 N.E.2d 976 (2008) (citing 2 Mark S. Rhodes, Couch Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 15:57, at 302 (2d rev. ed. 1984)), which held that a contract term only used in a heading and not in the text and otherwise not defined cannot properly be imposed on an insured to exclude coverage. The policy language is also similar to that interpreted in Nudi Auto RV & Boat Sales, Inc. v. John Deere Insurance Co., 328 Ill.App.3d 523, 532, 262 Ill.Dec. 555, 765 N.E.2d 1163 (2002), where this court held that even though the title of an section of the insurance contract read “ ‘False Pretense Coverage’,” the relevant text of the provision contained no mention of any intent to defraud and the text of the provision stated that any auto acquired by the dealer was a covered auto under the “false pretense coverage.” ¶ 14 Pekin cites two statutory construction cases for the proposition that, in construing a statute, one should interpret any specific provision within the context of the entire statute including the statute headings under which the specific provisions appear.

  4. Exotic Motors v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co.

    597 S.W.3d 767 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 5 times
    Discussing Missouri's decades-old practice, its rationale, and its benefits

    For example, False Pretense Coverage under the Policy may apply where a dealer's customer drives away with a vehicle during a test-drive or, particularly relevant here, where the insured acquires physical possession but not legal title to the vehicle. See Shaffer, 903 S.W.2d at 606 (discussing situations where false pretense coverage may exist differentiated from where the insured receives neither physical nor legal possession); see also, e.g., Nudi Auto RV & Boat Sales, Inc. v. John Deere Ins. Co., 328 Ill.App.3d 523, 262 Ill.Dec. 555, 765 N.E.2d 1163, 1165–66, 1169–72 (2002) (finding false pretense coverage existed under nearly identical policy language, which the parties agreed presented no ambiguity, where an auto dealer purchased and received physical possession of vehicles from an auto broker who went out of business and never delivered the vehicles’ titles, which the auto dealer then had to procure from the auction house itself as the auto broker never had the titles); Heshion Motors, Inc. v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 5 Kan.App.2d 432, 618 P.2d 327, 330 (1980), judgment aff'd and modified, 229 Kan. 412, 625 P.2d 437 (1981) (noting coverage may exist for vehicles taken from an insured by means of false pretenses as long as the insured satisfied the exclusionary clause by having had valid title to—or, as modified, being due to receive valid title within fifteen days of delivery of—the covered auto prior to the loss). Having determined that there is no ambiguity, we enforce the Policy according its terms using their plain and ordinary meanings as unde

  5. Coal City Redi-Mix Co. v. Kavanaugh

    2014 Ill. App. 3d 130332 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)

    Coal City argues that Kavanaugh was divested of certain rights in the motorcycle once it served him with the citation. Therefore, since "a purchaser of a motor vehicle cannot receive any greater title or interest in a motor vehicle than the seller had at the time of the sale" (Nudi Auto RV & Boat Sales, Inc., v. John Deere Insurance Co., 328 Ill. App. 3d 523, 535 (2002) (citing Dan Pilson Auto Center v. Demarco, 156 Ill. App. 3d 617 (1987)), Coal City argues that any "rights transferred by Mr. Kavanaugh to Pontiac are subject to the citation lien, imposed by statute upon service." Simply put, Coal City argues that Kavanaugh could not grant Pontiac a greater interest in the motorcycle than he possessed.

  6. Board of Education v. International Ins. Co.

    344 Ill. App. 3d 106 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)   Cited 8 times
    Explaining that "notwithstanding is defined as without prevention or obstruction from or by; in spite of, despite, and it implies the presence of an obstacle ... notwithstanding, in essence wipes out anything to the contrary"

    Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240-41, 489 N.E.2d 867, 871 (1986). "`When all parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, the court is invited to decide the issues presented as a question of law'" Nudi Auto RV Boat Sales, Inc. v. John Deere Insurance Co., 328 Ill. App. 3d 523, 531, 765 N.E.2d 1163, 1169 (2002), quoting Container Corp. of America v. Wagner, 293 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 1091, 689 N.E.2d 259, 261 (1997). We review the trial court's entry of summary judgment de novo. Axen v. Ockerlund Construction Co., 281 Ill. App. 3d 224, 229, 666 N.E.2d 693, 696 (1996).