Opinion
02-CV-240S.
August 19, 2004
DECISION AND ORDER
1. Plaintiff James F. Notaro commenced the above-captioned action on March 28, 2002, by filing a Complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York. He alleges that Defendants Anthony M. Masiello and the City of Buffalo (the "Buffalo Defendants"), along with others, discriminated against him because of his political beliefs and associations, in violation of his rights under federal and state law.
Plaintiff's Complaint also names two other groups of defendants. First, Defendants Joel A. Giambra, Carl A. Calabrese, County of Erie, and Erie Community College (the "County Defendants"). Second, Defendants James Finamore, Buffalo Erie County Workforce Development Consortium, Inc., Workforce Development Board, Inc., and Buffalo Erie County Private Industry Council, Inc. (the "Workforce Defendants").
2. On January 30, 2004, the Buffalo Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court heard oral argument with respect to that motion on May 3, 2004, and reserved decision at that time.
The Buffalo Defendants filed a memorandum of law and supplemental memorandum of law in support of their motion. Plaintiff filed an affidavit, with attached exhibits and a memorandum of law, in opposition.
Also pending before this Court is a Joint Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the County Defendants and Workforce Defendants. (Docket No. 41). Oral argument with respect to that motion is scheduled for October 19, 2004.
3. Rule 12 (c) provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (c). Courts faced with motions under 12 (c) apply the same standard used to decide motions brought under Rule 12 (b). Patel v. Contemporary Classics of Beverly Hills, 259 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2001). The court "must accept all allegations in the complaint as true and draw all inferences in the non-moving party's favor." Id. The case cannot be dismissed unless the court "is satisfied that the complaint cannot state any set of facts that would entitle [plaintiff] to relief." Id.
4. The following facts, which are alleged in the Complaint, are assumed true for purposes of the instant motion. Plaintiff was a salaried member of the New York State Liberal Party from 1960 until 1986, serving as the party's Executive Director for nine years. In addition, Plaintiff has been a well-known supporter of and advisor to Dennis Gorski, formerly Erie County Executive.
During Gorski's tenure as County Executive, Plaintiff served as the director of an office of the Buffalo and Erie County Private Industry Council ("PIC"). PIC used federal funds to provide job training and other employment-related services to Erie County residents. During the late 1990s, a process was initiated whereby PIC was to be phased out and replaced by an organization called the Buffalo and Erie County Workforce Development Consortium, Inc. ("WDC").
In November 1999, Gorski, a Democrat, was defeated by Joel A. Giambra, a Republican. Giambra took office in January of 2000. In July of that year, Plaintiff was informed that his employment with PIC would be terminated on September 30, 2000.
At or around the time of his termination, Plaintiff contacted Defendant Masiello, Mayor of the City of Buffalo. Plaintiff told Masiello that he wanted to apply for a position as Deputy Director of WDC. Pursuant to an agreement between Masiello and Giambra, Masiello had been given the authority to fill the position. Masiello told Plaintiff that the position was going to be filled by a member of Masiello's staff. Unlike Plaintiff, that individual had no experience in the field of employment training.
5. Plaintiff asserts two causes of action in his Complaint. The first cause of action, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges that the Buffalo Defendants, along with others, interfered with his First Amendment right to hold political beliefs and engage in political associations. In the second cause of action, Plaintiff claims that the Buffalo Defendants, along with others, discriminated against him with respect to his employment because of his political activities, in violation of New York Labor Law § 201-d.
6. The Buffalo Defendants argue that the Complaint should be dismissed because it fails to state a valid cause of action against them under either § 1983 or Labor Law § 201-d. This Court will address each cause of action in turn.
7. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an individual whose constitutional rights have been violated by a person acting under color of state law may file a lawsuit in federal court seeking compensation.See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 403, 117 S. Ct. 2100, 138 L. Ed. 2d 540 (1997). In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim, "a plaintiff must prove that the challenged conduct was attributable at least in part to a person acting under color of state law, and that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Wimmer v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 176 F.3d 125, 137 (2d Cir. 1999).
8. The First Amendment protects, inter alia, freedom of speech, the right of peaceable assembly, and the right "to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court has held that "promotions, transfers, and recalls after layoffs based on political affiliation or support are an impermissible infringement on the First Amendment rights of public employees." Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 75, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 111 L. Ed. 2d 52 (1990). "The First Amendment prevents the government, except in the most compelling circumstances, from wielding its power to interfere with its employees' freedom to believe and associate, or to not believe and not associate." Id. at 76; see also African Trade Information Center, Inc. v. Abromaitis, 294 F.3d 355, 360-62 (2d Cir. 2002) (discussing Rutan).
9. A district court in this Circuit recently addressed a First Amendment claim brought under the Rutan doctrine. In that case, the plaintiff filed a § 1983 action after being disqualified as a candidate for a promotion. Thorsen v. County of Nassau 294 F. Supp. 2d 371, 378 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). The court ruled that the complaint failed to state a valid cause of action because it lacked "specific allegations of fact regarding the motivations . . . behind the [defendant's] decision to disqualify [the plaintiff]." Id. at 378. Specifically, the court found that the plaintiff failed to allege any facts showing that his membership in a particular party faction "was a substantial and improper factor in the [defendant's] decision to disqualify him." Id. The court further held that the plaintiff could make an actionable claim by alleging that the employment decision was made "on the basis of his constitutionally-protected ideological or political views." Id.
10. In the present case, the Buffalo Defendants argue that the facts alleged in the Complaint do not state a claim underRutan. Specifically, they contend that Plaintiff failed to allege facts showing that his political affiliation was a substantial and improper factor in Masiello's decision to hire someone else as Deputy Director of WDC. Further, the Buffalo Defendants assert that Plaintiff's claim should be dismissed because he has not alleged facts showing that he has constitutionally-protected viewpoints at odds with those of Defendant Masiello.
11. This Court will grant Defendant's motion insofar as it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's First Amendment claim. While aRutan-type claim might be reasonably inferred from the facts alleged in the Complaint, this Court, as well as the parties, would benefit from a more specific statement of the facts upon which Plaintiff bases his claim. Therefore, Plaintiff's First Amendment claim will be dismissed without prejudice and he will be granted leave to file an Amended Complaint. To state a valid First Amendment claim and survive a renewed Motion to Dismiss, the Amended Complaint must allege specific facts establishing that Plaintiff's political beliefs and associations were a substantial and improper factor in Defendant Masiello's decision. In addition, Plaintiff must allege facts indicating that he has constitutionally-protected viewpoints at odds with those of Defendant Masiello.
This is consistent with the procedure used by the court inThorsen, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 378.
12. The Buffalo Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiff's state law employment discrimination claim. In New York, it is unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire, discharge from employment, or otherwise discriminate against an individual because of that individual's "political activities" conducted outside of working hours. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d (2). The Buffalo Defendants offer two arguments in support of their motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Labor Law claim. First, they assert that Plaintiff has not alleged that he engaged in "political activities," as that term is defined under the Labor Law. Second, they contend that Plaintiff's claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. This Court will address each argument in turn.
13. Under New York Labor Law, the term "political activities" is defined as "(i) running for public office, (ii) campaigning for a candidate for public office, or (iii) participating in fund-raising activities for the benefit of a candidate, political party or political advocacy group." N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d (1)(a).
14. In the present case, Plaintiff has alleged that he was a long-time member and leader of the New York State Liberal Party, as well as an active supporter of former County Executive Dennis Gorski. Accepting those allegations as true for purposes of this motion, this Court finds that Plaintiff engaged in "political activities" as that term is defined under New York Labor Law.See Baker v. City of Elmira, 707 N.Y.S. 2d 513, 514-16 (N.Y.App.Div. 3d Dep't 2000) (finding that plaintiff engaged in political activities based upon past service as Republican City Chairperson); Richardson v. City of Saratoga Springs, 667 N.Y.S. 2d 995, 996-97 (N.Y.App.Div. 3d. Dep't 1998) (finding that plaintiff engaged in political activities by supporting employer's political opponent and expressing opposing political views).
15. The Buffalo Defendants also contend that Plaintiff's Labor Law claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Labor Law § 201-d does not include a specific limitations period for discrimination claims. In addition, counsel did not cite, and this Court could not find, any cases addressing the question presented here — what is the statute of limitations for a Labor Law § 201-d claim?
Plaintiff contends that his Labor Law claim is subject to the "catch-all" limitations period provided under § 213 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR"). That section provides for a six-year limitations period for "an action for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law." N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 213 (1). The Buffalo Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claim is subject to the statute of limitations set forth in CPLR § 217. That section provides for a four-month limitations period for "a proceeding against a body or officer." N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 217 (1).
Initially, the Buffalo Defendants argued that the one year statute of limitations period found in C.P.L.R. § 215 (3) applied to Plaintiff's Labor Law claim. However, counsel subsequently withdrew that argument. (Docket No. 35, at p. 4).
16. For the following reasons, this Court finds that Plaintiff's claim is untimely under another provision of New York law. Section 50-i of the New York General Municipal Law provides that:
Counsel for the Buffalo Defendants did not bring this section to this Court's attention. Rather, counsel for the County Defendants submitted a letter memorandum addressing this issue. (Docket No. 60). Plaintiff's counsel filed a letter memorandum in response. (Docket No. 62).
No action or special proceeding shall be prosecuted or maintained against a city . . . for personal injury, wrongful death or damage to real or personal property alleged to have been sustained by reason of the negligence or wrongful act of such city . . . or of any officer, agent or employee thereof . . . unless . . . the action or special proceeding shall be commenced within one year and ninety days after the happening of the event upon which the claim is based; except that wrongful death actions shall be commenced within two years after the happening of the death.
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-i (1) (emphasis added). This section of the General Municipal Law is "applicable notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of law, general, special or local, or any limitation contained in the provisions of any city charter." N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-i (2).
17. In his Labor Law § 201-d claim, Plaintiff seeks damages from the Buffalo Defendants for injuries suffered as a result of Defendant Masiello's alleged wrongful act, i.e. his decision to hire a less-qualified person as Deputy Director of WDC. This Court finds that this type of claim is subject to the one-year and ninety day limitations period set forth under General Municipal Law § 50-i. See Ruggiero v. Phillips, 739 N.Y.S. 2d 797, 799-800 (N.Y.App.Div. 4th Dep't 2002) (holding that libel claim against Village and police officer employed by Village was subject to limitations period set forth in General Municipal Law § 50-i); Ules v. City of Utica, 757 N.Y.S. 2d 421, 422 (N.Y.App.Div. 4th Dep't 2003) (finding that plaintiff's claim was governed by General Municipal Law § 50-i because it was "a plenary one seeking damages for the City's alleged denial of plaintiffs' civil rights or for some other unspecified tortious conduct or `wrongful act' by the City").
Defendant Masiello's alleged wrongful act occurred sometime during or around September 30, 2000. (Complaint, at ¶¶ 24, 22). This lawsuit was commenced on March 28, 2002, more than one year and ninety days later. As such, Plaintiff's Labor Law claim is untimely under General Municipal Law § 50-i.
18. For the foregoing reasons,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the Buffalo Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 27) is GRANTED.
FURTHER, that Plaintiff's first cause of action is DISMISSED as against the Buffalo Defendants without prejudice.
FURTHER, that Plaintiff's second cause of action is DISMISSED as against the Buffalo Defendants with prejudice.
FURTHER, that Plaintiff shall file with the Clerk of the Court and serve an Amended Complaint consistent with this Decision and Order on or before Wednesday, September 15, 2004.
SO ORDERED.