This Court has noted the general lack of credibility that should be assigned to recantation testimony in the context of an extraordinary motion for new trial, stating that such "[d]eclarations made after the trial are entitled to much less regard than sworn testimony delivered at the trial." Norwood v. State, 273 Ga. 352, 353 (2) ( 541 SE2d 373) (2001) (quoting Johnson v. State, 236 Ga. App. 764, 765 (1) ( 513 SE2d 291) (1999)). Trial testimony is closer in time to the crimes, when memories are more trustworthy.
This Court has noted the general lack of credibility that should be assigned to recantation testimony in the context of an extraordinary motion for new trial, stating that such "[d]eclarations made after the trial are entitled to much less regard than sworn testimony delivered at the trial." Norwood v. State, 273 Ga. 352, 353 (2) ( 541 SE2d 373) (2001) (quoting Johnson v. State, 236 Ga. App. 764, 765 (1) ( 513 SE2d 291) (1999)). Trial testimony is closer in time to the crimes, when memories are more trustworthy.
is merely impeaching of the trial testimony and does not establish a convicted defendant’s right to a new trial, even if the witness states under oath that his prior trial testimony was false. See Davis v. State, 283 Ga. 438 , 441 (3) (A) (660 SE2d 354 ) (2008); Norwood v. State, 273 Ga. 352 , 353 (2) (541 SE2d 373 ) (2001). The witness’ original testimony would be admissible against the defendant at any retrial, and that original testimony would have greater credibility than a later recantation.
A post-trial statement purporting to state that trial testimony was false is merely impeaching of the trial testimony and insufficient to require a new trial in the absence of evidence that the trial testimony was of the purest fabrication. Norwood v. State, 273 Ga. 352 ( 541 SE2d 373) (2001). Murphy's testimony at the motion for new trial hearing not only carries less weight because it is post-trial (id.), but it is also suspicious as Murphy only recanted when appellant came to be in the same prison cell block as Murphy.
(Res. Ex. 123, at 27.) The state habeas court quotes Norwood v. State, 273 Ga. 352 (2001): That a material witness for the State, who at the trial gave direct evidence tending strongly to show the defendant's guilt, has since the trial made statements even under oath that his former testimony was false, is not cause for a new trial.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Norwood v. State , 273 Ga. 352, 352–353 (2), 541 S.E.2d 373 (2001). Huff acknowledges this rule, and we decline his invitation to disapprove it. Moreover, the trial court expressly found that it "does not find credibility in Starr's recantation."
Ms. Bradham's testimony “regarding [Sapp's] post-trial statement is merely impeaching of [his] testimony and does not establish as fact that [it] was knowingly and wilfully false.” Norwood v. State, 273 Ga. 352(2), 541 S.E.2d 373 (2001). Moreover, Ms. Bradham's testimony was not so material that it would probably produce a different verdict, as Sapp's statement still would have placed Appellant at the scene of the crime, attempting to complete a purchase of cocaine, “making him equally guilty of felony murder.”
"A post-trial statement purporting to state that trial testimony was false is merely impeaching of the trial testimony and insufficient to require a new trial in the absence of evidence that the trial testimony was of the purest fabrication. Norwood v. State, 273 Ga. 352 ( 541 SE2d 373) (2001)." Cooper v. State, 287 Ga. 861, 862-863 (3) ( 700 SE2d 593) (2010) (new trial not warranted despite witness testimony at new trial hearing that his trial testimony was false and procured by prosecutor).
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Norwood v. State, 273 Ga. 352, 353 (2) ( 541 SE2d 373) (2001). Martinez was not convicted of perjury and Mejia failed to establish that his testimony was the purest fabrication.