Opinion
D078431
08-17-2022
JOSEPHINE S. NORTON et al., as Trustees, etc., Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Respondent, v. NENA JO HASKINS, Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant,
David A. Kay for Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant. Law Offices of Murray M. Helm, Jr., Murray M. Helm, Jr., and Mark A. Maasch for Plaintiffs, Cross-Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. 37-2018-00016874-CU-OR-CTL, Joel R. Wohlfeil, Judge. Affirmed.
David A. Kay for Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant.
Law Offices of Murray M. Helm, Jr., Murray M. Helm, Jr., and Mark A. Maasch for Plaintiffs, Cross-Defendants and Respondents.
O'ROURKE, ACTING P. J.
INTRODUCTION
The trial court entered a judgment against defendant Nena Jo Haskins in an equitable action filed against her by plaintiff Josephine S. Norton, which judgment we affirmed in Norton v. Haskins (Aug. 17, 2022, D077331 [nonpub. opn.] (Norton i)). Thereafter, the court issued an order awarding Norton her costs of $5,686.08. In this appeal challenging that order, Haskins contends the court erred by awarding Norton those costs because: (1) Norton untimely filed her memorandum of costs and did not timely request relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473; and (2) it should not have awarded Norton $2,000.76 for copying costs. As explained below, we affirm the order.
On August 3, 2022, we granted the motion filed by plaintiff, cross-defendant and respondent Josephine S. Norton to substitute Josephine S. Norton and Marilyn N. Orr, trustees of the Norton Family Trust dated January 30, 1980, as amended, in her place and stead, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.36(a). That motion was filed after briefing and oral argument in this appeal was complete. For the sake of clarity and symmetry with the trial court and appellate briefing, our references to Norton throughout this opinion refer to either Josephine S. Norton or the interest held by Josephine S. Norton and Marilyn N. Orr, trustees of the Norton Family Trust dated January 30, 1980, as amended, as appropriate in context. (See Voices of the Wetlands v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 499, 506, fn. 1.)
All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In her appellant's opening brief, Haskins requests that we take judicial notice of the reporter's transcript that was filed in Norton I, supra, D077331. We grant that request and take judicial notice of that reporter's transcript.
In April 2018, Norton filed the instant equitable action against Haskins and other defendants, seeking repayment of the $90,000 loan that she had made to Deane Haskins, Haskins's former and now deceased husband (Deane), the proceeds of which he had used to pay off an existing loan and trust deed encumbering the Tattersall property that was solely owned by Haskins. At the time of the bench trial in 2019, the following three operative causes of action alleged by Norton were for: (1) equitable subrogation (sixth cause of action); (2) equitable mortgage (seventh cause of action); and (3) unjust enrichment (ninth cause of action).
For a detailed discussion of the factual and procedural background of Norton's action against Haskins, refer to our opinion in Norton I, supra, D077331.
On December 19, 2019, the trial court issued a statement of decision, finding in Norton's favor on her causes of action for equitable mortgage and unjust enrichment, but reducing the amount of that equitable mortgage by the settlement amount Norton received from Deane's malpractice insurer. On March 13, 2020, the court entered its judgment awarding Norton an equitable mortgage in the amount of $62,016.25 on the Tattersall property. On March 19, Norton served a notice of entry of judgment on the parties.
On June 11, Norton filed a memorandum of costs, requesting a total costs award of $5,911.08. On June 29, Haskins filed a motion to strike or, alternatively, tax Norton's costs, arguing, among other things, that Norton's memorandum of costs was not timely filed. Haskins also argued that the amount of exhibit copying costs requested by Norton appeared to be excessive. On August 10, Norton filed her opposition to the motion to tax costs, arguing that to the extent her memorandum of costs may have been untimely filed, it was a mistake and requested that the court exercise its discretion under section 473 to consider that mistake as excusable neglect and deem the memorandum as timely filed.
On August 21, the court issued a minute order, confirming its tentative ruling and denying Haskins's motion to strike Norton's memorandum of costs as untimely filed, denying Haskins's motion to tax costs in part and granting it in part, and awarding Norton costs of $5,686.08. On September 8, the court entered an amended judgment, adding to the original judgment its award to Norton of her costs. On September 22, Norton served a notice of entry of the amended judgment on the parties.
DISCUSSION
I
Notice of Appeal Adequately Identified the Costs Order
At the outset, we first address Norton's assertion that Haskins's notice of appeal did not adequately identify the trial court's August 21, 2020 order awarding Norton her costs as being appealed and therefore her appeal should be dismissed.
A
Unless otherwise provided by law, a notice of appeal must be filed on or before the earliest of three dates: (1) 60 days after the court clerk serves a notice of entry of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment on the appellant; (2) 60 days after the appellant serves, or is served by the opposing party with, a notice of entry of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment; or (3) 180 days after entry of judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a).) If a notice of appeal is filed late, we lack jurisdiction over the appeal and must dismiss it. (Rule 8.104(b); Van Beurden Ins. Services, Inc. v. Customized Worldwide Weather Ins. Agency, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 51, 56 (Van Beurden Ins. Services, Inc.).)
All references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
A postjudgment order is generally appealable pursuant to section 904.1(a)(2). If a judgment or order is appealable, an appeal must be taken from that judgment or order or the right to appellate review is forfeited. (§ 906; In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 761, fn. 8.) In particular, a postjudgment order awarding costs is appealable and must be appealed separately from an appeal of either the judgment or an amended judgment incorporating the costs award. (Torres v. City of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 214, 222.)" 'When a party wishes to challenge both a final judgment and a postjudgment costs/attorney fee order, the normal procedure is to file two separate appeals: one from the final judgment, and a second from the postjudgment order.' [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
Rule 8.100(a)(2) states: "The notice of appeal must be liberally construed. The notice is sufficient if it identifies the particular judgment or order being appealed. . . ." In Luz v. Lopes (1960) 55 Cal.2d 54 (Luz), the court stated: "[I]t is and has been the law of this state that notices of appeal are to be liberally construed so as to protect the right of appeal if it is reasonably clear what [the] appellant was trying to appeal from, and where the respondent could not possibly have been misled or prejudiced." (Id. at p. 59.) Despite the rule of liberal interpretation, if a notice of appeal completely omits any reference to the judgment or order being appealed, the notice of appeal will be considered inadequate and the appeal must be dismissed. (In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 78-79 (J.F.); Colony Hill v. Ghamaty (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1172-1173 (Colony Hill); Norman I. Krug Real Estate Investments, Inc. v. Praszker (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 35, 47.)
B
Norton argues that we must dismiss Haskins's appeal of the August 21, 2020 order awarding her costs because Haskins's notice of appeal did not adequately identify that order as being appealed. We disagree.
1. Adequacy of notice of appeal.
Construing Haskins's notice of appeal liberally, we conclude that it adequately identified the order awarding Norton her costs as being the subject of her appeal. On November 6, 2020, Haskins filed a notice of appeal and designation of record, stating that she "appeals the Amended Judgment awarding costs entered on September 8, 2020." In that document, she also designated the record on appeal, including the reporter's transcript for only a single trial court hearing: "1. Proceedings on August 21, 2020. (Less than 1/2 day.)" As noted above, the amended judgment entered on September 8, 2020, amended the original judgment by simply adding an award to Norton of her costs.
On February 3, 2021, we sent the parties a letter noting that Haskins's notice of appeal did not reference, or attach a copy of, the August 21, 2020 order awarding Norton her costs. Our letter further noted that even if we were to liberally construe that notice of appeal as appealing the costs order, that appeal may not have been timely filed. We requested that the parties submit letters explaining whether Haskins's appeal was from an appealable judgment or order and whether her notice of appeal was timely filed.
In Haskins's letter responding to our questions, she conceded that her notice of appeal should have specifically identified the August 21, 2020 order as the order she was appealing, but requested that we liberally construe her notice of appeal as appealing that order. Regarding timeliness, she argued that a 180-day appeal period applied to her appeal because no notice of entry of the order, or filed-endorsed copy of that order, had been served within the meaning of rule 8.104(a)(1)(B), which would have triggered a shortened 60-day appeal period. Accordingly, Haskins asserted that her notice of appeal, filed on November 6, 2020, was timely filed within the 180-day appeal period after the August 21, 2020 order.
In Norton's letter responding to our questions, she noted that Haskins's notice of appeal specifically identified the September 8, 2020 amended judgment, and not the August 21, 2020 order, as being appealed and argued that we should not, as Haskins requested, liberally construe that notice of appeal as appealing the August 21, 2020 order. Regarding timeliness, Norton conceded that because she served on Haskins only a notice of ruling, and not a notice of entry as required by rule 8.104(a)(1)(B) for a shortened 60-day appeal period, Haskins's notice of appeal was timely filed.
On February 16, 2021, we sent the parties a letter, stating that the appeal would proceed and the parties could address the adequacy of the notice of appeal in their appellate briefing. In her appellant's opening brief, Haskins restates her request that we liberally construe her notice of appeal as appealing the August 21, 2020 order. Haskins argues that would be appropriate, "considering that the notice of appeal specifically mentioned the denial of the motion to tax costs." In her respondent's brief, Norton restates her argument that we should not liberally construe Haskins's notice of appeal as appealing the August 21, 2020 order and should instead dismiss her appeal as being only from the September 8, 2020 amended judgment.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Haskins's notice of appeal, filed on November 6, 2020, must be liberally construed as appealing the August 21, 2020 order awarding Norton her costs. First, although the notice of appeal specifically identified the September 8, 2020 amended judgment as being appealed, the notice of appeal described that amended judgment as "awarding costs." Furthermore, the only amendment to the original judgment that was made by the September 8, 2020 amended judgment was to add the award to Norton of her costs. Therefore, on its face, the notice of appeal referred to, if not specifically identified, the August 21, 2020 order awarding Norton her costs.
Second, to the extent there remained any ambiguity in Haskins's notice of appeal, her combined notice of appeal and designation of record clarified any such ambiguity. As stated above, Haskins designated a record that included the reporter's transcript for only a single trial court hearing-namely, the August 21, 2020 hearing. The record on appeal shows that the only order issued by the trial court at that August 21, 2020 hearing was the order confirming its tentative ruling granting in part and denying in part Haskins's motion to tax costs and awarding Norton her costs of $5,686.08.
Therefore, based on Haskins's combined notice of appeal and designation of record, we conclude that Norton was placed on notice that Haskins was appealing the August 21, 2020 order and could not possibly have been misled or prejudiced by the identification of the September 8, 2020 amended judgment as being the subject of her appeal. (Luz, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 59.) Contrary to Norton's apparent assertion, Haskins's notice of appeal did not completely omit any reference to the August 21, 2020 order as being appealed. (Cf. J.F., supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 78-79; Colony Hill, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1172-1173.) Accordingly, we conclude Haskins's notice of appeal adequately identified the August 21, 2020 order awarding Norton her costs as being the subject of her appeal.
2. Timeliness of appeal.
Although Norton apparently concedes that Haskins's notice of appeal was timely filed, we nevertheless briefly address that question because our jurisdiction over this case depends on a timely filed appeal. (Rule 8.104(b); Van Beurden Ins. Services, Inc., supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 56.) Our review of the record on appeal shows that neither the court clerk nor any party served a document entitled, "Notice of Entry," of the August 21, 2020 order within the meaning of rule 8.104(a)(1)(A) or (B). Rather, on August 24, 2020, Norton apparently served on Haskins a "notice of ruling," which stated that the trial court confirmed its August 19, 2020 tentative ruling at the August 21, 2020 hearing, but then attached only a copy of the trial court's August 19, 2020 tentative ruling awarding Norton her costs. Then, on August 26, Norton apparently served on Haskins a "revised notice of ruling," which again stated that the trial court confirmed its August 19, 2020 tentative ruling at the August 21, 2020 hearing, but then again attached only a copy of the trial court's August 19, 2020 tentative ruling awarding Norton her costs. The two notices of ruling served by Norton did not constitute service of either a "Notice of Entry" or a "filed-endorsed copy" of the August 21, 2020 order as required under rule 8.104(a)(1)(B) for a shortened 60-day appeal period to apply. Therefore, the default 180-day appeal period pursuant to rule 8.104(a)(1)(C) applied to Haskins's notice of appeal challenging the August 21, 2020 order. Because her notice of appeal was filed on November 6, 2020, it was timely filed within the applicable 180-day appeal period. Accordingly, we deny Norton's request that we dismiss Haskins's appeal.
II
Norton's Memorandum of Costs Was Timely Filed
Haskins contends that the trial court erred by denying her motion to strike and granting Norton her costs because Norton did not timely file her memorandum of costs.
A
On March 13, 2020, the trial court entered its judgment awarding Norton an equitable mortgage against the Tattersall property. On March 19, Norton served a notice of entry of judgment on the parties.
On June 11, Norton filed a memorandum of costs, requesting a total costs award of $5,911.08. On June 29, Haskins filed a motion to strike or, alternatively, tax Norton's costs, arguing that Norton's memorandum of costs was not timely filed. In particular, Haskins argued that Norton did not file her memorandum within the 15-day period required under rule 3.1700(a). Citing rule 3.1700(a)'s requirement that a memorandum of costs be filed within 15 days after service of a notice of entry of judgment, Haskins argued that Norton's June 11 filing was untimely, even after giving effect to the trial court's COVID-19 orders that deemed the period from March 17 through May 22 court holidays within the meaning of sections 12 and 12a. Haskins also noted that Norton had not requested an extension of the 15-day filing period, as permitted under rule 3.1700(b).
Norton opposed Haskins's motion to strike or, alternatively, tax her costs, arguing that her memorandum of costs was timely filed because the trial court's COVID-19 orders had the effect of staying the 15-day period for filing her memorandum. Norton argued that the court's COVID-19 orders had the effect of staying the 15-day filing period until May 26, which, with a 5-day extension for mailing her memorandum, made June 15 the deadline for filing her memorandum of costs. Norton further argued that to the extent her memorandum of costs may have been untimely filed, it was a mistake and requested that the court exercise its discretion under section 473 to consider that mistake as excusable neglect and nevertheless deem the memorandum as timely filed.
On August 19, the court issued its tentative ruling on Haskins's motion to strike or tax Norton's costs. Regarding the timeliness of Norton's filing, the court adopted Norton's argument that her filing was timely under rule 3.1700(a). The court noted that it was closed from March 17 until May 26 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which period was treated as a court holiday and thus excluded from the rule 3.1700(a) 15-day period calculation pursuant to sections 12 and 12a. The court tentatively concluded: "Thus, the deadline to serve and file a memorandum of costs was June 15, 2020 (15 days + 5 [days] for mail service after [May] 26). The subject memorandum was filed on June 11th and is timely." On August 21, the court issued a minute order, confirming its tentative ruling and, among other things, denying Haskins's motion to strike Norton's memorandum of costs as untimely filed.
B
As Haskins notes, rule 3.1700(a)(1) sets forth a general 15-day period for filing memoranda of costs, stating: "A prevailing party who claims costs must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of service of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk under . . . section 664.5 or the date of service of written notice of entry of judgment or dismissal, or within 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first. . . ." Importantly, however, rule 3.1700(b)(3) provides for extensions of that 15-day filing period, stating: "The party claiming costs and the party contesting costs may agree to extend the time for serving and filing the cost memorandum and a motion to strike or tax costs. ... In the absence of an agreement, the court may extend the times for serving and filing the cost memorandum or the notice of motion to strike or tax costs for a period not to exceed 30 days." (Italics added.)
When a trial court finds a memorandum of costs has been timely filed, a reviewing court can reasonably infer that the trial court exercised its discretion under rule 3.1700(b)(3) to extend that period on its own motion to the extent the general 15-day filing period may not have been met. In Cardinal Health 301, Inc. v. Tyco Electronics Corp. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 116 (Cardinal Health), we stated:
"We necessarily infer from the court's ruling [awarding respondent its costs] that it granted [the respondent] a 30-day extension to file the cost memorandum under Rule 3.1700(b)(3). Under this rule, a trial court may grant the extension on its own motion. [Citation.] The rule does not require that the party expressly request the extension, or that the court specifically state that it granted the extension. A trial court is presumed to know and understand the applicable law. [Citation.]
"Further, the court did not abuse its discretion in granting the extension. [The respondent's] memorandum of costs was filed two weeks after the statutory deadline. [The appellant] then filed a motion to tax and a reply brief, and had the full opportunity to challenge the cost motion at the hearing on the motion. [The appellant] never . . . suggested] any basis for the court to conclude [it] would be prejudiced if the court extended the date of the filing. On this record, there was no abuse of discretion." (Cardinal Health, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 155; see also, Adam v. DeCharon (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 708, 713 [trial court properly considered attorney fee motion that was untimely filed after 15-day filing period under its authority to extend filing period by 30 days].)
Assuming arguendo, without deciding, that the general 15-day period for Norton to file her memorandum of costs ended on May 26, 2020, we nevertheless infer that the trial court implicitly exercised its discretion under rule 3.1700(b)(3) to extend that filing period by 30 days (i.e., until June 25) and, based thereon, correctly found that Norton's filing of her memorandum of costs on June 11 was timely. (See Cardinal Health, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 155.) Contrary to Haskins's apparent argument, Norton was not required to request a 30-day extension from the court in order to obtain an extension, nor was the court required to expressly state that it was exercising its discretion under rule 3.1700(b)(3). (Ibid.) Rather, we may, and do, infer that, by finding Norton's memorandum was timely filed, the court implicitly exercised its discretion under rule 3.1700(b)(3) to extend Norton's filing deadline by an additional 30 days beyond the general 15-day period under rule 3.1700(a)(1). (Ibid.) Furthermore, given the uncertainty regarding the effect of the trial court's COVID-19 orders on rule 3.1700(a)(1)'s 15-day filing deadline, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by implicitly extending the filing deadline for Norton's memorandum of costs and then concluding it was timely filed. (Ibid.) Accordingly, we reject Haskins's argument that the court erred by denying her motion to strike Norton's memorandum of costs as untimely filed.
Because we dispose of this contention based on our application of rule 3.1700(b)(3) to the circumstances in this case, we need not, and do not, address Norton's alternative argument that the court also would have granted her relief under section 473 to the extent her untimely filing was the result of an excusable mistake.
III
Award of Copying Costs
Haskins contends the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Norton $2,000.76 for copying costs.
A
In her memorandum of costs, Norton requested, among other things, an award of $2,000.76 for the costs category of "[m]odels, enlargements, and photocopies of exhibits," and specified that those costs were incurred for "Trial Exhibits." In her motion to tax costs, Haskins argued that Norton's requested costs for trial exhibits was "not memorialized in any manner" and that she was provided with only "a recap" of those costs which Norton then claimed were necessary trial costs. Haskins argued that Norton had not shown those copying costs were necessary to the conduct of the litigation, rather than merely convenient or beneficial. She further argued that Norton did not show the "per copy" cost, or the number of pages copied, was reasonable. In a declaration in support of Haskins's motion to tax, her counsel stated that, based on his review of the "recap" of Norton's monthly accounting for copying costs provided to him by Norton's counsel, the $2,000.76 amount sought by Norton for copying costs represented 45.9 percent of her total copying costs during the period her counsel represented her.
In opposition to Haskins's motion to tax costs, Norton argued that all of the copying costs that she incurred during July and August 2019 (which totaled $2,000.76) were for "preparing exhibit binders for trial, including those exhibit[s] designated by Haskins as she did not copy and provide her exhibits in a manner that allowed for trial preparation despite repeated requests from Norton's counsel. The cost was 25 cents per page." Norton's counsel submitted a declaration stating that all of Norton's copying costs incurred during July and August 2019 (i.e., $2,000.76) were for preparation of trial exhibits. In her reply, Haskins argued that Norton had failed to provide her with receipts showing the actual costs that she incurred and therefore had not provided persuasive evidence showing her right to an award of those costs.
In its order granting in part and denying in part Haskins's motion to tax costs, the court stated regarding copying costs: "Cost item 12 [for trial exhibit copying costs] will not be taxed. The opposition [i.e., Norton] establishes the claimed copy charges related to the preparation of trial exhibits."
B
A prevailing party is generally entitled as a matter of right to an award of his or her costs. (§ 1032, subd. (b).) In particular, a prevailing party is entitled to costs incurred for "[m]odels, the enlargements of exhibits and photocopies of exhibits, and the electronic presentation of exhibits" if they were reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact. (§ 1033.5, subd. (a)(13).) Costs must be awarded only for exhibits and photocopies that were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation. (§ 1033.5, subd. (c)(2); Heppler v. J.M. Peters Co. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1265, 1298-1299 (Heppler)) However, costs for trial exhibits that were not ultimately presented to the trier of fact are not recoverable under section 1033.5, subdivision (c)(2), but those costs may still be awarded in the trial court's discretion under section 1033.5, subdivision (c)(4). (Segal v. ASICS America Corp. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 651, 657 (Segal).) On appeal, we review the trial court's award of costs for abuse of discretion. (Segal, at p. 658; Heppler, at p. 1298.)
C
In her appellant's opening brief, Haskins makes a conclusory argument, without citation to any supporting case or other legal authority, that Norton's copying costs of $2,000.76 for trial exhibits was excessive. Rather, Haskins simply provides her own suggested calculation for what copying costs she believes were necessary for Norton to incur. In particular, Haskins argues that there were 1,094 pages of exhibits presented at trial and, assuming only three sets of exhibit binders were necessary for trial (i.e., one for each side and the court), at a copying cost of 25 cents per page, the total copying costs should have been no greater than $820.50. Based on her suggested calculation, Haskins argues the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Norton $2,000.76 for her trial exhibit copying costs and should have awarded, at most, only $820.50.
In her respondent's brief, Norton argues that Haskins's suggested calculation of her necessary copying costs was based on faulty assumptions and was not presented to the trial court in support of her motion to tax costs. Norton notes that Haskins's primary argument below was instead that Norton had not provided her with actual receipts in support of her requested copying costs. Norton then notes that the trial court rejected that argument, finding that she had "established] the claimed copy charges related to the preparation of trial exhibits." Norton then argues that Haskins has not carried her burden on appeal to show the court abused its discretion by awarding Norton $2,000.76 for trial exhibit copying costs. We agree.
As Norton notes, a memorandum of costs need not include supporting documentation if counsel verifies that the requested costs are correct and necessarily incurred. (Bach v. County of Butte (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 294, 307-308 (Bach).) If counsel so verifies the memorandum of costs, that memorandum is considered prima facie evidence that the costs requested were necessarily incurred. (Id. at p. 308.) "There [is] no requirement that copies of bills, invoices, statements or any other such documents be attached to the memorandum . . . ." (Ibid.) Likewise, a trial court may decide a costs award based on a counsel's declaration submitted in support of the requested costs, which declaration summarized those costs. (Cf. City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 784-785 (City of Colton) [regarding attorney fee award based on summary, and without attachment, of time records and billing statements in counsel's declaration].) Norton also notes that four, not three, trial exhibit binders were prepared (i.e., one each for the plaintiff, defendant, trial court, and witness).
Based on our review of the record, we conclude Haskins has not carried her burden on appeal to show that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion to tax the $2,000.76 amount requested by Norton for her trial exhibit copying costs. (Segal, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 658 [abuse of discretion standard of review applies to award of costs]; Heppler, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 1298 [same].) Rather, in deciding the amount and necessity of the copying costs that she incurred, we conclude the court reasonably relied on the declaration of Norton's counsel that all of Norton's copying costs incurred during July and August 2019 (i.e., $2,000.76) were for preparation of trial exhibits. (Bach, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at pp. 307-308; City of Colton, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785.) Accordingly, we affirm its award to Norton of her total costs of $5,686.08.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Norton shall recover her costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: IRION, J., DO, J.