The evidence does not conclusively show that there was a consideration to support the release in evidence; the case was one, that at least should go to the jury. Watkins v. Junker, 4 Texas Civ. App. 626[ 4 Tex. Civ. App. 626]; Helms v. Crane, 4 Texas Civ. App. 89[ 4 Tex. Civ. App. 89]; Franklin Ins. Co. v. Velleneuve, 25 Texas Civ. App. 356[ 25 Tex. Civ. App. 356], 29 Texas Civ. App. 128[ 29 Tex. Civ. App. 128]; Daugherty v. Herndon, 65 S.W. 891, 27 Texas Civ. App. 125[ 27 Tex. Civ. App. 125]; Bahrenburg v. Conrad Schoop Fruit Co. (Mo.), 107 S.W. 440; Tucker v. Dolan, 8 Am. Rep., 546; Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Blasingame, 38 Texas Civ. App. 402[ 38 Tex. Civ. App. 402]; Fire Ins. Association v. Wickham, 141 U.S. 564. MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the court.
" See, also, Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Blasingame (Tex. Civ. App.) 85 S.W. 819 and Berry v. American Cent. Ins. Co. of St. Louis, supra. It is, of course, unnecessary for the insurer to show that its alleged defense was, in fact, a valid defense at the time of the compromise, and it may be relieved if it in good faith believed it had a good defense, but the mere statement at the time of settlement that a dispute exists is not enough.
In statements of the rule we find the word "undisputed" nearly always coupled with the word "liquidated." Hunt on Accord and Satisfaction, § 72; Frazier v. Ray, supra; Farmers' Mechanics' Life Assoc. v. Caine, 224 Ill. 599, 79 N.E. 956; Harms v. Fidelity Casualty Co., 172 Mo. App. 241, 157 S.W. 1046; Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Blasingame, 38 Tex. Civ. App. 402, 85 S.W. 819; Rauen v. Prudential Life Ins Co., 129 Iowa, 725, 106 N.W. 198. Joyce says ("Insurance," § 3465a), there is "not a liquidated demand * * * where there is a dispute whether liability under it exists."
And this rule was proper even before the adoption of the new rules of civil procedure in Texas, which generally are more liberal toward sustaining verdicts of the lower courts. West Texas Coaches v. Madi, Tex.Com.App., 26 S.W.2d 199; Thornton v. Moody, Tex.Civ.App., 24 S.W. 331 (error refused); Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Blasingame, 38 Tex. Civ. App. 402, 85 S.W. 819 (error refused); Ward v. . Cathey, Tex.Civ.App., 210 S.W. 289 (error refused). Finding no reversible error in the record before us, the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed.
There are many decisions in this state in which it was recognized that to render the expression of an opinion an element of actionable fraud there must exist the fact of bad faith. Only a few may be listed as follows: Bank of Washington v. San Benito R. G. V. Ry. Co., Tex. Civ. App. 293 S.W. 599; Towns v. Traders General Ins. Co., Tex. Civ. App. 107 S.W.2d 460; O'Brien v. Von Lienen, Tex. Civ. App. 149 S.W. 723; Means v. Limpia Royalties, Tex. Civ. App. 88 S.W.2d 1080; J. S. Curtiss Co., Inc. v. White, Tex. Civ. App. 90 S.W.2d 1095; Traders General Ins. Co. v. Cole, Tex. Civ. App. 108 S.W.2d 864; Lipscomb v. Houston Electric Co., Tex. Civ. App. 149 S.W.2d 1042; Bankers' Health Accident Co. of America v. Shadden, Tex. Civ. App. 15 S.W.2d 704; Northwestern Life Ass'n v. Findley, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 494, 68 S.W. 695; Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Blasingame, 38 Tex. Civ. App. 402, 85 S.W. 819. Some cases may be found which without discussion of any distinction applied the rule relating to representations of fact, but wherein it appears it could have been reasonably contended that the representation was a matter of opinion. Of these in addition to Graves v. Hartford Accident, etc., Co., supra, 138 Tex. 589, 161 S.W.2d 464, may be mentioned Cowan v. El Paso Electric R. Co., Tex.Com.App., 271 S.W. 79; Gulf States Security Life Ins. Co. v. Edwards, Tex. Civ. App. 109 S.W.2d 1125. Of course these decisions are of little aid here.
Since the judgment finds support on one ground of negligence, the error of the court in improperly submitting another ground of negligence alleged was harmless. Thornton v. Moody (Tex. Civ. App.) 24 S.W. 331 (error refused); Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Blasingame et al., 38 Tex. Civ. App. 402, 85 S.W. 819 (error refused); Ward et ux. v. Cathey (Tex. Civ. App.) 210 S.W. 289 (error refused); Yoes v. Texas P. Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 211 S.W. 311; Eastern Texas Elec. Co. v. Hunsucker (Tex. Civ. App.) 230 S.W. [817] 819.'" West Texas Coaches, Inc. v. Madi (Tex.Com.App.) 26 S.W.2d 199, 202.
All these contentions are fully answered by the following well-settled rule: "Since the judgment finds support on one ground of negligence, the error of the court in improperly submitting another ground of negligence alleged was harmless. Thornton v. Moody (Tex.Civ.App.) 24 S.W. 331 (error refused); Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Blasingame et al., 38 Tex. Civ. App. 402, 85 S.W. 819 (error refused); Ward et ux. v. Cathey (Tex.Civ.App.) 210 S.W. 289 (error refused); Yoes v. T. P. Ry. Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 211 S.W. 311; Eastern Texas Elec. Co. v. Hunsucker (Tex.Civ.App.) 230 S.W. 817, 819." West Texas Coaches, Inc., v. Madi, et al. (Tex.Com.App.) 26 S.W.2d 199, 202.
It is well recognized that a claim under a life insurance policy, after the death of the insured, is a liquidated demand, and that an agreement to settle for less than the face value of the policy, in the absence of a good-faith dispute as to the liability of the insurer, is without consideration, and that under such circumstances a settlement for less than the face value of the policy will not bar an action to recover the balance due thereunder. 24 Tex.Jur. 1168; Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Blasingame, 38 Tex. Civ. App. 402, 85 S.W. 819 (writ refused); Cox v. Bankers' Guaranty Life Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 45 S.W.2d 390, par. 9; First Texas Prudential Ins. Co. v. Connor (Tex. Civ. App.) 209 S.W. 417; Franklin Ins. Co. v. Villeneuve, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 356, 60 S.W. 1014; Detroit Belt Lacer Co. v. Fowler Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 4 S.W.2d 651; Simms Oil Co. v. American Refining Co. (Tex.Com.App.) 288 S.W. 163.
Since the judgment finds support on one ground of negligence, the error of the court in improperly submitting another ground of negligence alleged was harmless. Thornton v. Moody (Tex.Civ.App.) 24 S.W. 331 (error refused); Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Blasingame et al., 38 Tex. Civ. App. 402, 85 S.W. 819 (error refused); Ward et ux. v. Cathey (Tex.Civ.App.) 210 S.W. 289 (error refused); Yoes v. T. P. Ry. Co (Tex.Civ.App.) 211 S.W. 311; Eastern Texas Elec. Co. v. Hunsucker (Tex.Civ.App.) 230 S.W. 819. Appellant complains of the action of the trial court in overruling a special exception to appellee's petition.
We are of the opinion, however, that there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on this issue, and will not disturb their finding thereon. This case thus comes clearly within the rules announced in Franklin Ins. Co. v. Villeneuve, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 128, 68 S.W. 203; N.W. Life Ins. Co. v. Findley, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 494, 68 S.W. 695; Ins. Co. v. Blasingame, 38 Tex. Civ. App. 402, 85 S.W. 819; Accident Ins. Co. v. Miller (Tex.Civ.App.) 193 S.W. 750; Fire Ins. Co. v. Wickham, 141 U.S. 577, 12 S.Ct. 84, 35 L.Ed. 860. Under this view of the case the trial court could properly have given a peremptory instruction to the jury to find for the appellee.