Northwestern Human Services, Inc. v. Panaccio

11 Citing cases

  1. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Lincow

    715 F. Supp. 2d 617 (E.D. Pa. 2010)   Cited 32 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding insurers were not required to prove they actually relied on health care providers' misrepresentations to succeed on a § 4117 claim against the providers

    . . ." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Midtown Med. Ctr. Inc., No. 02-2789, 2007 WL 3224542 at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2007) (citing Northwestern Human Servs., Inc. v. Panaccio, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19147 at *15-16, *18-19 (E.D. Pa. 2004)). As noted in Hecht, a RICO act proximately causes injury if it was a "substantial factor in the sequence of responsible causation, and if the injury is reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural consequence."

  2. In re Le-Nature's, Inc., Commercial Litigation

    No. 9-MC-162, No. 9-CV-430 (W.D. Pa. May. 13, 2010)

    Magnum v. Archdiocese of Phila., No. 6-2589, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84123, at *25 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2006).Northwestern Human Servs., Inc. v. Panaccio, 03-157, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19147 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2004), on which Defendants also rely, is similarly distinguishable. That case involved medicare fraud, and the alleged injuries — legal fees and civil penalties — were, as the present Defendants put it, "fallout" rather than an integral part of the alleged scheme.

  3. In re Le-Nature's, Inc., Commercial Litigation

    No. 9-MC-162, No. 9-CV-469 (W.D. Pa. May. 13, 2010)   Cited 1 times
    Denying a motion to dismiss because the complaint alleged enough to "suggest proximate cause"

    Magnum v. Archdiocese of Phila., No. 6-2589, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84123, at *25 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2006).Northwestern Human Servs., Inc. v. Panaccio, 03-157, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19147 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2004), on which Defendants also rely, is similarly distinguishable. That case involved medicare fraud, and the alleged injuries — legal fees and civil penalties — were, as the present Defendants put it, "fallout" rather than an integral part of the alleged scheme.

  4. In re Le-Nature's, Inc.

    NO. 9-MC-162, NO. 9-CV-469 (W.D. Pa. May. 6, 2010)

    Magnum v. Archdiocese of Phila., No. 6-2589, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84123, at *25 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2006).Northwestern Human Servs., Inc. v. Panaccio, 03-157, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19147 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2004), on which Defendants also rely, is similarly distinguishable. That case involved medicare fraud, and the alleged injuries — legal fees and civil penalties — were, as the present Defendants put it, "fallout" rather than an integral part of the alleged scheme.

  5. In re Le-Nature's, Inc.

    No. 9-MC-162, No. 9-CV-430 (W.D. Pa. May. 6, 2010)

    Magnum v. Archdiocese of Phila., No. 6-2589, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84123, at *25 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2006).Northwestern Human Servs., Inc. v. Panaccio, 03-157, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19147 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2004), on which Defendants also rely, is similarly distinguishable. That case involved medicare fraud, and the alleged injuries — legal fees and civil penalties — were, as the present Defendants put it, "fallout" rather than an integral part of the alleged scheme.

  6. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Midtown Med. CTR

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-7389 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2007)   Cited 2 times

    Plaintiffs counter that proximate cause exists when "the RICO plaintiff's interest are the direct target of the alleged scheme. . . ." Northwestern Human Servs., Inc. v. Panaccio, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19147 at *15-16. *18-19 (E.D.Pa. 2004) (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)). The Court agrees that the Plaintiffs were the target of the scheme thereby creating a direct relation between the injuries asserted and the injurious conduct.

  7. In re Exxon Mobil Corp. Securities Litigation

    Civil Action No. 04-1257 (FLW) (D.N.J. Sep. 19, 2005)

    In addition, the Second, Seventh and Eighth Circuits, as well as several district courts within the Third Circuit, have held that Sarbanes-Oxley cannot be applied retroactively and does not revive claims that were time-barred prior to its enactment. See In re Interpool, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 04-321, 2005 WL 2000237, slip op. at *19, n. 11 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2005); In re Enterprise Mortgage Acceptance Co., Sec. Litig., 391 F.3d 401, 410 (2d Cir. 2004); In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 1435356, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 28, 2004); Lieberman v. Cambridge Partners, L.L.C., 2004 WL 1396750, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Jun. 21, 2004); L-3 Communications Corp. v. Clevenger, 2004 WL 1941248, at *5-6 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 31, 2004); Northwestern Human Services, Inc. v. Panaccio, 2004 WL 2166293, at *17 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 24, 2004); see also In re ADC Telecommunications, Inc. Sec. Litig., 409 F.3d 974, 978 (8th Cir. 2005); Foss v. Bear, Stearns Co., Inc., 394 F.3d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 2005).See discussion infra at 19-20.

  8. In re Exxon Mobil Corp. Securities Litigation

    387 F. Supp. 2d 407 (D.N.J. 2005)   Cited 30 times

    In addition, the Second, Seventh and Eighth Circuits, as well as several district courts within the Third Circuit, have held that Sarbanes-Oxley cannot be applied retroactively and does not revive claims that were time-barred prior to its enactment. See In re Interpool, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 04-321, 2005 WL 2000237, slip op. at *19, n. 11 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2005); In re Enterprise Mortgage Acceptance Co., Sec. Litig., 391 F.3d 401, 410 (2d Cir. 2004); In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 1435356, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 28, 2004); Lieberman v. Cambridge Partners, L.L.C., 2004 WL 1396750, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Jun. 21, 2004); L-3 Communications Corp. v. Clevenger, 2004 WL 1941248, at *5-6 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 31, 2004); Northwestern Human Services, Inc. v. Panaccio, 2004 WL 2166293, at *17 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 24, 2004); see also In re ADC Telecommunications, Inc. Sec. Litig., 409 F.3d 974, 978 (8th Cir. 2005); Foss v. Bear, Stearns Co., Inc., 394 F.3d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 2005).See discussion infra at 19-20.

  9. In re Reading Broadcasting, Inc.

    390 B.R. 532 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008)

    The heightened requirements involved with pleading fraud are tempered not only by a flexible approach to the rules of federal civil procedure, Craftmatic Securities Litigation v. Kraftsow, 890 F.2d at 645-46 (remedy for failing to conform with Rule 9(b) is to allow amendment of the complaint to provide greater specificity, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15); see District Council 47 v. Bradley, 795 F.2d 310, 316 (3d Cir.1986); Wright & Miller, 5A Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1298 (2008), but also in those circumstances "[w]here it can be shown that the requisite factual information is peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge or control." Northwestern Human Services, Inc. v. Panaccio, 2004 WL 2166293, at *8 (E.D.Pa.2004).

  10. In re Reading Broadcasting, Inc.

    390 B.R. 532 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008)

    The heightened requirements involved with pleading fraud are tempered not only by a flexible approach to the rules of federal civil procedure, Craftmatic Securities Litigation v. Kraftsow, 890 F.2d at 645-46 (remedy for failing to conform with Rule 9(b) is to allow amendment of the complaint to provide greater specificity, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15); see District Council 47 v. Bradley, 795 F.2d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 1986); Wright Miller, 5A Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1298 (2008)), but also in those circumstances "[w]here it can be shown that the requisite factual information is peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge or control." Northwestern Human Services, Inc. v. Panaccio, 2004 WL 2166293, at *8 (E.D. Pa. 2004). This approach to application of Rule 9 is particularly appropriate when a fraud claim is brought by a bankruptcy trustee.