Opinion
No. 52856-4-I
Filed: April 18, 2005 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Skagit County. Docket No: 03-2-01154-4. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 08/13/2003. Judge signing: Hon. George N. Bowden.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Rosetta J. Sanz (Appearing Pro Se), c/o 6630 Bayview Edison Road, Bow, WA 98232.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Kent Millikan, Attorney at Law, 3411 Colby Ave, Everett, WA 98201-4709.
Rosetta Sanz appeals the judgment and writ of restitution in favor of Northwest Plus Credit Union (NWPCU) in this unlawful detainer action. We affirm.
Northwest Plus Credit Union was formerly known as Northwest Telco Credit Union.
The following facts are based on the unchallenged findings of fact. In October 1999, Sanz borrowed $51,800 from NWPCU and executed a note in favor of NWPCU. The note was secured by a deed of trust to a home and real property located in Skagit County at 6630 Bayview Edison Rd., Bow, Washington. Home Street Bank had a first deed of trust on the property. Beginning in February 2002, Sanz defaulted in making the monthly payments of $510 to NWPCU. NWPCU commenced a deed of trust foreclosure proceeding under chapter 61.24 RCW by a notice of default in April 2002 and a notice of foreclosure and notice of trustee's sale in June 2002. The original trustee's sale date of September 13, 2002 was postponed four times because Sanz filed and then later dismissed four separate Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions. Sanz failed to cure the default in payments or commence an action to stop the trustee's sale before the June 27, 2003 sale date.
Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 808, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).
NWPCU was the highest bidder at the sale and holds title to the property by virtue of a trustee's deed of foreclosure sale, dated July 2, 2003 and recorded July 7, 2003. NWPCU was entitled to possession on July 17, 2003 under RCW 61.24.060. Sanz refused to vacate the property and refused NWPCU's request to inspect the property. She attempted to convey her interest in the property by warranty deed to Dover E. Perry, dated and recorded on July 16, 2003. Perry then attempted to convey the property by warranty deed to Brande Tanner, "[t]rustee for the Rose Clan," dated and recorded July 21, 2003. Tanner then attempted to lease the property back to Sanz.
On July 17, 2003, NWPCU filed a complaint for unlawful detainer to obtain possession of the property from Sanz. Perry and Tanner attempted to intervene and dismiss the action based on their claimed interest in the property. NWPCU sought a prejudgment writ of restitution. Following a hearing, on August 1, 2003, the trial court ordered that a writ of restitution be issued, restoring NWPCU to possession of the property. The order required a bond of $5,000. At a subsequent hearing on August 8, 2003, Sanz argued that the notice she received was defective, that NWPCU was not the legal owner of the property, that Sanz discharged NWPCU's interest in the property, that NWPCU was not a valid purchaser of a trustee sale, and that NWPCU had no legal or equitable interest in the property. The court found that the record clearly indicated Sanz had received adequate statutory notice and that Sanz's challenge was not timely. The court approved the bond, ordered the writ should issue, and denied the motion to intervene.
Sanz argued the notice was defective because it did not include notice of foreclosure to occupants or tenants. See RCW 61.24.040(9). But Sanz admitted that as of June 27, 2003, the date of the trustee's sale, she was the owner of the property.
Sanz testified at trial that she discharged the debt through a wire transfer, but the evidence established that the transfer never occurred and NWPCU received no money.
Sanz refused to vacate and remained in possession of the property at the time of trial on August 13, 2003. As a result, NWPCU had incurred damages of the reasonable rental value of $60.00 per day from July 18, 2003 to August 13, 2003. Sanz had also defaulted in payment on her first mortgage loan on the property, which was in foreclosure with a balance owing of approximately $180,000.
The court concluded: that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; that Sanz's right, title and interest in the property terminated as of the June 27, 2003 trustee's sale and July 2, 2003 trustee's deed, subject only to Sanz's obligation to vacate the property by July 17, 2003; that neither Sanz nor any other occupant had any right, title or interest in the property and no right to possession; that under RCW 61.24.060 and 59.12.030(1) Sanz was guilty of unlawful detainer; that NWPCU was entitled to damages under RCW 59.12.170, although the court declined to award double damages authorized by statute; that Sanz's defenses failed, as she had received all required notices and any claims or defenses were waived; and that NWPCU was entitled to its attorney fees and costs under the note and deed of trust provisions. The court confirmed the prejudgment writ of restitution, dismissed all motions filed by the intervenors, and entered judgment for NWPCU.
Sanz appeals. She contends that the note and second deed of trust were void from their inception because they violated RCW 31.12.415(1), a statute she describes as restricting state chartered credit unions from making loans secured by second deeds of trust. Sanz did not raise this argument in the trial court. We decline to consider it for the first time on appeal. Moreover, as NWPCU correctly notes, the statute was repealed in 1997.
Except for a few narrow exceptions, an appellate court will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal. Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 117 Wn.2d 772, 780, 819 P.2d 370 (1991).
Laws of 1997, ch. 397, sec. 88.
Sanz raises multiple other issues for the first time in her reply brief. In many instances it is difficult to discern the nature of the challenge, and her arguments are unsupported by the record or applicable legal authority. We decline to consider them.
In re Marriage of Sacco, 114 Wn.2d 1, 5, 784 P.2d 1266 (1990) (an appellate court will not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief); Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d at 809 (an appellate court will not consider an assignment of error unsupported by citation of authority).
Affirmed.
COLEMAN, KENNEDY and COX, JJ.