A right of first refusal is often referred to as a preemptive right because “it allows the holder to preempt a sale to an interested third party, and requires the landowner to offer the property to the right holder on the same terms.” Northern Plains Alliance, L.L.C. v. Mitzel, 2003 ND 91, ¶ 14, 663 N.W.2d 169. We have further explained:

It also affirmed dismissal of intentional interference with contract claims when the contract was not breached, the second essential element of an intentional interference with contract claim. See Berger, 2023 ND 171, ¶ 48 (affirming summary judgment dismissing intentional interference with a contract claims when the construction contract and construction loan agreement were not breached); N. Plains All., L.L.C. v. Mitzel, 2003 ND 91, ¶ 23, 663 N.W.2d 169 ("Because there was no breach, an essential element of [plaintiff's] intentional interference with contract claim is missing and summary judgment was appropriate."); Soentgen v. Quain &Ramstad Clinic, P.C., 467 N.W.2d 73, 84 (N.D. 1991) ("Because Q &R did not breach its contract with Soentgen, the trial court properly granted summary judgment on this [interference with contract] claim."). And it has affirmed dismissal of intentional interference with a contract claims when, as a matter of law, the defendant's action was justified because the defendant was asserting a legal right.

"By" sounds like a condition, "at" like a term of performance. A good out-of-state case illustrating what we have been saying is Northern Plains Alliance, L.L.C. v. Mitzel , 663 N.W.2d 169 (N.D. 2003). The case involved a right of first refusal (RFR) in a divorce decree.

Berry–Iverson Co. of N.D., Inc. v. Johnson, 242 N.W.2d 126, 130 (N.D.1976); see also77 Am. Jur. 2d Vendor and Purchaser § 27 (2015). A right of first refusal is often referred to as a preemptive right because “it allows the holder to preempt a sale to an interested third party, and requires the landowner to offer the property to the right holder on the same terms.” Northern Plains Alliance, L.L.C. v. Mitzel, 2003 ND 91, ¶ 14, 663 N.W.2d 169. We have further explained:

[¶ 14] The Deckerts rely on a series of cases holding that acceptance of an option for the sale of land converts the option into a binding executory contract of sale, and payment of the purchase price is merely performance of the executory contract. See, e.g., Northern Plains Alliance, L.L.C. v. Mitzel, 2003 ND 91, ¶ 16, 663 N.W.2d 169; Kuhn v. Hamilton, 117 N.W.2d 81, 83 (N.D.1962); Horgan v. Russell, 24 N.D. 490, 496, 140 N.W. 99, 101 (1913). But these cases did not involve an option agreement like the one in this case which required tender of the full purchase price as the method for exercising the option.

[¶ 5] Summary judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56 is a procedural device for promptly and expeditiously disposing of an action without a trial if either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and no dispute exists as to either the material facts or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, or if resolving the factual disputes will not alter the result. Fish v. Dockter, 2003 ND 185, ¶ 7, 671 N.W.2d 819;Northern Plains Alliance, L.L.C. v. Mitzel, 2003 ND 91, ¶ 8, 663 N.W.2d 169. The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that, under applicable principles of substantive law, the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Collette v. Clausen, 2003 ND 129, ¶ 6, 667 N.W.2d 617.

Collette v. Clausen, 2003 ND 129, ¶ 9, 667 N.W.2d 617. Summary judgment is a "procedural device for promptly and expeditiously disposing of an action without a trial if either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and no dispute exists as to either the material facts or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, or if resolving the factual disputes will not alter the result." Northern Plains Alliance v. Mitzel, 2003 ND 91, ¶ 8, 663 N.W.2d 169 (citing Skjervem v. Minot State Univ., 2003 ND 52, ¶ 4, 658 N.W.2d 750). The moving party must establish there is no genuine issue of material fact and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mitzel, at ¶ 8.

The Supreme Court of North Dakota has held that "[w]hen parties enter into an agreement for the sale of property which is expressly subject to a right of first refusal by a third party, the contract is conditional and becomes binding on the seller only if the right of first refusal is not exercised." N. Plains All., L.L.C. v. Mitzel, 663 N.W.2d 169, 172 (N.D. 2003) (first citing Houtchens v. United Bank of Colo. Springs, N.A., 797 P.2d 814, 815 (Colo. App. 1990) ; and then citing Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council, Inc., 976 P.2d 1213, 1217 (Utah 1999) ); see also DePetrillo v. Belo Holdings, Inc., 45 A.3d 485, 493 (R.I. 2012) ("[DePetrillo]'s purchase and sale agreement with Belo expressly made [DePetrillo]'s rights to the parcel subject to Citadel's right of first refusal—DePetrillo's interest in the property was not to vest until Citadel waived its option to purchase the tower and transmission site. Citadel, instead, exercised its right of first refusal; as a result, the purchase and sale agreement between plaintiff and Belo was terminated and DePetrillo's rights to the property were extinguished."). "