Northern Indiana Transit, Inc. v. Burk

64 Citing cases

  1. New York Central Railroad v. Glad

    242 Ind. 450 (Ind. 1962)   Cited 32 times
    In New York Central Railroad Company v. Glad, 242 Ind. 450, 179 N.E.2d 571 (1962), the Supreme Court of Indiana held that where the evidence clearly shows that the plaintiff has violated a statute which creates a duty for the protection of the plaintiff and the accident was a result of such violation, he is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

    It is conclusively shown by undisputed evidence that plaintiff-appellee violated the duty prescribed by ยง 47-2114, supra, by proceeding onto the crossing when appellant's train was "plainly visible" and in "hazardous proximity to the crossing" and before he could "do so safely." Generally, the violation of a duty prescribed by statute or ordinance is negligence per se or as a matter of law. Northern Indiana Transit, Inc. v. Burk et al. (1950), 228 Ind. 162, 2. 172, 89 N.E.2d 905, 17 A.L.R.2d 572; Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. et al. v. Wilson (1948), 226 Ind. 1, 5, 77 N.E.2d 580; Indiana, Bloomington and Western Railway Company et al. v. Barnhart (1888), 115 Ind. 399, 16 N.E. 121; Prest-O-Lite Company v. Skeel (1914), 182 Ind. 593, 106 N.E. 365, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 474; Rimco Realty Investment Corporation v. LaVigne et al. (1943), 114 Ind. App. 211, 50 N.E.2d 953; Larkins v. Kohlmeyer (1951), 229 Ind. 391, 398, 98 N.E.2d 896; Rentschler v. Hall (1947), 117 Ind. App. 255, 261, 264, 69 N.E.2d 619; Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. Briggs (1942), 112 Ind. App. 360, 369, 42 N.E.2d 367. Exceptions to this general rule have been recognized in Indiana where compliance with the provisions of the statute or ordinance was impossible or non-compliance was excusable.

  2. New York Central Railroad v. Cavinder

    141 Ind. App. 42 (Ind. Ct. App. 1965)   Cited 42 times
    In New York Central Railroad Company v. Cavinder, 141 Ind. App. 42, 211 N.E.2d 502 (1965), we find a most comprehensive and accurate statement of the law of proximate cause.

    proximate cause of an injury so as to impose liability therefor unless the consequence was one which, in the light of attending circumstances, ought, could, or should reasonably have been foreseen or anticipated. Northern Ind. Transit, Inc. v. Burk (1950), 228 Ind. 162, 176, 177, 89 N.E.2d 905, 17 A.L.R.2d 592; Swanson v. Slagal, Administratrix, supra (1937), 212 Ind. 394, 413, 414, 8 N.E.2d 993; Phares v. Carr (1952), 122 Ind. App. 597, 603, 106 N.E.2d 242 (Transfer denied); McIntosh v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (1942), 111 Ind. App. 550, 559, 38 N.E.2d 263. 21 Ind. Law Encyc., Negligence, ยง 65, p. 325. Where there is an independent responsible agency intervening between the defendant's negligence and the injury, the question whether the original negligence is the proximate cause of 5. the injury is to be determined by whether the agency might have been reasonably expected under the circumstances to intervene in such a way as to be likely to produce an injury similar to the one actually caused.

  3. Pontious v. Littleton

    146 Ind. App. 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 1970)   Cited 23 times
    In Pontious v. Littleton, 146 Ind. App. 369, 255 N.E.2d 684 (1970), the defendant against whom judgment was rendered in a bench trial on a property damage claim contended that the plaintiff had violated right-of-way statutes of the state of Indiana and, therefore, was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.

    The court, in the Glad case, further said: "Generally, the violation of a duty prescribed by statute or ordinance is negligence per se or as a matter of law. Northern Indiana Transit, Inc. v. Burk et al. (1950), 228 Ind. 162, 172, 89 N.E.2d 905, 17 A.L.R.2d 572; Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. et al. v. Wilson (1948), 226 Ind. 1, 5, 77 N.E.2d 580; Indiana, Bloomington and Western Railway Company et al. v. Barnhart (1888), 115 Ind. 399, 16 N.E. 121; Prest-O-Lite Company v. Skeel (1914), 182 Ind. 593, 106 N.E. 365, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 474; Rimco Realty Investment Corporation v. LaVigne et al. (1943), 114 Ind. App. 211, 50 N.E.2d 953; Larkins v. Kohlmeyer (1951), 229 Ind. 391, 398, 98 N.E.2d 896; Rentschler v. Hall (1947), 117 Ind. App. 255, 261, 264, 69 N.E.2d 619; Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. Briggs (1942), 112 Ind. App. 360, 369, 42 N.E.2d 367. "Exceptions to this general rule have been recognized in Indiana where compliance with the provisions of the statute or ordinance was impossible or non-compliance was excusable.

  4. Pierce v. United States

    718 F.2d 825 (6th Cir. 1983)   Cited 11 times

    Where there is an independent responsible agency intervening between the defendant's negligence and the injury, the question whether the original negligence is the proximate cause of the injury is to be determined by whether the agency might have been reasonably expected under the circumstances to intervene in such a way as to be likely to produce an injury similar to the one actually caused. Northern Ind. Transit, Inc. v. Burk, supra (1950), 228 Ind. 162, 175-177, 89 N.E.2d 905, 17 A.L.R.2d 592; Engle, Admr. v. Director General Railroads (1922), 78 Ind. App. 547, 551, 133 N.E. 138 (Transfer denied); 21 Ind. Law Encyc., Negligence, ยง 67, p. 331. Generally, where harmful consequences are brought about by intervening independent forces the operation of which might have been reasonably foreseen, then the chain of causation extending from the original wrongful act to the injury is not broken by the intervening and independent forces and the original wrongful act is treated as a proximate cause.

  5. Brandes v. Burbank

    613 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1980)   Cited 17 times
    Acknowledging that violation of a regulation can be treated as negligence per se or simply as evidence of a violation subject to rebuttal

    The substantive law of the state of Indiana is that which we must apply in this case, and if we assume that the district court correctly charged in Instruction No. 12 that a violation of the federal regulation was negligence as a matter of law, we might, at least under some existing Indiana authority which has not been overruled come quickly to the conclusion in that Instruction No. 14 was erroneous. This, in Northern Indiana Transit, Inc. v. Burk, 228 Ind. 162, 89 N.E.2d 905, 909 (1950) the court stated: When the breach of a statutory duty is held to be negligence per se, or negligence as a matter of law, the court holds that the legislature has created an absolute duty, which cannot be escaped by attempting to prove that the breach was in fact done in the exercise of due care.

  6. Kurowsky v. Deutsch

    533 N.E.2d 1210 (Ind. 1989)   Cited 9 times
    Analyzing Baller by Baller, 490 N.E.2d 382

    Appellant argues that he is a child and, under this Court's holding in Bixenman v. Hall (1968), 251 Ind. 527, 242 N.E.2d 837, is entitled to have his conduct, alleged to be in violation of a traffic regulation, judged on the basis of a child's standard of care and free of any presumption of negligence. An analysis of this instruction commences with the law of negligence applicable to the conduct of adults which violates a statute or ordinance enacted for the purpose of safety announced in Northern Indiana Transit v. Burk (1950), 228 Ind. 162, 89 N.E.2d 905. This Court considered a traffic regulation requiring vehicles to be stopped or parked within twelve inches of the curb.

  7. Reuille v. Bowers

    409 N.E.2d 1144 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 12 times
    In Reuille v. Bowers (1980), Ind. App., 409 N.E.2d 1144, at 1154, this Court quoted the Indiana Supreme Court case of Davison v. Williams, (1968) Ind., 242 N.E.2d 101 at 105.

    However, as a safety statute, Ind. Code 9-4-1-69(a)(2) should receive a reasonable construction and interpretation. Northern Indiana Transit, Inc. v. Burk (1950), 228 Ind. 162, 89 N.E.2d 905; Doering v. Walters (1923), 80 Ind. App. 194, 140 N.E. 74;Eberhart v. Abshire (7th Cir. 1946), 158 F.2d 24 (a traffic safety statute, unlike a penal statute, should be construed liberally.) 26 I.L.E., Statutes ยง 171.

  8. Poplawski v. Huron Clinton Auth

    78 Mich. App. 644 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977)   Cited 4 times
    In Poplowski v Huron Clinton Metropolitan Authority, 78 Mich. App. 644; 260 N.W.2d 890 (1977), lv den with disclaimer of Court of Appeals analysis, 402 Mich. 882 (1978), this Court stated that Zeni should not be read so broadly, and that an "excuse" instruction should be given only where there is some evidence from which a jury could infer that a statute violation was excusable.

    Therefore, until explicitly told otherwise by the Supreme Court, we limit Zeni v Anderson to its facts and find it inapplicable to this case.Alarid v Vanier, 50 Cal.2d 617; 327 P.2d 897 (1958), Northern Indiana Transit, Inc v Burk, 228 Ind. 162; 89 N.E.2d 905 (1950), Herman v Muhs, 256 Iowa 38; 126 N.W.2d 400 (1964), Snook v Long, 241 Iowa 665; 42 N.W.2d 76 (1950), Kisling v Thierman, 214 Iowa 911; 243 N.W. 552 (1932), Tarr v Keller Lumber Construction Co, 106 W. Va. 99; 144 S.E. 881 (1928), Landry v Hubert, 101 Vt. 111; 141 A 593 (1928). See also, Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 Col L Rev 21 (1949).

  9. Smith v. Chesapeake Ohio R.R. Co.

    160 Ind. App. 256 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974)   Cited 19 times

    "Where there is an independent responsible agency intervening between the defendant's negligence and the injury, the question whether the original negligence is the proximate cause of the injury is to be determined by whether the agency might have been reasonably expected under the circumstances to intervene in such a way as to be likely to produce an injury similar to the one actually caused. Northern Ind. Transit, Inc. v. Burk, supra (1950), 228 Ind. 162, 175-177, 89 N.E.2d 905, 17 A.L.R. 2d 592; Engle, Admr. v. Director General Railroads (1922), 78 Ind. App. 547, 551, 133 N.E. 138 (Transfer denied). 21 Ind. Law Encyc., Negligence, ยง 67, p. 331.

  10. Jenkins v. City of Fort Wayne

    139 Ind. App. 1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1965)   Cited 10 times
    In Jenkins v. City of Fort Wayne (1966), 139 Ind. App. 1, 212 N.E.2d 916, two instructions were held to be prejudicial because they included misstatements of the law.

    The rule in Indiana is clearly stated in New York Central 2. Railroad Co. v. Glad (1962), 242 Ind. 450, at pages 457-458, 179 N.E.2d 571, as follows: "Generally, the violation of a duty prescribed by statute or ordinance is negligence per se or as a matter of law. Northern Indiana Transit, Inc. v. Burk et al. (1950), 228 Ind. 162, 172, 89 N.E.2d 905, 17 A.L.R.2d 572; Hayes Freight Lines, et al., Inc. v. Wilson (1948), 226 Ind. 1, 5, 77 N.E.2d 580; Indiana, Bloomington and Western Railway Company et al. v. Barnhart (1888), 115 Ind. 399, 16 N.E. 121; Prest-O-Lite Company v. Skeel (1914), 182 Ind. 593, 106 N.E. 365, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 474; Rimco Realty Investment Corporation v. LaVigne et al. (1943), 114 Ind. App. 211, 50 N.E.2d 953; Larkins v. Kohlmeyer (1951), 229 Ind. 391, 398, 98 N.E.2d 896; Rentschler v. Hall (1947), 117 Ind. App. 255, 261, 264, 69 N.E.2d 619; Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. Briggs (1942), 112 Ind. App. 360, 369, 42 N.E.2d 367. "Exceptions to this general rule have been recognized in Indiana where compliance with the provisions of the statute or ordinance was impossible or noncompliance was excusable.