Opinion
No. 05-02-00184-CV.
Opinion issued January 14, 2003.
Appeal from the 68th District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. DV99-04238-C.
AFFIRMED.
Before Justices WRIGHT, BRIDGES, and O'NEILL.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant asserts the trial court erred in refusing to order Appellee to turn over a vehicle in his possession. We affirm the trial court's order denying turnover.
The facts are known to the parties, so we do not recite them here. We review the trial court's turnover order for an abuse of discretion. Criswell v. Ginsberg Foreman, 843 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, no writ). The turnover statute provides a procedural remedy for judgment creditors, but it is not intended to alter the substantive rights of the parties. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 31.002 (Vernon Supp. 2003); Cross, Kieschnick Co. v. Johnston, 892 S.W.2d 435, 438 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1994, no writ) (citing Cravens, Dargan Co. v. Peyton L. Travers Co., 770 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied)).
Because the parties' substantive rights to the vehicle could not be determined in a turnover proceeding, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying turnover of the vehicle. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order denying turnover.
Resolving NENB's challenge to the turnover order as we do, we need not reach NENB's issues asserting that the cross-collateralization clause in the vehicle loan was effective to secure Cloud's liability as guarantor for the Oxford loan. Also, the turnover order recites that Cloud agreed to turn over certain designated shares of stock. No issue is raised concerning substantive rights in that stock and our decision does not affect the trial court's recitation of Cloud's voluntary surrender of the stock.