See e.g., Walden v. Mosley, 312 F. Supp. 855 (N.D.Miss. 1970) (petitioner not allowed to raise issue of Fourth Amendment violations by the asylum state); North v. Koch, 169 Colo. 508, 457 P.2d 915 (1969) (petitioner not allowed to raise issue of Miranda violations); Martin v. Maryland, 287 A.2d 823 (D.C.App. 1972) (petitioner not allowed to raise issue of Fourth Amendment violations); Commonwealth v. Kulp, 225 Pa. Super. 345, 310 A.2d 399 (1973) (petitioner not allowed to raise issue Fourth Amendment violations); Reeves v. Cox, 118 N.H. 271, 385 A.2d 847 (1978) (petitioner not allowed to raise issue of Miranda violations); Cobb v. Gilman, 271 Ind. 223, 391 N.E.2d 618 (1979) (petitioner not allowed to raise issue of Miranda violations); Utt v. State, 293 Md. 271, 443 A.2d 582 (Ct.App. 1982) (petitioner not entitled to Sixth Amendment right of counsel at extradition hearing). Despite its overwhelming acceptance, however, the principles enunciated in Flood are not unassailable, for it is true that the Flood rule would theoretically permit the asylum state to violate the petitioner's constitutional rights, and if any evidence garnered by the asylum state is not ultimately utilized by the
White v. Rickets, 684 P.2d 239, 242 (Colo. 1984); Ryan v. Cronin, 191 Colo. 487, 553 P.2d 754 (1976); Crumrine v. Erickson, 186 Colo. 139, 526 P.2d 148 (1974); McGill v. Leach, 180 Colo. 331, 505 P.2d 374 (1973); North v. Koch, 169 Colo. 508, 457 P.2d 915 (1969). As we noted in White v. Rickets, the "intervention by the judiciary into the administration of corrections programs by executive officials is reserved for most serious violations of fundamental rights, and an allegation to that effect is essential to any claim for habeas corpus relief."
In habeas corpus proceedings, judicial inquiry generally is limited to an investigation of the validity of petitioner's confinement at the time of the hearing. Ryan v. Cronin, supra; Crumrine v. Erickson, 186 Colo. 139, 526 P.2d 148 (1974); McGill v. Leach, 180 Colo. 331, 505 P.2d 374 (1973); North v. Koch, 169 Colo. 508, 457 P.2d 915 (1969). Petitioner alleges only that the place of his confinement should be altered.
However, we have also held that all criminal procedural rights or rules do not apply to such cases. See, e.g., Eathorne v. Nelson, 180 Colo. 288, 505 P.2d 1 (1973) (petitioner not entitled to have tainted in-court identification suppressed); Luker v. Koch, 176 Colo. 75, 489 P.2d 191 (1971) (petitioner cannot raise questions of sanity or incompetency as those issues relate to guilt or innocence); North v. Koch, 169 Colo. 508, 457 P.2d 915 (1969) (petitioner not entitled to have statement to police regarding his whereabouts suppressed where he did not have counsel present at the time he made the statement). Habeas corpus proceedings involving extradition are summary in nature and have a limited purpose. Massey v. Wilson, 199 Colo. 121, 605 P.2d 469 (1980).
The only questions which may be presented to the court by the habeas corpus petition are whether the prisoner is lawfully detained and whether the requirements of extradition have been met. See North v. Koch, 169 Colo. 508, 457 P.2d 915 (1969). A dismissal of the extradition proceeding does not prevent the state from later reinstituting the matter.
See Michigan v. Doran, supra. Since the extradition hearing is not designed to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused and is summary in nature, the accused is not entitled to all of the procedural protections of a criminal trial. See Eathorne v. Nelson, 180 Colo. 288, 505 P.2d 1 (1973) (finding admissible allegedly tainted identification testimony); North v. Koch, 169 Colo. 508, 457 P.2d 915 (1969) (finding admissible statement allegedly obtained in violation of Miranda rights); People ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 47 Ill. 2d 103, 264 N.E.2d 198 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995, 91 S.Ct. 1243, 28 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (fruits of an allegedly illegal search admitted). "The responsibility for a full and fair trial on the merits rests on the damanding state."
[3,4] Second, a habeas corpus proceeding is civil in nature and is conducted for the purpose of determining whether a person in custody is lawfully detained. North v. Koch, 169 Colo. 508, 457 P.2d 915 (1969). A habeas corpus proceeding is not filed as part of an extradition proceeding, but is filed as an independent civil action.
[4] The essential purpose to be served with a writ of habeas corpus is to resolve the issue of whether a person is unlawfully detained. Eathorne v. Nelson, 180 Colo. 288, 505 P.2d 1 (1973); Hithe v. Nelson, 172 Colo. 179, 471 P.2d 596 (1970); North v. Koch, 169 Colo. 508, 457 P.2d 915 (1969). [5] We have repeatedly declared that the writ of habeas corpus may not be used as a substitute for an appeal and that a hearing on a writ of habeas corpus may not be used as a basis for reviewing issues resolved by another court. King v. Tinsley, 158 Colo. 99, 405 P.2d 689 (1965); Johnson v. Tinsley, 155 Colo. 346, 394 P.2d 842 (1964).
In Wilkerson v. Vogt, 167 Colo. 109, 445 P.2d 715 (1968), we considered and disposed of the argument made by Rush and held that extradition cannot be defeated by contending that the transaction which gave rise to the criminal charges in the demanding state was not fraudulent and that criminal processes have been activated to effectuate collection of a civil debt. Accord, White v. Leach, 188 Colo. 62, 532 P.2d 740; Eathorne v. Nelson, 180 Colo. 288, 505 P.2d 1 (1973); Osborne v. VanCleave, 173 Colo. 26, 475 P.2d 625 (1970); North v. Koch, 169 Colo. 508, 457 P.2d 915 (1969); Holmes v. People, 169 Colo. 371, 456 P.2d 731 (1969); Fox v. People, 161 Colo. 163, 420 P.2d 412 (1966); Self v. People, 133 Colo. 524, 297 P.2d 887 (1956). [3,4] In the interests of comity and speedy resolution of extradition matters, the inquiry by the courts of Colorado, the asylum state, in a habeas corpus proceeding, is severely restricted, and Rush is left to pursue his remedies in the courts of Arizona, the demanding state.
C.R.S. 1963, 60-1-13. North v. Koch, 169 Colo. 508, 457 P.2d 915 (1969); Buhler v. People, 151 Colo. 345, 377 P.2d 748 (1963); Oates v. People, 136 Colo. 208, 315 P.2d 196 (1957). [2,3] Another procedural error which is noted, in the hope that both defense counsel and prosecutors will heed, was the initial designation of the governor as the respondent.