" It is insisted that Rem. Rev. Stat., ยง 7448 [P.C. ยง 3226], as interpreted in North Spokane Irrigation Dist. v. Spokane County, 173 Wn. 281, 22 P.2d 990, is unconstitutional, as it contravenes the following provisions of our state constitution: "The power of taxation shall never be suspended, surrendered or contracted away.
While "tax money heretofore collected validly cannot be refunded simply on the basis of the retroactive repeal" (italics ours), Yakima v. Huza, 67 Wn.2d 351, 359, 407 P.2d 815 (1965), this limitation on legislative power does not apply before the taxes have been collected. See Snow's Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Morgan, 80 Wn.2d 283, 292, 494 P.2d 216 (1972) (the "legislature had the power to cut off the tax liability at any stage"); North Spokane Irrig. Dist. 8 v. Spokane Cy., 173 Wn. 281, 283, 22 P.2d 990 (1933) ("the state, through its legislature, may abolish . . . a tax lien of any kind"). This court's most recent decision involving Const. art. 8, ยงยง 5 and 7 indicates that a tax may be repealed retroactively so long as the repeal does not require an expenditure of public funds.
Also, "[i]t is undoubtedly the rule that the state, through its legislature, may abolish or legislate out of existence a tax lien of any kind." North Spokane Irrig. Dist. 8 v. Spokane Cy., 173 Wn. 281, 283, 22 P.2d 990 (1933). In this case, we should hold the State did not have a vested right to collect inheritance taxes that had accrued at the date of decedent's death but were not yet due.
No person or municipality can acquire, as against the state, a vested right to taxes, or the right to insist upon the collection of taxes when levied. See also North Spokane Irr. Dist. 8 v. Spokane County, 173 Wn. 281, 22 P.2d 990 (1933), holding that the legislature may abolish a tax lien. The question remains whether the legislature intended to abolish the right to assess and levy ad valorem taxes in the year 1969, when it enacted Laws of 1969, Ex. Ses., ch. 225.
"Every person having color of title made in good faith to vacant and unoccupied land, who shall pay all taxes legally assessed thereon for seven successive years, he or she shall be deemed and adjudged to be the legal owner of said vacant and unoccupied land to the extent and according to the purport of his or her paper title. . . ." Appellant irrigation district contends that, under the rule announced by this court in North Spokane Irr. Dist. v. Spokane County, 173 Wn. 281, 22 P.2d 990, the deed from the county treasurer to the irrigation district of July 25, 1928, conveyed the title free from all liens and encumbrances, including all state and county tax liens existing at the time of the transfer; that, consequently, there were no state or county taxes which would constitute a basis for the tax foreclosure proceedings instituted June 1, 1928; that the decree of the court, the foreclosure sale, and the deed to the county issued in pursuance of this judgment, are nullities; and that the county acquired no title which it could convey to the plaintiffs. [1] We think the judgment of the trial court was correct and should be affirmed.
" [3] Respondent's first contention relative to the constitutional question is answered by our decisions in North Spokane Irrigation Dist. v. Spokane County, 173 Wn. 281, 22 P.2d 990, and Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v. Benton County, 179 Wn. 1, 35 P.2d 1109. In the first case it appeared that land upon which there were delinquent water assessments was "struck off" to the irrigation district by the county treasurer under the provisions of Rem. Rev. Stat., ยง 7444 [P.C. ยง 3222].
Upon the foregoing facts, which were supported by his proof, appellant insists that he made out a case grounded in fraud. To begin with, he argues that the deed from the county treasurer to the irrigation district cancelled the lien of the general taxes under the decision of this court in North Spokane Irr. Dist. v. Spokane County, 173 Wn. 281, 22 P.2d 990. His conclusion is that the representations to the contrary, which induced him to employ respondent as his attorney for the purpose of procuring a reduction of such taxes, were false. [1] That appellant relied upon these representations and, in consequence, suffered damage, can hardly be questioned.
We submit the following authorities in support of this proposition. Gasaway v. Seattle (Wash.) 100 P. 991; North Spokane Irrigation District v. Spokane County, 22 P.2d 990; Ledegar v. Bockoven, 185 P. 1097; White v. Knowlton, 84 Minn. 141; White v. Thomas (Minn.) 98 N.W. 101; Gould v. Grout, 125 N.W. 273; Dancy Drainage Dist. v. Bond. Co., 225 N.W. 873.
It is admitted that state taxes levied and unpaid for the statutory period would not be discharged by the port districts act. We are also satisfied that any such conveyance by the county to the district would not offend against Art. XI, ยง 9, supra, or violate any constitutional right of appellant, as the legislature may abolish or legislate out of existence a tax lien of any kind. Gasaway v. Seattle, 52 Wn. 444, 100 P. 991; North Spokane Irr. Dist. v. Spokane County, 173 Wn. 281, 22 P.2d 990. Further, it does not appear herein that, by such conveyance to the district, the county and the state will not eventually receive as much money, to be credited to the various funds, as they would had the property not been so conveyed.
We think that sections 41 and 55 of the general revenue law were amended by implication, by section 29 1/2 of the irrigation district law, and that the tax deeds given by the county under said sections 41 and 55 do not convey absolute title, but that such conveyance is burdened with the irrigation district lien unless the assessments have been paid. The following cases are authority for the proposition that the legislature can constitutionally so provide: Howie v. Panola-Quitman Drainage District, 168 Miss. 387, 151 So. 154; Bolton v. Terra Bella Irrigation District, 106 Cal.App. 313, 289 P. 678; La Mesa Lemon Grove and Spring Valley Irrigation District v. Hornbeck, 216 Cal. 730, 17 P.2d 143; North Spokane Irrigation District v. Spokane County, 173 Wn. 281, 22 P.2d 990; Yakima County v. Stephens, 177 Wn. 601, 33 P.2d 93. Appellants discount the value of some of these cases as authority because the word "tax" is used, rather than "assessment," and rely on the distinction made in the Walker river irrigation district case.