North American Pump Corp. v. Clay Equipment Corp.

29 Citing cases

  1. Olander v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

    317 F.3d 807 (8th Cir. 2003)   Cited 13 times
    Holding that the Termination Review Provision did not make the Termination Provision ambiguous

    The Supreme Court of North Dakota has also applied the rule to personal services contracts, under which agents and professionals who are not employees provide ongoing services of indefinite duration. See N. Am. Pump Corp. v. Clay Equip. Corp., 199 N.W.2d 888, 894 (N.D. 1972) (exclusive agency agreement to sell equipment); Myra Found. v. Harvey, 100 N.W.2d 435, 437 (N.D. 1959) (bookkeeping services). That the Supreme Court of North Dakota would apply the general rule to Section III.A. of the State Farm Agent's Agreement is confirmed by Wadeson v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 343 N.W.2d 367, 371 (N.D. 1984).

  2. Swanson v. Larson

    2021 N.D. 216 (N.D. 2021)   Cited 4 times

    [¶18] "This court has held that where parties enter into an agreement by the terms of which one party is to perform services for the other, and the contract neither expressly nor impliedly fixes the time of its duration, it may be terminated by either party by the giving of notice to the other." N. Am. Pump Corp. v. Clay Equip. Corp., 199 N.W.2d 888, 894 (N.D. 1972) (citing Myra Found. v. Harvey, 100 N.W.2d 435, 437 (N.D. 1959)). In this state, the "general rule establishes that [an] [a]greement's silence as to its duration is, without more, an unambiguous declaration that it is terminable at will by either party."

  3. Keller v. Bolding

    2004 N.D. 80 (N.D. 2004)   Cited 17 times
    Stating that evidentiary imprecision on the amount of damages does not preclude recovery

    [¶ 21] Evidentiary imprecision on the amount of damages does not preclude recovery. As this Court said in the syllabus inNorth Am. Pump Corp. v. Clay Equip. Corp., 199 N.W.2d 888, 891 (N.D. 1972): 6. Where damages obviously have been suffered and there is no definite evidence available for an exact determination of the amount of damages resulting from a breach of contract, the best evidence which the circumstances will permit is all the law requires.

  4. Bergquist-Walker Real Est. v. Wm. Clairmont

    333 N.W.2d 414 (N.D. 1983)   Cited 21 times
    In Bergquist-Walker Real Estate v. William Clairmont, 333 N.W.2d 414, 418 (N.D. 1983), this court held that "[i]f there is any possibility that an oral contract is capable of being completed within one year, the contract is not within the statute of frauds even though it is clear that the parties may have intended and thought it probable that the contract would extend over a longer period, and even though the contract does so extend."

    He points to the evidence of one sale of Tyler property by Walker for which he was to receive a commission of $600 and argues that the jury could very well have multiplied the grouping of lots to be sold by the amount of the commission realized in one case and this would result in a figure that the jury could conclude would be Walker's initial damages. In support of his position, Walker refers us to a previous decision of this court in North American Pump Corp. v. Clay Equipment Corp., 199 N.W.2d 888 (N.D. 1972), in which the court held that uncertainty as to the amount of damages does preclude recovery and that if a reasonable basis for computing the approximate amount of damages is provided, that is all the law requires. In that case the court further stated:

  5. Johnson v. Auran

    214 N.W.2d 641 (N.D. 1974)   Cited 25 times
    Discussing the sufficiency of a note or memorandum to constitute a contract which meets the requirements of the statute of frauds

    They do not change the principle stated in Goetz. See Buettner v. Nostdahl, 204 N.W.2d 187 (N.D. 1973); North American Pump Corp. v. Clay Equipment Corp., 199 N.W.2d 888 (N.D. 1972); Rieger v. Rieger, 175 N.W.2d 563 (N.D. 1970); Tostenson v. Ihland, 147 N.W.2d 104 (N.D. 1966); Keen v. Larson, 132 N.W.2d 350 (N.D. 1964). We have reviewed the parol evidence which was admitted and conclude that such evidence did not add to or vary the terms of Exhibit B; rather, it attempted to explain and make certain the existing ambiguous terms of Exhibit B by referring to circumstances under which it was made.

  6. Olander v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

    278 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 2002)   Cited 1 times

    And the Supreme Court of North Dakota has applied the principle to other types of personal services contracts. See Myra Foundation v. Harvey, 100 N.W.2d 435, 437 (N.D. 1960), followed in North Amer. Pump Corp. v. Clay Equip. Corp., 199 N.W.2d 888, 894 (N.D. 1972). Applying South Dakota law, which includes a statute virtually identical to § 34-03-01, we held in Martin v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 553 F.2d 573, 574 (8th Cir. 1977), that an insurance agency contract having no fixed term was terminable at will by either party. That is the general rule.

  7. ANR Western Coal Development Co. v. Basin Electric Power Cooperative

    276 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 2002)   Cited 14 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding actor acted with sufficient intent for claim of tortious interference where it had knowledge that its accounting advice would undercut the defendant's contractual right to receive royalties

    Uncertainty as to the amount of damages does not preclude recovery, and mathematical certainty as to the amount of recovery is not necessary. If a reasonable basis for computing an approximate amount of damages is provided, that is all that the law requires.N. Am. Pump Corp. v. Clay Equip. Corp., 199 N.W.2d 888, 895-96 (N.D. 1972), quoted in Symington v. Mayo, 590 N.W.2d 450, 454 (N.D. 1999). WCDC has offered sufficient proof that the delayed development was wrongful, and because the delay-rental-payback payments are tied to the rate of coal development, WCDC has sustained damages. Moreover, the pro-rata method, applied to the tonnage of WCDC royalty-bearing coal wrongfully displaced by Coteau's preferential mining of Dakota Star, provides a reasonable basis for computing WCDC's delay-rental-payback damages.

  8. Leland Oil & Gas, LLC v. Azar

    Case No. 1:14-cv-161 (D.N.D. Feb. 27, 2017)

    "[W]here damage obviously has been suffered, but there is no definite evidence available for an exact determination of the amount of damage resulting from a breach of contract, the best evidence which the circumstances will permit is all the law requires."Langer, at ¶ 27 (quoting Livinggood, at ¶ 8); see also Schirado, at ¶ 17; Keller, at ¶ 21; North Am. Pump Corp. v. Clay Equip. Corp., 199 N.W.2d 888, 891 Syll. ¶ 6 (N.D.1972). This Court has therefore concluded that, in cases "where the amount of damages may be hard to prove, the amount of damages is to be left to the sound discretion of the finder of facts."

  9. Johnson v. Buskohl Constr. Inc.

    2015 N.D. 268 (N.D. 2015)   Cited 7 times

    Whether to require the jury to make a special finding upon each issue of fact is within the sound discretion of the trial court. North Am. Pump Corp. v. Clay Equip. Corp., 199 N.W.2d 888, 898 (N.D.1972). In reviewing a trial court's use of a special verdict, we consider whether the trial court abused its discretion, based on the evidence presented and the issues involved in the case.

  10. Howard v. Trotter

    825 N.W.2d 857 (N.D. 2012)

    ” Langer v. Bartholomay, 2008 ND 40, ¶ 27, 745 N.W.2d 649. “Uncertainty as to the amount of damages does not preclude recovery, and mathematical certainty as to the amount of recovery is not necessary. If a reasonable basis for computing an approximate amount of damages is provided, that is all that the law requires.” North Am. Pump Corp. v. Clay Equipment Corp., 199 N.W.2d 888, 895–96 (N.D.1972). “In cases where the amount of damages may be hard to prove, ‘the amount of damages is to be left to the sound discretion of the finder of facts.’ ” Langer, at ¶ 27 (quoting B.W.S. Investments v. Mid–Am Restaurants, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 759, 764 (N.D.1990)).