We quash the order of transfer because it cannot be concluded from the record now before us that the amount in controversy is indisputably less than $15,000 or that the allegations claiming entitlement to an amount in excess of $15,000 were not made in good faith. See Ross v. Barnett, 436 So.2d 1040, 1041 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Norris v. Southern Bell Tel. Tel. Co., 324 So.2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). If later developments in the case show without dispute that the amount in controversy is less than $15,000, the trial court is free to transfer the cause. Ross, 436 So.2d at 1041; Norris, 324 So.2d at 109.
We quash the order of transfer upon a holding that it cannot be concluded from the record now before us that the amount in controversy is indisputably less than $5,000 or that the allegations of Count II claiming entitlement to an amount in excess of $5,000 were not made in good faith. See Norris v. Southern Bell Telephone Telegraph Company, 324 So.2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Thibadeau v. Santini Bros., Inc., 315 So.2d 550 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). If later developments in the case show without dispute that the amount in controversy is less than $5,000, the trial court is free to transfer Count II. Norris v. Southern Bell Telephone Telegraph Company, 324 So.2d at 109. Certiorari granted; order quashed.
Rocco, 163 So.2d at 23 (citing Knudsen v. Green, 116 Fla. 47, 156 So. 240, 242 (1934) ). As stated by the Third District in Norris v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 324 So.2d 108, 109 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) : There may be a basis in this record for a belief that the plaintiff exaggerated her claim but it cannot be said that such a conclusion appears without issue.
White argues, and we agree, that, if the original jurisdictional amount of the claim is determined to have been filed in good faith, the circuit court will retain jurisdiction even when the actual damages are later shown to be less than $250,000. See Becker v. Re/Max Horizons Realty, Inc., 819 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Crown Bank v. U.S. Mortgage Network Corp., 705 So.2d 100 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998);Norris v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 324 So.2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Castellano v. Bader Bros. Van Lines, Inc., 208 So.2d 842 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968); Spencer v. Florida-Georgia Tractor Co., 114 So.2d 466 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959). To hold otherwise would require prudent parties to file a claim with good faith damages in excess of $250,000 both in the circuit court and before the Board, if there was a risk that the damages may be reduced to an amount less than $250,000.
White argues, and we agree, that, if the original jurisdictional amount of the claim is determined to have been filed in good faith, the circuit court will retain jurisdiction even when the actual damages are later shown to be less than $250,000. See Becker v. Re/Max Horizons Realty, Inc., 819 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Crown Bank v. U.S. Mortgage Network Corp., 705 So.2d 100 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998);Norris v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 324 So.2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Castellano v. Bader Bros. Van Lines, Inc., 208 So.2d 842 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968); Spencer v. Florida-Georgia Tractor Co., 114 So.2d 466 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959). To hold otherwise would require prudent parties to file a claim with good faith damages in excess of $250,000 both in the circuit court and before the Board, if there was a risk that the damages may be reduced to an amount less than $250,000.
In my view, we should accept the good faith allegations the plaintiff has made in its complaint. Cf. Grunewald v. Warren, 655 So.2d 1227, 1229 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Norris v. Southern Bell Tel. Tel. Co., 324 So.2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) (the fact that the plaintiff may have exaggerated her claim cannot form the basis for concluding that the amount claimed could not in good faith reach the jurisdictional limit of the circuit court). The plaintiff alleged that the failure to disclose the information constituted a "material misrepresentation pursuant to Florida Statute 627.409 and therefore voids and nullifies coverage in this matter.
Rocco v. Coffey, Fla.App. 1964, 163 So.2d 21 [2nd DCA]." Norris v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 324 So.2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Ray, 52 Fla. 634, 42 So. 714 (1906). See White v. Marine Transp. Lines, Inc., 372 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1979); Richter Jewelry Co. v. Harrison, 147 Fla. 732, 3 So.2d 387 (1941).
However, the order transferring the case to the county court, based on the grounds set forth in the earlier orders, is reviewable by certiorari. Krueger v. Wear, 498 So.2d 578 (Fla.3d DCA 1986); Norris v. Southern Bell Tel. Tel. Co., 324 So.2d 108 (Fla.3d DCA 1975). Because the partial summary judgments striking the claims for punitive damages and emotional distress were improvidently granted, the order transferring the cause to the county court must be quashed.
Thus, Jennings' timely petition activates our common law certiorari jurisdiction because the order sought to be reviewed a) constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law, and b) requires him to litigate a putative claim in a proceeding that cannot afford him the relief requested and for that reason does not afford him an adequate remedy. See Tantillo v. Miliman, 87 So.2d 413 (Fla. 1956); Norris v. Southern Bell Tel. Tel. Co., 324 So.2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960). The same reasoning does not apply against Schatzman. Nonetheless, because we have jurisdiction, there is no impediment to our exercising it over Schatzman as a party.
PER CURIAM. Treating this appeal from an order transferring a case from the circuit court to county court as a petition for writ of certiorari, Norris v. Southern Bell Telephone Telegraph Co., 324 So.2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Thibadeau v. Santini Bros., Inc., 315 So.2d 550 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Fla.R. App.P. 9.040(c), we deny the petition for certiorari on the ground that section 34.01(c)2, Florida Statutes (1985), specifies that the amount in controversy is determined " exclusive of interest. . . ." Petition denied.