Opinion
5:21-CV-455 (CAR)
01-19-2024
ROBIN N. NORMAN, Plaintiff, v. CO II CALANDIA THOMAS, et al., Defendants.
RECOMMENDATION
THOMAS Q. LANGSTAFF, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brought the above-styled action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on December 21, 2021. (Doc. 1). In the Court's first initial review of Plaintiff's Complaint, the Court permitted Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to safety claims to proceed against Defendants Thomas and Jones. (Doc. 13). The Court also permitted Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical need claims to proceed against Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith. Id. It was recommended that all other claims be dismissed. Id.
Plaintiff filed an Objection to this Court's Report and Recommendation, adding new factual allegations. (Doc. 22). The Court construed Plaintiff's objection as a motion to amend his complaint, granted that motion, and conducted a new initial review. (Doc. 24). On this second initial review, the Court permitted Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to safety claims to proceed against Defendants Thomas, Jones, and Garia Smith. Id. The Court also permitted Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical need claims to proceed against Defendants Thomas, Jones, Gardner, Stefan Smith, Garia Smith, and Williams. Id. All other claims were dismissed. (Docs. 24, 29).
Plaintiff's filings and the docket refer to this defendant as “Gavia” Smith. However, it appears from the pending Motion for Summary Judgment and this Defendant's declaration that her name is “Garia” Smith. (Docs. 46-3, 46-8). Accordingly, the Clerk is DIRECTED to change the docket to reflect that the correct spelling of this Defendant's name is “Garia” Smith.
On March 1, 2023, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 46). Plaintiff did not file any response, despite being advised of his right to do so. (Doc. 47).
Plaintiff's Allegations
Plaintiff sets forth the following allegations concerning his incarceration at Central State Prison (“CSP”) in his Complaint and Objection to the undersigned's initial Recommendation. (Docs. 1, 22).
Plaintiff arrived at CSP on February 18, 2021. (Doc. 1 at 9). Plaintiff was placed in a bottom bunk upon arrival in accordance with a medically prescribed profile he received from Newton County Jail. Id. The CSP medical department verified this profile upon Plaintiff's arrival. Id. Sometime after Plaintiff's arrival, Defendant Thomas ordered Plaintiff to move from his bottom bunk to a top bunk. Id. Plaintiff told Defendant Thomas about his medical issues and informed Defendant Thomas he would be at risk of being hurt or killed if he had to sleep on a top bunk. Id. Defendant Thomas threatened Plaintiff, stating she would put the whole dorm on lockdown if Plaintiff did not move bunks. Id. This would have made him a target for retaliation by other inmates. Id. Plaintiff complained about his bunk assignment to CSP staff members for three months, telling them he had nearly fallen several times. Id. at 10.
At 4:30 AM on June 5, 2021, Plaintiff fell from his bunk, hitting his head on a steel desk and landing on the concrete floor of his cell. Id. This fall opened a large, bleeding wound on Plaintiff's head and caused intense pain in his back, shoulder, and neck. Id. There were no officers in his building at the time of the fall, so Plaintiff's cellmates began banging on their cell door to get someone's attention. Id. at 10-11. Eventually, Plaintiff's cellmates got the attention of an unsecured inmate who went to find an officer. Id. at 11. Defendant Garia Smith responded to Plaintiff's cell and opened the door. Id. Plaintiff and the inmate who retrieved Garia Smith then began walking towards the medical department together. Id. No one was present at the medical department, so Plaintiff kept walking to the security office. Id. At this time, Plaintiff was in severe pain and badly bleeding. Id.
At the security office, Plaintiff spoke with Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith, pleading with them to call for medical help. Id. Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith told Plaintiff medical staff would not arrive at the building for hours and took no other actions to help Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff informed Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith that he was in severe pain and that the bleeding would not stop, but they ordered him out of the security office to wait for medical staff. Id. Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith left the security office at shift change without speaking to Plaintiff or ensuring he received medical care. Id. at 12. Plaintiff alleges he was sitting outside the security office for hours without receiving help. Id.
Eventually, a non-defendant officer came and transported Plaintiff to medical staff for treatment. Id. Medical staff evaluated Plaintiff and recommended that he be transported to the hospital for treatment. Id. Plaintiff was transported to the hospital by Defendant Garia Smith and a non-defendant officer. Id.
After returning from the hospital, Plaintiff was again forced to take a top bunk. Id. at 13. Plaintiff pleaded with Defendant Thomas, asking her to give him a bottom bunk. Id. Plaintiff informed Defendant Thomas he was in pain and unable to climb onto the top bunk. Id. Plaintiff was denied a bottom bunk and was told he could sleep on the floor. Id.
On September 29, 2021, Defendant Williams denied Plaintiff medical treatment because Plaintiff arrived at the medical department too late. Id. at 14.
Standard of Review
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1). All facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cruz v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 428 F.3d 1379, 1382 (11th Cir. 2005).
As the parties moving for summary judgment, Defendants have the initial burden to demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact remain in the case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604 (11th Cir. 1991). The movant “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,” and identifying those portions of the record, including pleadings, discovery materials, and affidavits, “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials - including the facts considered undisputed - show that the movant is entitled to it.” FED R. CIV. P. 56(e)(3). Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the Court to consider the entire record when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3).
Defendants support their Motion for Summary Judgment by submitting sworn declarations from each Defendant, as well as the transcript of Plaintiff's deposition. (Docs. 46-1, 46-2, 46-3, 46-4, 46-5, 46-6, and 46-7). Plaintiff submits no response to Defendants' Motion.
Evidence
Plaintiff's Deposition
Plaintiff received a bottom bunk profile from Newton County Jail prior to arriving at CSP. (Doc. 46-7 at 18). He was given a bottom bunk profile because of a sleep disorder that causes him to toss and turn violently in his sleep. Id. at 18-19. Upon arriving at CSP, Plaintiff was not issued a bottom bunk profile by the Georgia Department of Corrections (“GDC”). Id. at 18.
Approximately a month prior to his fall, Plaintiff was ordered to move from a bottom bunk to a top bunk by Defendant Thomas. Id. at 21-22, 35. Plaintiff attempted to show Defendant Thomas his Newton County bottom bunk profile, but Defendant Thomas insisted Plaintiff move to a top bunk. Id. at 22. Defendant Jones ordered Defendant Thomas to move Plaintiff. Id. at 21, 36-37. Defendant Jones also threatened to put the entire building on lockdown if Plaintiff didn't move into the top bunk. Id.
At approximately 4:30 AM on June 5, 2021, Plaintiff fell from his bunk and hit his head on a metal table. Id. at 22-23, 25. Plaintiff woke up on the floor with a bleeding head wound and began asking his cellmates for help. Id. at 24. Other inmates began attempting to signal for help by beating on their cell windows. Id. They eventually got the attention of another inmate who was not confined to a cell and asked him to retrieve an officer. Id. at 24-25. Defendant Garia Smith came to Plaintiff's cell and began asking questions about what had occurred. Id. at 25. After speaking with Plaintiff, Defendant Garia Smith left to get help from medical staff. Id. at 26. Before Defendant Garia Smith returned, the inmate who retrieved Defendant Garia Smith convinced Plaintiff to begin walking towards the medical department. Id.
No one was present at the medical department, so Plaintiff continued walking to the security office. Id. Once at the security office, Plaintiff spoke to Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith and requested medical attention. Id. Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith ordered Plaintiff to wait outside the security office until medical staff were available to see him. Id. After waiting for an unspecified amount of time, Plaintiff walked back into the security office and told Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith he needed immediate medical attention. Id. Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith ordered Plaintiff out of the office a second time and told Plaintiff to wait. Id. Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith then left the security office, walking past Plaintiff without ensuring he received medical care. Id. at 26-27. Plaintiff was still bleeding when Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith left the security office. Id. at 27.
Plaintiff was transported to medical staff by a CSP staff member named Lieutenant Thomas. Medical staff immediately recommended Plaintiff be transported to the hospital for treatment. Id. at 27-28. Plaintiff was transported to the hospital from CSP at 10:00 AM. Id. at 28. At the hospital, Plaintiff's head wound was closed with seven staples. Id. at 29. Hospital staff also took x-rays but diagnosed no neck injuries at that time. Id. at 31. Plaintiff did not “have a clue that [his neck] was that bad.” Id. Plaintiff was returned to CSP after receiving treatment. Id. at 31-32. Upon returning from the hospital, Plaintiff was given a bottom bunk profile. Id. at 32. Plaintiff has been in a bottom bunk since he returned from the hospital following this incident. Id. at 32-33. On October 5, 2022, approximately 16 months after his fall, Plaintiff underwent neck surgery. Id. at 33-34.
It is not clear from Plaintiff's testimony whether this is the same person as Defendant Thomas. However, the Court need not address this ambiguity because there is no allegation of wrongdoing during Plaintiff's transportation from the security office to the medical wing at CSP.
On an unspecified date following Plaintiff's fall, Defendant Williams turned Plaintiff away from the medical department because Plaintiff arrived too late. Id. at 41.
Defendant Thomas's Declaration
Defendant Thomas was employed as a Lieutenant at CSP on the date of the incident. (Doc. 46-1 at 1). Defendant Thomas does not recall speaking with Plaintiff about his medical care or his desire for a bottom bunk assignment. Id. Between February 17, 2021, and June 5, 2021, Plaintiff never approached Defendant Thomas to indicate his assignment to a top bunk was dangerous. Id. at 3. Defendant Thomas had no authority to give Plaintiff a bottom bunk profile because only medical personnel could make such a designation. Id. at 2. Defendant Thomas attaches Plaintiff's Movement History to her declaration, showing where Plaintiff was housed throughout his time at CSP. Id. at 3. The Movement History indicates Plaintiff was moved from a bottom bunk to a top bunk on April 14, 2021. Id. at 3, 5. The records from this move indicate Plaintiff did not have a bottom bunk profile at the time. Id. at 3, 8. The Movement History also indicates that Plaintiff was placed in a top bunk when he returned from the hospital on June 5, 2021, and remained there until October 14, 2021. Id. at 5. The reason for Plaintiff's movement on October 14, 2021, is listed as “correcting erroneous move.” Id. Defendant Jones never ordered Defendant Thomas to move Plaintiff from a bottom bunk to a top bunk. Id. at 3.
Defendant Jones's Declaration
Defendant Jones was employed as a Lieutenant at CSP on the date of the incident. (Doc. 462 at 1). Defendant Jones does not recall speaking with Plaintiff about his medical care or his desire for a bottom bunk assignment. Id. Plaintiff did not approach Defendant Jones between February 17, 2021, and June 5, 2021, to indicate his top bunk assignment was dangerous. Id. at 3. Defendant Jones was not authorized to grant bottom bunk profiles. Id. at 2. Similar to Defendant Thomas, Defendant Jones provides Plaintiff's Movement History, and cites it as evidence that Plaintiff had no bottom-bunk profile prior to the fall. Id. at 2-3. Defendant Jones had no authority to issue orders to Defendant Thomas prior to the incident. Id. at 3. Defendant Jones never ordered Defendant Thomas to move Plaintiff to a top bunk. Id.
Defendant Garia Smith's Declaration
Defendant Garia Smith was employed as a correctional officer at CSP on the date of the incident. (Doc. 46-3 at 1). Defendant Garia Smith had no authority over Plaintiff's bunk profile. Id. at 2. Defendant Garia Smith did not possess any knowledge about Plaintiff's bunk profile, or any medical conditions that would impact his bunk profile, while Plaintiff was incarcerated at CSP. Id. Plaintiff did not approach Defendant Garia Smith between February 17, 2021, and June 5, 2021, to indicate his top bunk assignment was dangerous. Id. Defendant Garia Smith was at her assigned post when Plaintiff fell and immediately assisted in transporting him to medical. Id.
Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith's Declarations
Defendant Gardner's declaration fails to specify the precise date it was signed, providing only the month and the year. (Doc. 46-4 at 2). By failing to include a date, Defendant Gardner's declaration does not strictly comply with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Hughes v. Dale Cnty. Med. Ctr., 2008 WL 1757768 at *1 (M.D. Ala. 2008) (“[T]he statute expressly requires that...an unsworn declaration must be dated.”). However, there is persuasive authority suggesting “enumeration of the month and year is sufficient to constitute substantial compliance” with §1746. Hosea v. Langley, 2006 WL 314454 (S.D. Ala. 2006), aff'd, 226 Fed.Appx. 863 (11th Cir. 2007). Thus, the Court will consider Defendant Gardner's declaration for purposes of this motion, noting that it is largely duplicative of the dated declaration signed by Defendant Stefan Smith. See Doc. 46-5.
Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith were employed as correctional officers at CSP on the date of the incident. (Docs. 46-4 at 1; 46-5 at 1). Plaintiff came to Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith's work area around 5:00 AM on June 5, 2021. Id. Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith immediately assisted in transporting Plaintiff to medical for treatment. Id. Medical staff had not yet arrived at CSP, so Plaintiff had to wait less than an hour for medical staff to arrive. (Doc. 465 at 1). Defendant Stefan Smith waited with Plaintiff until medical staff arrived. Id. Defendant Williams's Declaration
Defendant Williams was employed as a Unit Manager in the medical department of CSP on the date of the incident. (Doc. 46-6 at 1). Defendant Williams's responsibilities include signing inmates in and out of medical care, and letting medical staff know when inmates require treatment. Id. Plaintiff never informed Defendant Williams of any serious medical need. Id. at 2. Defendant Williams would have immediately contacted medical or transported Plaintiff to medical if he were informed of a serious medical need. Id.
Facts for Summary Judgment
Reading all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court accepts the following facts as true for purposes of deciding Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff possessed a medical bottom bunk profile from Newton County Jail when he arrived at CSP but was not granted a GDC bottom bunk profile. At some point after Plaintiff's arrival at CSP, Defendant Thomas ordered Plaintiff to move from his bottom bunk to a top bunk. Plaintiff showed Defendant Thomas his Newton County bottom bunk profile at this time, but Defendant Thomas insisted Plaintiff move. This bunk movement was ordered by Defendant Jones, and Defendant Jones threatened to place the dorm on lockdown if Plaintiff did not move.
At 4:30 AM on June 5, 2021, Plaintiff fell from his bunk, struck his head on a bedside table, and sustained a head wound that began bleeding heavily. Because Defendant Garia Smith was not located inside of Plaintiff's dorm at the time of the fall, another inmate had to retrieve her and alert her to Plaintiff's injuries. When Defendant Garia Smith arrived at Plaintiff's cell, she asked him what happened, opened his cell door, and left to go get help from medical staff. Before Defendant Garia Smith returned, Plaintiff began walking towards the medical department with the help of another inmate. After finding no one at the medical department, Plaintiff continued to the security office.
Plaintiff encountered Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith at the security office and asked them to call for medical assistance. Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith ordered Plaintiff to wait outside the security office until someone from the medical staff was available to see him. Plaintiff went back into the office a second time and requested medical care, insisting it was an emergency. Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith told Plaintiff to wait until medical staff were available and ordered him back outside. Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith then left the security office. Plaintiff waited less than an hour for medical to open. A non-defendant officer arrived and transported Plaintiff to the medical department. Medical staff recommended Plaintiff be taken to the hospital, and Plaintiff was transported out of CSP at 10:00 AM. At the hospital, Plaintiff received seven staples to the wound in his head.
Upon returning to CSP, Plaintiff was immediately issued a GDC bottom bunk pass by CSP medical staff. However, Plaintiff was returned to a top bunk and was not transferred to a bottom bunk for several months. At some point following Plaintiff's accident, he went to the medical department to receive medical treatment but was turned away by Defendant Williams.
Discussion
Plaintiff's Complaint raises three categories of claims. First, Plaintiff asserts Defendants Thomas, Jones, and Garia Smith were deliberately indifferent to his safety. Second, Plaintiff claims Defendants Thomas, Jones, and Garia Smith were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs prior to his fall from the bunk. Third, Plaintiff claims Defendants Thomas, Garia Smith, Gardner, Stefan Smith, and Williams were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs after his fall from the bunk. Defendants assert they are entitled to summary judgment for two reasons. First, they allege Plaintiff has failed to raise any genuine dispute of material fact as to any of his claims. Second, Defendants allege they are entitled to qualified immunity.
I. Deliberate Indifference to Safety
Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's safety constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation. Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). A claim of deliberate indifference to safety includes both an objective and a subjective test. Id. The objective test requires a plaintiff “show that a condition of his confinement ‘pose[s] an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health' or safety.” Id. (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993)) (alterations in original). The subjective test requires three showings: “(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.” Id. at 1290, fn. 21 (quoting Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003)).
A. Defendant Thomas
As an initial matter, top bunk placements themselves do not constitute an unconstitutional condition of confinement. Brown v. Pastrana, 446 Fed.Appx. 270, 272 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[S]leeping approximately eight feet above the floor without a panic button or railings ...do[es] not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.”). Thus, Defendant Thomas's subjective awareness that Plaintiff was on a top bunk is not enough to make Defendant Thomas subjectively aware of any unreasonable risk to Plaintiff's safety. Instead, Plaintiff must show Defendant Thomas was subjectively aware that Plaintiff's sleep disorder made him particularly likely to fall from a top bunk.
Defendant Thomas avers in her declaration that she does not recall ever speaking to Plaintiff regarding his medical care or condition. (Doc. 46-1 at 1). Plaintiff fails to rebut this assertion, providing no evidence that Defendant Thomas was subjectively aware of his sleep disorder. At no point in Plaintiff's deposition does he indicate that he told Defendant Thomas about his sleep disorder, nor is there any evidence Defendant Thomas observed the symptoms of Plaintiff's sleep disorder.
Plaintiff's evidence indicates that Plaintiff showed Defendant Thomas his Newton County bunk profile on one occasion. (Doc. 46-7 at 22). However, this bunk profile provides no details about Plaintiff's alleged sleep disorder or its symptoms. (Doc. 1 at 19). The only information provided on the sheet is that the prescribed bunk profile is “medically necessary.” Id. A medical bunk pass can be issued for various reasons, some of which do not involve a risk of falling from a bunk. See Burley v. Upton, 257 Fed.Appx. 207, 210 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding officers were not deliberately indifferent for failing to honor a bottom bunk pass issued for back pain). Thus, the fact that Defendant Thomas saw Plaintiff's bunk pass was not sufficient evidence to show Defendant Thomas was subjectively aware of any serious risk that Plaintiff was going to fall from his bunk. See Hall v. Moore, 2015 WL 9946410 at *9 (N.D. Fla. 2015) (“[Knowledge of a medical pass, without more, is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference”). Because there is no evidence that Defendant Thomas was subjectively aware of Plaintiff's sleep disorder, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendant Thomas was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's safety. Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1245.
B. De fendants Jones and Garia Smtih
At no point in Plaintiff's deposition testimony does Plaintiff indicate he told Defendant Jones or Defendant Garia Smith anything that would make them subjectively aware that he was at risk of falling from a top bunk. See Doc. 46-7 at 36-39 (discussing the facts underlying Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Jones and Garia Smith). These Defendants each provide unrebutted declarations that Plaintiff never spoke to them regarding the dangers of his bunk assignment. (Docs. 46-2 at 3; 46-3 at 2). Thus, because there is no evidence these Defendants were subjectively aware of Plaintiff's bunk assignment or his sleep disorder, no reasonable jury could conclude these Defendants were deliberately indifferent. Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1245.
II. Deliberate Indifference to Pre-Fall Medical Needs
“Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs is a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). To state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must make three showings: “(1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendants' deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that indifference and the plaintiff's injury.” Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2009).
Serious medical needs include conditions diagnosed by a physician, as well as afflictions “so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Hill v. Dekalb Reg'l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002). Additionally, the medical need must be “one that, if left unattended, ‘pos[es] a substantial risk of serious harm.'” Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)) (alterations in original).
To show a defendant was deliberately indifferent, plaintiff must show: “(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.” Mann, 588 F.3d at 1307 (quoting Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1351 (11th Cir. 2004)). Prison officials can be deliberately indifferent by not only failing to attend to a prisoner's medical needs, but also by “intentionally interfering with [a] treatment once prescribed.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.
A. Defendant Thomas
Plaintiff's Complaint could be taken to allege two different theories of deliberate indifference to his pre-fall medical needs against Defendant Thomas: (1) Defendant Thomas denied Plaintiff a prescribed medical treatment by failing to honor his bunk pass, and (2) Defendant Thomas was deliberately indifferent for failing to treat Plaintiff's sleep disorder itself. Because there are no disputes of material fact regarding either of these theories, Defendant Thomas is entitled to summary judgment.
First, Defendant Thomas cannot be held liable for failing to honor Plaintiff's Newton County bottom bunk profile because Defendant Thomas was “entitled to rely on the opinions, judgment and expertise of a prison medical staff to determine a medically necessary and appropriate cause of treatment for an inmate.” Baker v. Pavlakovic, 2015 WL 4756295 at *7 (N.D. Ala. 2015) (citing Williams v. Limestone Cnty., Ala., 198 Fed.Appx. 893, 897-898 (11th Cir. 2006)). Defendant Thomas avers in her declaration that whenever an inmate is transferred to a new prison, “any profile [the inmate] had must be reviewed by the medical staff at his new prison to determine if it will be continued.” (Doc. 46-1 at 2). Plaintiff concedes in his deposition testimony that he was not issued a GDC bottom bunk pass when he arrived at CSP. (Doc. 46-7 at 18, 47). Defendant Thomas submits documents from CSP showing Plaintiff did not possess a bottom bunk profile when he was first moved to a top bunk on April 14, 2021. (Doc. 46-1 at 8). This evidence demonstrates that CSP medical staff made the medical decision to not continue Plaintiff's bottom bunk profile. Defendant Thomas provides unrebutted testimony that she is not medical staff, and that only medical staff are authorized to change an inmate's bunk profile. Id. at 1-2. Thus, Defendant Thomas was entitled to rely on the CSP medical staff's decision to not adopt Plaintiff's Newton County bunk profile, without second guessing that decision. Baker, 2015 WL 4756295 at *7.
Second, to the extent Plaintiff claims Defendant Thomas was deliberately indifferent for failing to treat his sleep disorder, that claim fails as well. As the Court outlined above, Plaintiff provides no evidence that Defendant Thomas was subjectively aware of Plaintiff's sleep disorder. This lack of subjective awareness demonstrates there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendant Thomas was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's sleep disorder. Mann, 588 F.3d at 1307.
B. De fendants Jones and Garia Smith
There is also no evidence that Defendants Jones and Garia Smith had subjective knowledge of any serious medical need. As the Court has already discussed, Plaintiff provides no evidence that he discussed either his sleep disorder or his bunk assignment with Defendant Jones or Defendant Garia Smith. (Doc. 46-7 at 36-39). Without any evidence to suggest these Defendants were subjectively aware of a serious medical need, no reasonable jury could find that they were deliberately indifferent. Mann, 588 F.3d at 1307.
III. Deliberate Indifference to Plaintiff's Post-Fall Medical Needs
A. Defendant Garia Smith
Plaintiff's claims against Garia Smith for deliberate indifference to his post-fall injuries break down into two distinct allegations. First, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Garia Smith was not at her post on the night of his accident, thereby causing a delay in his access to medical care. Second, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Garia Smith was deliberately indifferent for failing to escort him to medical. Defendant Garia Smith is entitled to summary judgment on each of these theories.
Plaintiff presents no evidence that Defendant Garia Smith was subjectively aware of any serious medical need prior to Plaintiff's fall. (Doc. 46-7 at 25-26, 37-39). Defendant Garia Smith only became aware of Plaintiff's medical need when she was brought to Plaintiff's cell after the fall. Thus, even accepting as true Plaintiff's allegation that Defendant left her post, that decision would constitute no more than negligence, and would be insufficient to prove an Eighth Amendment violation. Harris v. Coweta Cnty., 21 F.3d 388, 393 (11th Cir. 1994) (“Accidents, mistakes, negligence, and medical malpractice are not ‘constitutional violation[s] merely because the victim is a prisoner.'”) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106) (alteration in original).
Once Defendant Garia Smith was alerted to Plaintiff's medical need, there is no evidence she was deliberately indifferent. A prison official “who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they respond reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. Plaintiff concedes that Defendant “went to go get somebody from medical” once she observed Plaintiff's injuries. (Doc. 46-7 at 26). Because Plaintiff's own version of events fails to allege that Defendant Garia Smith disregarded his medical need, Defendant Garia Smith is entitled to summary judgment. Mann, 588 F.3d at 1307.
B. Defendant Williams
Defendant Williams is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff fails to present any evidence that he was suffering from a serious medical need when Defendant Williams refused to allow him into medical. Plaintiff testifies that he went to see Defendant Williams after an unspecified surgery on his forehead. (Doc. 46-7 at 41). However, Plaintiff does not describe what medical need he had when he sought medical treatment from Defendant Williams. Thus, Plaintiff fails to provide sufficient facts to create a jury question regarding the existence of a serious medical need. Hill, 40 F.3d at 1187.
Even if Plaintiff did suffer from a serious medical need, he also fails to provide evidence that Defendant Williams was subjectively aware of that need. Defendant Williams avers that Plaintiff never informed him that Plaintiff suffered from a serious medical need. (Doc. 46-6 at 2). Plaintiff's testimony as to his interaction with Defendant Williams is sparse and provides no evidence that he informed Defendant Williams he was suffering from any serious medical need. Accordingly, Defendant Williams is entitled to summary judgment. Mann, 588 F.3d at 1307.
C. Defendant Thomas
Plaintiff's unsworn Complaint alleges that Defendant Thomas ordered him back onto a top bunk after he returned from the hospital. (Doc. 1 at 13). However, Plaintiff later testified that he received a bottom bunk profile the day after returning from the hospital. (Doc. 46-7 at 47). Plaintiff also testified he had been sleeping in a bottom bunk ever since his fall. Id. at 32-33. Thus, it appears that Plaintiff abandoned any claim that Defendant Thomas deliberately refused to recognize Plaintiff's bottom bunk profile after the fall.
There is some evidence supporting the allegations made in Plaintiff's Complaint. Bunk records from CSP indicate Plaintiff was assigned to a top bunk until October 14, 2021, several months after CSP medical staff issued Plaintiff a bottom bunk pass. (Doc. 46-2 at 5). However, even if it is assumed that Plaintiff was denied a bottom bunk after his fall, there are no facts in the record to show Defendant Thomas was involved in this denial. While Plaintiff's unsworn Complaint alleges Defendant Thomas was responsible for returning him to a top bunk, “[u]nsworn statements, even from pro se parties, should not be considered in determining the propriety of summary judgment.” Wells v. Cramer, 262 Fed.Appx. 184, 187 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation and punctuation omitted).
The Court notes that Plaintiff's Complaint includes two references to penalty of perjury in the certificates of service. (Doc. 1 at 15, 17). Different courts have taken different approaches when deciding whether a “penalty-of-perjury” statement in a certificate of service can satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Jackson v. Morales, 2012 WL 3000207 at *2 (N.D. Fla. 2012) (“Although the certificate of service attached to the ‘affidavit' indicates that the ‘foregoing statement' is true and signed under penalty of perjury, fairly construed this averment refers to the date and manner of service rather than the contents of the ‘affidavit' itself.”); Riddle v. Ala. Dep't of Corr., 2023 WL 2435665 at *2, fn. 3 (M.D. Ala. 2023) (considering a plaintiff's complaint verified when plaintiff affirmed in the certificate of service that the “foregoing” was true and correct). For several reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff's averments swear to the truth of the certificates of service, not the Complaint itself.
First, Plaintiff includes these averments in attachments to his standard complaint form and not the complaint form itself. Second, Plaintiff includes one of his averments in the certificate following Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel. (Doc. 1 at 16). There is nothing in this Motion that would require Plaintiff to verify its contents under penalty of perjury, indicating only the certificate itself is being verified. Third, it is unclear why Plaintiff would include two different averments in his Complaint if each was intended to reference the entirety of the document. Finally, the Court is unpersuaded that Plaintiff could be successfully prosecuted for perjury if any of the statements in the body of this Complaint were proved to be false, defeating the underlying purpose of § 1746. Thus, Plaintiff's Complaint is not verified and is not admissible evidence for summary judgment purposes.
Plaintiff's sworn deposition testimony fails to allege Defendant Thomas was involved in denying Plaintiff a bottom bunk after his fall. Additionally, the bunk records do not provide any indication as to which CSP staff members were responsible for moving Plaintiff. (Doc. 46-2 at 5). The lack of evidence showing Defendant Thomas was involved in denying Plaintiff a bottom bunk after Plaintiff's fall establishes that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendant Thomas was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's post-fall medical needs.
While it is not clear from Plaintiff's Complaint and Objection whether his post-fall denial of a bottom bunk would constitute a deliberate indifference to medical needs or deliberate indifference to safety claim, that distinction is immaterial because both types of claims require a showing of causation. Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir.1995). The lack of evidence showing Defendant Thomas was responsible for continuing to place Plaintiff on a bottom bunk would be equally fatal to each claim.
D. De fendants Gardner and Ste fan Smith
Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims of deliberate indifference to his post-fall medical needs for two reasons: (1) there is insufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith were deliberately indifferent, and (2) Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence that the delay in his medical treatment caused him any harm.
1. Deliberate Indifference
“Even where medical care is ultimately provided, a prison official may nonetheless act with deliberate indifference by delaying the treatment of serious medical needs.” McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999). “The tolerable length of delay in providing medical attention depends on the nature of the medical need and the reason for the delay.” Harris, 21 F.3d at 39394. When examining a delay in medical care for deliberate indifference, “the reason for a delay matters: a good reason may justify a delay.” Youmans v. Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557, 566 fn. 11 (11th Cir. 2010).
Most cases finding officers deliberately indifferent for delaying medical care involve delays lasting more than an hour. See Aldridge v. Montgomery, 753 F.2d 970, 972-73 (11th Cir. 1985) (two-and-a-half hour delay in treating a bleeding head wound constituted deliberate indifference); Alsobrook v. Alvarado, 477 Fed.Appx. 710, 712 (11th Cir. 2012) (one hour and forty minute delay in treating bleeding head injuries constituted deliberate indifference); Harris, 21 F.3d at 394 (“A few hours' delay in receiving medical care for emergency needs such as broken bones and bleeding cuts may constitute deliberate indifference.”). Many of these cases also rely on the fact that the officer had no legitimate reason for delaying medical care. See Aldridge, 753 F.2d at 972 (officers delayed medical care “because they were waiting for a detective to tell them what to do”); Alsobrook, 477 Fed.Appx. at 712 (finding “there was no justifiable reason” for a delay in medical care where the only reason offered was that plaintiff's cellmate refused to be handcuffed).
Considering the reason for Defendants' delay in seeking medical treatment for Plaintiff and the length of that delay, no reasonable jury could conclude Defendants were deliberately indifferent in their response to Plaintiff's medical need. Regarding the reason for the delay, Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith assert Plaintiff's medical care was only delayed because medical was not open when Plaintiff arrived at the security office. (Docs. 46-4 at 1; 46-5 at 1). Plaintiff does not dispute this fact, testifying that Defendants ordered him to wait outside the security office until “someone from medical could see” him. (Doc. 46-7 at 26). Thus, the undisputed facts indicate Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith did not delay Plaintiff medical care arbitrarily or with malicious intent. Instead, Defendants chose to wait until trained medical staff were available. This decision is not evidence of deliberate indifference. Irizarry v. Alsobrook, 2021 WL 751029 at *2 (M.D. Fla. 2021) (“[T]here is no indication whatsoever that Alsobrook had a malevolent purpose in waiting for medical staff to confirm the need for EMS.”).
Regarding the length of the delay, Defendant Stefan Smith avers that Plaintiff was required to wait less than an hour before he was evaluated in the CSP medical department. (Doc. 46-5 at 1). Plaintiff does not refute this assertion. Plaintiff testifies he fell from his bunk around 4:30 AM and was transferred from the CSP medical department to the hospital around 10:00 AM. (Doc. 46-7 at 25, 28). However, Plaintiff offers no testimony regarding what portion of this time he was waiting outside security and what portion of this time he spent in the CSP medical department. Thus, Plaintiff does not refute Defendant Stefan Smith's assertion that Plaintiff waited less than an hour to be evaluated at CSP medical. A delay of less than an hour stands in stark contrast to those cases in which prisoners are denied medical treatment for multiple hours. Aldridge, 753 F.2d at 972; Alsobrook, 477 Fed.Appx. at 712. While some cases entertain claims of deliberate indifference for shorter delays, those cases involve life threatening injuries that require immediate care. See Valderrama v. Rousseau, 780 F.3d 1108, 1120 (11th Cir. 2015) (delaying treatment for gunshot victim for more than 10 minutes constituted deliberate indifference); Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1273 (11th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (“A delay in care for known unconsciousness brought on by asphyxiation is especially timesensitive and must ordinarily be measured not in hours, but in a few minutes.”). While the visible cut to Plaintiff's head required medical attention, it did not rise to the level of severity established by these cases. As to his neck injury, there is no evidence that any Defendant had knowledge of such an injury. In fact, although Plaintiff had surgery on his neck approximately 16 months after this fall, he acknowledges that x-rays at the hospital after his fall led to no diagnosis and that he did not “have a clue...it was that bad.” (Doc. 46-7 at 31).
The undisputed evidence shows Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith delayed Plaintiff's medical care for less than an hour to allow CSP medical staff to arrive. Considering the reason for the delay, the length of the delay, and the severity of Plaintiff's known injury, no reasonable jury could conclude this decision amounted to deliberate indifference.
2. Causation
“An inmate who complains that delay in medical treatment rose to a constitutional violation must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of delay in medical treatment to succeed.” Hill, 40 F.3d at 1188. Delay of treatment only rises to the level of a constitutional violation where “‘it is apparent that delay would detrimentally exacerbate the medical problem,' the delay does seriously exacerbate the medical problem, and the delay is medically unjustified.” Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1259-60 (quoting Hill, 40 F.3d at 1187-88) (emphasis added). Whether the delay in medical care worsened a prisoner's condition is “a question which overlaps with the causation inquiry.” Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1329.
Here, Plaintiff provides no evidence that Defendants' decision to wait for medical staff exacerbated his injury. Plaintiff testifies generally about medical complications he faced after his fall. (Doc. 46-7 at 33). However, Plaintiff provides no evidence indicating these complications would not have arisen if Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith had acted more promptly. Thus, without “verifying medical evidence” showing Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith's decision to wait for medical staff made Plaintiff's head or neck injury worse, no reasonable jury could conclude Defendants caused Plaintiff any harm. Hill, 40 F.3d at 1188. On this basis alone, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Gardner and Stefan Smith fail.
There are cases suggesting a prisoner “does not necessarily need to show that the delay in medical care exacerbated his condition because the delay in care is, itself, a wanton infliction of pain and a constitutional violation.” Valderrama, 780 F.3d at 1116 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Ravan v. Talton, 2023 WL 2238853 at *8 (11th Cir. 2023) (“[A]ny delay in treatment caused Ravan to suffer additional pain.”). However, these cases involve much more obvious, severe injuries than Plaintiff's head wound. Valderrama, 780 F.3d at 1117 (“Mr. Valderrama's gunshot wound was plainly a life-threatening injury.”); Ravan, 2023 WL 2238853 at *1 (plaintiff suffered from “a severe skin reaction that causes the skin...to blister and peel, forming very painful raw areas”) (alterations in original, punctuation omitted). Additionally, these cases include explicit evidence indicating the prisoner suffered severe pain during the delay. Ravan, 2023 WL 2238853 at *8 (“Ravan swore that he suffered hour by hour from bleeding sores in [his] mouth, body, [and] legs.”) (alterations in original, punctuation omitted); Reid v. Streit, 694 Fed.Appx. 968, 972-73 (11th Cir. 2017) (finding no need for evidence that delay exacerbated a detainee's broken hand where the detainee “more than once told [the defendant] that he was in immense pain”). While Plaintiff's injury did require medical care, Plaintiff offers no testimony indicating he suffered from “immense pain” while he waited outside the security office. Further, Plaintiff's only obvious injury was the cut on his forehead. Neither the Defendants, the hospital, or even the Plaintiff were aware of any serious neck injury.
Given the factual distinctions between these cases and Plaintiff's case, the Court finds Hill's verifying medical evidence standard applies in this case. Plaintiff failed to produce evidence demonstrating “the detrimental effect of delay in medical treatment.” Hill, 40 F.3d at 1188. Thus, even assuming that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical need, Plaintiff's failure to produce verifying medical evidence establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether any delay in medical treatment rose to a constitutional violation.
IV. Qualified Immunity
Defendants also raise the defense of qualified immunity. (Doc. 46-8 at 14). “Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established' at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011).
As the Court finds no constitutional violation, Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity. Jacoby v. Baldwin Cnty., 835 F.3d 1338, 1344 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted) (“a public official is entitled to qualified immunity if the plaintiff fails to establish either” prong of the qualified immunity analysis).
Conclusion
Therefore, for the above stated reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 46) be GRANTED.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. The district judge shall make a de novo determination as to those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made; all other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed by the district judge for clear error. Any objection is limited in length to TWENTY (20) PAGES. See M.D. GA. L.R. 7.4.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED.