Appellant, Douglas R. Norman, previously appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine. In Norman v. State, 208 Ga. App. 830 ( 432 S.E.2d 216) (1993), we affirmed the conviction, but remanded with direction on the limited issue of whether Norman's trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress. Norman now appeals the trial court's adverse ruling on remand that his trial counsel was not ineffective in this regard.

"The evidence, although circumstantial, was sufficient under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia . . . and under OCGA § 24-4-6 to authorize the jury's verdict that [Simmons] [was] guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of possessing the cocaine discovered [wedged in] the seat of the police vehicle."Ross v. State, 240 Ga. App. 563, 565 ( 524 SE2d 255) (1999), citing Jackson, supra; Norman v. State, 208 Ga. App. 830 (1) ( 432 SE2d 216) (1993). (b) Simmons contends that the state failed to prove that the substance in the brown bag was a "mixture with a purity of 10 percent or more of cocaine."

We therefore "remand the case to the trial court for a hearing and appropriate findings concerning the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel." Smith, 255 Ga. at 656 (3). See, e.g., Norman v. State, 208 Ga. App. 830, 833 (3) ( 432 SE2d 216) (1993). 2.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Norman v. State, 208 Ga. App. 830, 831 (3) ( 432 SE2d 216) (1993). "In order to establish ineffective assistance, [Morrison] must show not only that his trial counsel's performance was deficient, but also that the deficiency so prejudiced his defense that, but for the trial counsel's performance, a reasonable probability exists that the result of the trial would have been different."

Id. This is such a case. Norman v. State, 208 Ga. App. 830, 831(3) ( 432 S.E.2d 216) (1993). Pursuant to the two-prong test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, defendant must meet two tests in order to prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim: 1) he must show that trial counsel's performance was deficient in that he made errors so serious that he was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed defendant by the Sixth Amendment; 2) defendant must show that the defense was prejudiced by the deficient performance so that defendant was deprived of a fair trial, one whose results were reliable. As to the first prong, the Supreme Court has approved the "reasonably effective assistance" standard.

Elrod v. State, 222 Ga. App. 704, 705 ( 475 S.E.2d 710) (1996), citing Brundage v. State, supra, and Hutton v. State, 192 Ga. App. 239, 243 ( 384 S.E.2d 446) (1989) (Beasley, J., dissenting in part). See also Mackey v. State, 235 Ga. App. 209, 209 n. 4 ( 509 S.E.2d 68) (1998); Pollard v. State, 230 Ga. App. 159, 161 ( 495 S.E.2d 629) (1998); Norman v. State, 208 Ga. App. 830 ( 432 S.E.2d 216) (1993). As to the merits of Forsman's contentions,

However, it is clear that Elrod's second counsel would have been permitted to raise the ineffective assistance of counsel issue as an enumeration in the first appeal pending before this court because this would have been "the earliest practicable moment" for such a claim to have been raised. See Norman v. State, 208 Ga. App. 830 831 (3) ( 432 S.E.2d 216) (1993); White v. Kelso, 261 Ga. 32 ( 401 S.E.2d 733) (1991) ("the claim may be raised for the first time in the direct appeal if the direct appeal marks the first appearance of new counsel."). Compare Glover v. State, 266 Ga. 183 ( 465 S.E.2d 659) (1996) (the claim is waived if new counsel had the opportunity to file a motion for new trial, yet failed to do so).

However, while Marcello is correct that this issue may be raised for the first time on appeal and remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing, this is a case in which remand would serve no useful purpose and may be decided on the record by this court. Norman v. State, 208 Ga. App. 830, 831 ( 432 S.E.2d 216) (1993); Brundage v. State, 208 Ga. App. 58, 59 ( 430 S.E.2d 173) (1993). Marcello fails to support this enumeration by citing to any instance in which counsel rendered ineffective assistance. He merely states that trial counsel was having back trouble and the trial court denied his motion for continuance. Marcello cites to no instances at trial in which counsel was ineffective and fails to allege any harm due to counsel's back problems.

Even if the pro se appellant did not waive the issue by failing to raise it at the earliest opportunity, i.e., by amending the timely motion for new trial rather than deliberately withdrawing it or filing an extraordinary motion as allowed by OCGA § 5-5-41, the instances of alleged ineffectiveness which he specifies may be reviewed on the existing record, as was done in Brundage v. State, 208 Ga. App. 58 (2) ( 430 S.E.2d 173) (1993). Compare Norman v. State, 208 Ga. App. 830, 831 (3) ( 432 S.E.2d 216) (1993). See Hutton v. State, 192 Ga. App. 239 ( 384 S.E.2d 446) (1989) (Beasley, J., dissenting to the remand).

The evidence, although circumstantial, was sufficient under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 L.E.2d 560) and under OCGA § 24-4-6 to authorize the jury's verdict that defendant is guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of possessing the cocaine discovered under the seat of the police vehicle. Norman v. State, 208 Ga. App. 830 (1) ( 431 S.E.2d 216). Judgment affirmed. Johnson, C. J., and Phipps, J., concur.