Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. Robert M. Padia, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Petition denied. (Super.Ct.No. RIJ110501)
David Goldstein for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
No appearance for Real Party in Interest.
OPINION
McKINSTER J.
Petitioner Norma M. (mother) is the natural mother of Alexis M. and Valerie M., dependent children of the juvenile court. The juvenile court has set a selection and implementation hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) for December 19, 2007, when mother’s parental rights may be terminated. Mother has filed the instant petition under California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, to review the setting of the termination hearing. Mother seeks an order vacating the order requesting a termination hearing and returning custody of the children to her. We deny the petition.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The children were taken into protective custody in 2005 when both mother and Valerie tested positive for methamphetamine at the time of Valerie’s birth. At a detention hearing on August 17, 2005, the juvenile court ordered that the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) begin providing reunification services to both mother and father.
Father is not a party to this petition.
A jurisdictional and dispositional hearing was held in September 2005. Both mother and father were present. The court declared the children dependents of the juvenile court and ordered reunification services continued for mother and father. The recommended services included counseling, substance abuse treatment, drug testing and parenting classes. The court authorized placing the children with mother upon a suitable home evaluation and on mother’s successful participation in her case plan.
At the six-month review hearing, the social worker recommended terminating reunification services for mother, but continuing services for father. According to the social worker’s report, mother had been discharged from several treatment programs. The hearing itself was delayed by two or three months. In the interim, mother had enrolled in another program and was attending regularly, but she had submitted some positive drug screening tests. In May 2006, the court ordered reunification services to continue for both mother and father. The court found that mother’s progress has been minimal and incomplete.
The 12-month review hearing took place in October 2006. The social worker now reported that mother was enrolled in a residential drug treatment program, but otherwise she had made little progress on her case plan. The court found, however, that mother’s progress was now adequate, though incomplete, and there was a substantial probability the children could be returned within six months. The court ordered an additional six months of services for mother and father.
An 18-month review hearing was scheduled for February 2007. The 18-month hearing was continued several times to permit extended unsupervised visits between mother and the children, including overnight and weekend visits. The social worker reported that mother interacted positively with the children during supervised visits and that mother had made continued progress on her case plan. Mother was also in compliance with her drug court program requirements. The social worker opined that mother was demonstrating her ability to maintain a clean and sober life for herself and the children. The father was incarcerated.
Two days before the continued 18-month review hearing, the social worker filed a new report now recommending that the court terminate reunification services for mother and father and set a selection and implementation hearing. The father had apparently been released from prison and had listed the mother’s address as his parole address. The social worker apparently had requested an alternate address for father, which had not been provided. The 18-month hearing was delayed yet again. In an addendum report, the social worker remained concerned that, although mother had made significant progress on her case plan, she might still lack judgment to protect the children if she were permitting father to reside in the home.
The contested hearing was finally conducted in August 2007. The juvenile court found that reasonable services had been provided, and terminated services to both parents. The court set a selection and implementation hearing for December 19, 2007.
ANALYSIS
Mother’s petition contends that the juvenile court erred in setting a selection and implementation hearing to terminate parental rights. Mother argues that the court should instead have ordered the children returned to her care as she had substantially complied with all aspects of her case plan. She urges that she had demonstrated benefit from her plan services and that there was no substantial risk of detriment to the children if they were returned to her care.
Mother contends that insufficient evidence supported the court’s finding of detriment under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21, subdivision (f). We review the finding under the substantial evidence test. (Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689, 705.) We resolve all conflicts in favor of the court’s ruling, examining the entire record. (In re John V. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1212.)
Two witnesses testified at the hearing: the social worker and mother. The social worker testified that, for the first six months of the reunification period, mother had not addressed her issues nor had contact with the children. Mother had begun progressing on her case plan within the calendar year 2007, i.e., about eight or nine months before the hearing. Early in 2007, DPSS had begun considering returning the children to mother. DPSS had begun to make arrangements for increased unsupervised visitation. The children did have a few overnight visits with mother, and then, within days before DPSS was to place the children with mother for an extended stay, the father paroled to the residence where mother was living.
Mother’s attorney questioned the social worker whether she had checked with the parole board to determine whether the father indeed was paroled to mother’s residence. The social worker could not remember actually confirming with the parole board, but, she stated, “I didn’t see why father would lie where he paroled to. Mother and father met with me and reported that he paroled to her residence.” In fact, mother and father initially told the social worker they wanted to be a family together.
When the social worker objected and expressed concern about mother permitting unsupervised contact between the children and father, then the parents “spoke about the father living somewhere else.”
The social worker’s concerns were not alleged, because, even after the problem with father living in the home had been pointed out, mother also permitted another man, also recently released from prison, to parole to her residence. The social worker was concerned whether mother would be able to provide a protective environment for the children.
In addition to concerns about mother’s judgment in protecting the children, the social worker noted that, within the last one or two months before the hearing, mother had missed some 12-step recovery meetings, and had a no-show for one or two drug tests. Mother was participating in a family preservation drug court program; the program reported that mother was compliant, despite having had a recent no-show. The social worker was nevertheless concerned about the consistency of mother’s participation in her drug abuse recovery program.
The social worker conceded that mother had maintained consistent contact with the children for eight or nine months, and that mother had not provided a positive drug test in that time.
Mother testified that, when father was released from prison, she was unaware that he had given her address as his parole residence.
As to the other man who had paroled to mother’s residence, mother stated, “I don’t live with no man. I have friends in recovery that are males and females. I am very active in meetings in the [C]ity of Moreno Valley.”
Father’s attorney secured a stipulation that, if called to testify, father would state that he had enrolled in an outpatient drug treatment program, he was compliant with the conditions of his parole, and “he does not live with the mother at this time.”
The deputy county counsel argued that mother had not been honest in denying knowledge that father had been paroled to her residence: “She and father came in and said the father was paroled to her home, and they planned on being a couple. Since then apparently they’ve split.” Mother had also allowed another man, a drug abuser, into her home. “He may be in recovery, but he was living in the home as well. All this was going on during the time period when we were looking at overnights with mother . . . .” In addition, mother’s recent lack of compliance with her drug program “says a lot toward her lack of dealing with her drug abuse issues.”
The children’s attorney also argued that services should be terminated: “For mom to be making choices allowing dad to parole to her house, allowing another person to be in the home who has a questionable background as well, then the two no shows as well as noncompliance with the three NA/AA meetings [leads to] concern as to mother’s stability and her recovery.”
Father’s attorney effectively undercut mother’s testimony that she had no knowledge that father had paroled to her residence: “Father does not reside there. He did regret paroling there. As soon as he realized it was going to be a problem, he made efforts and resides with another relative.”
Mother’s attorney also admitted that father had stayed at the residence “for one night or not sure how long.”
The juvenile court, having considered all the evidence, the reports, and the arguments, found that returning the children to mother’s custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to them.
Substantial evidence supported this determination. (Constance K. v. Superior Court, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th 689, 705; see also In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 974.) The case had gone on for 24 months. Mother had not begun making substantial progress on her case plan until relatively recently. As yet, mother had not progressed beyond unsupervised overnight visitation. Almost as soon as mother began her recovery, she jeopardized it by making poor choices. Although mother denied knowledge that father had paroled to her residence, the court was entitled to credit the contrary evidence, including the social worker’s report of face-to-face meetings where mother and father both expressed their intention to live as a couple. Mother had also begun missing drug tests and the required 12-step recovery meetings.
The juvenile court was entitled, under these factual circumstances, to find that immediately returning the children to mother’s care would place them at a substantial risk of detriment. The problem that initiated the dependency was mother’s and father’s long-standing abuse of drugs. Mother was at last beginning to address the issue, but had not yet demonstrated a stable commitment to sober living. What she had demonstrated was a lack of clear judgment about, and an uncertain commitment to, the children’s safety.
Counsel argues that the court has demanded too much. “We are looking for passing grades, not straight A’s.” (David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 790.) Here, although mother had made significant progress on the components of her treatment plan in the early part of the year, her own actions thereafter cast doubt on the quality of her grades. Mother’s actions in inviting convicted drug abusers to reside at her home amounted to an “F” in judgment. The juvenile court properly found that the children could not safely be returned to mother’s care. The court acted properly in terminating reunification services and setting a selection and implementation hearing.
DISPOSITION
Mother’s petition is denied.
We concur: RAMIREZ P. J., RICHLI J.