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Nordstrom, Inc. v. Gaul
108 Or. App. 237 (Or. Ct. App. 1991)4 Citing cases
Boeing Co. v. Young
858 P.2d 484 (Or. Ct. App. 1993)A mental disorder is compensable as a consequence of a work-related accidental injury if the injury materially caused the mental disorder. Nordstrom, Inc. v. Gaul, 108 Or. App. 237, 240, 815 P.2d 710 (1991). ORS 656.005(7) has since been amended to provide that
Clarke v. Saif
120 Or. App. 11 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) Cited 5 timesIn Clarke v. SAIF, 120 Or.App. 11, 852 P.2d 208 (1993), we rejected the claimant's contention that he was not medically stationary because his doctor had prescribed a leg brace to support his weak leg and ankle.
Medical treatment for the improvement of a psychological condition may be considered in determining whether a claimant is medically stationary. Nordstrom, Inc. v. Gaul, 108 Or. App. 237, 815 P.2d 710 (1991). However, claimant misses the crucial distinction between that situation and his own.
Boeing Co. v. Viltrakis
829 P.2d 738 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) Cited 6 timesIn Boeing Co. v. Viltrakis, 112 Or. App. 396, 829 P.2d 738 (1992), the issue was whether the claimant's mental condition, which was caused by stress resulting from having suffered a compensable injury, was subject to the provisions of ORS 656.802(2).
Employer focuses on the emphasized language as support for its conclusion that the provisions of ORS 656.802(2) apply any time that a person seeks compensation for the effects of work-related stress. We held in American Nursing v. Yost, 108 Or. App. 243, 815 P.2d 708 (1991), and Nordstrom, Inc. v. Gaul, 108 Or. App. 237, 815 P.2d 710 (1991), that, when a claimant merely seeks to recover benefits for the consequences of a compensable injury, but does not seek to establish independently the compensability of a mental disorder, the provisions of ORS 656.802 do not apply. See Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Page, 73 Or. App. 136, 398 P.2d 61 (1985); Grace v. SAIF, 76 Or. App. 511, 709 P.2d 1146 (1985). If the condition is compensable, it is because it is related to the compensable injury, not because it is independently work-connected.
American Nursing v. Yost
815 P.2d 708 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) Cited 2 timesThe Board applied the correct legal standard. Nordstrom, Inc. v. Gaul, 108 Or. App. 237, 815 P.2d 710 (1991). Employer also assigns error to the Board's finding that the injury was a material contributing cause of the psychological condition. It argues that there was no substantial evidence to support that finding. It asserts that the condition preexisted the injury and was not worsened by it. It further asserts that the diagnoses of Brown and Glass are unpersuasive.