Flav-O-Rich, Inc. v. City of Birmingham, 476 So.2d 46, 48 (Ala. 1985). This court will not "read into [a] statute something which the legislature did not include[,] although it could have easily done so."Noonan v. East-West Beltline, Inc., 487 So.2d 237, 239 (Ala. 1986). The revenue commissioners assert that the attorney general's opinion is a correct interpretation of § 23-1-81(d), Ala. Code 1975.

And "[i]t is not proper for a court to read into the statute something which the legislature did not include although it could have easily done so." Noonan v. East-West Beltline, Inc., 487 So.2d 237, 239 (Ala. 1986). "The judiciary will not add that which the Legislature chose to omit."

‘It is not proper for a court to read into the statute something which the legislature did not include although it could have easily done so.’ Noonan v. East-West Beltline, Inc., 487 So. 2d 237, 239 (Ala. 1986) (emphasis added). Instead, in determining the meaning of a statute, this Court must look to ‘the plain meaning of the words as written by the legislature.’

"It is not proper for a court to read into the statute something which the legislature did not include although it could have easily done so." Noonan v. East–West Beltline, Inc., 487 So.2d 237, 239 (Ala. 1986).We note that the MVSRA still has a field of operation even though Alabama requires that all owners or drivers obtain liability coverage before obtaining a driver's license or registering a motor vehicle. If a person does not comply with the MLIA and obtain liability insurance and that person is involved in an accident, the MVSRA applies. If that person was required to provide "proof of liability coverage" under § 32–7–22, that policy would have to comply with the express terms of § 32–7–22, including permissive drivers. If a person involved in an accident was thought to be uninsured and that person had insurance, then § 32–7–6 of the MVSRA would apply and that person's "automobile liability insurance" policy would be an exception to security and a suspended license.

This Court must accordingly refrain from creating such a distinction of our own accord. See, e.g., Noonan v. East – West Beltline, Inc. , 487 So.2d 237, 239 (Ala.1986) ("It is not proper for a court to read into the statute something which the legislature did not include although it could have easily done so."). The police plaintiffs have identified no ambiguity or vagueness in § 36-27-1(14).

We note the trial court's action in entering a summary judgment in favor of Mayor Ephriam and the City of Prichard was primarily based on its conclusion that the appointment of fire chief under § 11–43C–38(a) cannot extend beyond the term of the appointing mayor, explaining that the fire chief's appointment and service “is inexorably linked to that of the appointing mayor” and “[t]his appointing authority is essential so that an incoming mayor's specific public safety directives may be properly carried out, and that his/or general executive, administrative, and supervisory powers may be properly executed.” However, as properly noted by Trenier, had the legislature intended to limit the term of fire chief to the term of the appointing mayor, the legislature could have added language to this effect, but it did not. See Noonan v. East–West Beltline, Inc., 487 So.2d 237, 239 (Ala.1986) (“It is not proper for a court to read into the statute something which the legislature did not include although it could have easily done so.”). Accordingly, although the trial court's legal conclusion appears logical under the circumstances, this Court cannot not read into § 11–43C–38(a) something the legislature did not include. Id.--------

The legislature, however, did not do so, and this Court may not read into the statute language the legislature did not include. See City of Pinson v. Utilities Bd. of Oneonta, 986 So.2d 367, 373 (Ala.2007) (‘ “It is not proper for a court to read into the statute something which the legislature did not include although it could have easily done so.” ’ (quoting Noonan v. East–West Beltline, Inc., 487 So.2d 237, 239 (Ala.1986))); Ware v. Timmons, 954 So.2d 545, 556 (Ala.2006) (‘[W]e presume “that the legislature does not intend to make any alteration in the law beyond what it explicitly declares.” ’ (quoting Duncan v. Rudulph, 245 Ala. 175, 176, 16 So.2d 313, 314 (1944))).

The legislature could have listed administrators ad litem as proper parties, or alternate parties, to bring a wrongful-death proceeding if it had chosen to do so. See Noonan v. East–West Beltline, Inc., 487 So.2d 237, 239 (Ala.1986) (“It is not proper for a court to read into the statute something which the legislature did not include although it could have easily done so.”). The requirements for prosecuting a wrongful-death action in Alabama are contained in § 6–5–410, Code of Ala.1975, which provides:

Alabama–Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 694 So.2d 1344, 1346 (Ala.1997). The probate judge cites Noonan v. East–West Beltline, Inc., 487 So.2d 237 (Ala.1986), in support of his position that there is no statutory requirement under § 40–22–2 that the debt being secured be the mortgagor's debt. In Noonan, East–West Beltline, Inc., owned all the outstanding stock in Bel Air Corporation. Bel Air entered into two separate financing transactions with a bank.

Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 694 So. 2d 1344, 1346 (Ala. 1997). The probate judge cites Noonan v. East-West Beltline, Inc., 487 So. 2d 237 (Ala. 1986), in support of his position that there is no statutory requirement under § 40-22-2 that the debt being secured be the mortgagor's debt. In Noonan, East-West Beltline, Inc., owned all the outstanding stock in Bel Air Corporation. Bel Air entered into two separate financing transactions with a bank.