Nonnenmann v. Lucky Stores, Inc.

6 Citing cases

  1. Wheeler v. Southport Seven Planned Unit Dev.

    2012 N.D. 201 (N.D. 2012)   Cited 17 times
    Comparing restrictive covenants to zoning ordinances as tools to restrict the use of real property

    “In most cases, the appropriate relief has been an injunction against future breaches and, if necessary, damages for past breaches.” Id. at § 60.07 (citing Nonnenmann v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 53 Ill.App.3d 509, 10 Ill.Dec. 714, 368 N.E.2d 200 (1977); Peters v. Davis, 426 Pa. 231, 231 A.2d 748 (1967); Albright v. Fish, 138 Vt. 585, 422 A.2d 250, 252 (1980)). [¶ 13] In the context of restrictive covenants, we have said a landowner may sell land subject to covenants so long as they are not contrary to public policy.

  2. Wheeler v. Southport Seven Planned Unit Dev.

    2012 N.D. 201 (N.D. 2012)

    "In most cases, the appropriate relief has been an injunction against future breaches and, if necessary, damages for past breaches." Id. at § 60.07 (citing Nonnenmann v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 368 N.E.2d 200 (Ill. Ct. App. 1977); Peters v. Davis, 231 A.2d 748 (Pa. 1967); Albright v. Fish, 422 A.2d 250, 252 (Vt. 1980)). [¶13] In the context of restrictive covenants, we have said a landowner may sell land subject to covenants so long as they are not contrary to public policy.

  3. Pelosi v. Wailea Ranch Estates

    91 Haw. 478 (Haw. 1999)   Cited 20 times
    Remanding case to the ICA for reconsideration in light of this court's holding

    Many jurisdictions apply the test of "relative hardship," also called "balancing the equities," to property owners who breach covenants without deliberateness or intent. See Nonnemann v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 368 N.E.2d 200, 204 (Ill.App.Ct. 1977) (noting that a court will apply the relative hardship test except "where encroachment by a defendant was intentional" (citation omitted)); Horvath v. Gladstone, 637 P.2d 531, 533 (Nev. 1981) (applying a balancing of the equities where the purchaser performed no act in violation of the restrictions); Hunsicker v. Katz, 456 A.2d 576, 580 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1983) (applying the relative hardship test where "the appellees' encroachment was the result of an unintentional mistake"); Harksen v. Peska, 581 N.W.2d 170, 176 (S.D. 1998) (noting that "[a] critical factor in balancing equities is that the party being enjoined knew that he was violating the covenant"); Hollis v. Garwall, Inc., 974 P.2d 836, 845 (Wash. 1999) (observing that the doctrine of balancing the equities "is reserved for the innocent defendant who proceeds without knowledge or warning that his activity encroaches upon another's property rights" (emphasis added)); see also Lange v. Schofield, 567 So.2d 1299, 1302 (Ala. 1990) (apply

  4. Shoub Props., LLC v. Vill. of Glen Ellyn

    2021 Ill. App. 2d 200342 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021)

    Case law also supports the plaintiffs' proposition. See Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 150 Ill.App.3d 357, 385 (1986) (neighbors alleging that a proposed development violated a zoning ordinance); Nonnenmann v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 53 Ill.App.3d 509, 512 (1977) (plaintiff contesting the defendant's proposed use of the property). We therefore agree that the plaintiffs need not wait until construction has commenced to bring this suit.

  5. Flying Diamond Airpark v. Meienberg

    215 Ariz. 44 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 153 times

    The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of injunctive relief and noted that "[t]he equitable principle of relative hardship is available only to innocent parties who proceed without knowledge or warning that they are acting contrary to others' vested property rights." Id. at 495 (emphasis added); see also Nonnenmann v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 368 N.E.2d 200, 204 (Ill.App.Ct. 1977) ("Since the violative improvements were completed in the face of plaintiff s assertion of right, and therefore must be considered to be intentional, we believe that we should not undertake a balancing of hardships under the circumstances as shown by the record in this case."). ¶ 20 In his reply brief, Meienberg cites Dr ulard v. LeTourneau, 593 P.2d 1118 (Or. 1979), in support of his position that the burden on him would outweigh any benefit to Flying Diamond.

  6. Dixon v. City of Monticello

    223 Ill. App. 3d 549 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 21 times
    Noting that the remedy of specific performance is granted to prevent injustice and because “perfect justice cannot be done at law”

    Among the stipulated facts were (1) by letter of the city attorney dated August 24, 1989, the City indicated it anticipated a permit for the construction of the parking lot would issue; (2) the attorney's opinion was expressed in a letter dated July 14, 1989, to the effect that the zoning ordinance allowed the construction of the parking lot on the subject property; and (3) because of the litigation instituted by the objectors, the permit to build the parking lot did not issue. The three cases mainly relied on by the objectors are Parkview Colonial Manor Investment Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals (1979), 70 Ill. App.3d 577, 388 N.E.2d 877, Nonnenmann v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1977), 53 Ill. App.3d 509, 368 N.E.2d 200, and Williams v. City of Bloomington (1969), 108 Ill. App.2d 307, 247 N.E.2d 446. In Parkview, plaintiff petitioned for a special use permit to construct two 75-unit three-story apartments on a parcel zoned single-family residence (SR-1).