Because the plain language of OCGA § 16-15-4 (m) indicates the legislature's intent to punish as "separate offense[s]" violations of subsections (a) and (b), charged violations of those subsections cannot merge. See Nolley v. State , 335 Ga. App. 539, 545 (2), 782 S.E.2d 446 (2016) (discussing how the express language of subsection (m) illustrates the legislature's intent "that any crime committed in violation of [the Gang Act] is a separate offense which does not merge with another separate offense under the Code section or with any predicate offense listed in the Code section"). In this case, where Monroe was found guilty of numerous violations of both OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) and (b), the convictions for violating those two subsections do not merge for sentencing purposes.

As we have previously held, each of the statutory subsections quoted above, even if arising from the same transaction, "expresses the Legislature's intention to create a single crime, committed by a person already a member or associated with the gang," with the Legislature having "the power to criminalize multiple convictions or punishments arising out of the same transaction." Nolley v. State , 335 Ga. App. 539, 547 (2), 782 S.E.2d 446 (2016) ; see also Johnson v. State , 313 Ga. 155, 159 (4), 868 S.E.2d 226 (2022) ("the text of the statute itself best reflects the legislative choice of whether a particular course of conduct involves one or more distinct ‘offenses’ under the statute") (citation and punctuation omitted). In other words, each subsection of OCGA § 16-15-4 provides an individual unit of prosecution, even if the conduct underlying the multiple charges is the same.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Nolley v. State, 335 Ga.App. 539, 543 (1) (782 S.E.2d 446) (2016).

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Nolley v. State, 335 Ga.App. 539, 545 (2) (782 S.E.2d 446) (2016).

The law permits expert testimony on gang culture and activities generally, and based on the witness's qualifications, he should have been able to testify on that subject. See Nolley v. State , 335 Ga. App. 539, 543 (1), 782 S.E.2d 446 (2016) (where defendant was alleged to be a member of the Gangster Disciples, the State qualified a witness from the GBI as an expert in "criminal street gangs and gang-related culture, trends, and customs"). Moreover, the trial court entered a pretrial order stating that "expert testimony on gangs, their history, activities and culture, including those of the alleged gang in this case, shall be admissible at the trial of this case."

OCGA § 16–15–4 prohibits participation in criminal gang activity, and subsection (m) provides that "[a]ny crime committed in violation of this Code section shall be considered a separate offense."Nolley v. State , 335 Ga. App. 539, 545 (2), 782 S.E.2d 446 (2016). Consequently, we conclude that the trial court did not err in imposing separate sentences on Counts 1, 3, and 5.

Because both counts three and four charged Gibbs with fleeing from Officer Stuckey after having been given a proper signal to stop from Officer Stuckey, the unit of prosecution under both counts is the same and the counts merged. See Nolley v. State , 335 Ga.App. 539, 547 (2), 782 S.E.2d 446 (2016) ("The [s]tate's indictment charging violation of one offense in two counts ... was multiplicitous, and resulted in [defendant] being punished twice for a single offense."). Compare Smith , 290 Ga. at 774 (3), 723 S.E.2d 915 (finding no merger required for five counts of attempting to elude a police officer where defendant led police on a chase "after being given clear signals by five separate police vehicles to stop" because unit of prosecution under OCGA § 40-6-395 was act of fleeing from an individual police vehicle or officer after being given the signal to stop by that vehicle or officer).

See Jones v. State, 292 Ga. 656, 659 (1) (b), 740 S.E.2d 590 (2013) (listing the evidence necessary to prove a violation of the Criminal Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act).Nolley v. State, 335 Ga.App. 539, 543 (1), 782 S.E.2d 446 (2016) (punctuation omitted) (emphasis supplied); accord Jones, 292 Ga. at 659, 740 S.E.2d 590 ; see also In the Interest of C. P., 296 Ga.App. at 575, 675 S.E.2d 287 ("[O]ur Supreme Court has ... held that a conviction under OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) requires that there be some nexus between the enumerated act and an intent to further street gang activity." (punctuation omitted)).

Accordingly, this enumeration is without merit. 335 Ga.App. 539, 782 S.E.2d 446 (2016). See id. at 544–545(2), 782 S.E.2d 446.

”Nolley v. State, 335 Ga.App. 539, 545(2), 782 S.E.2d 446 (2016).Here, a review of the statutory elements of felony obstruction and aggravated assault demonstrates that they are two separate offenses.