Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-0491-D.
June 30, 2003.
ORDER
Defendant Quality Estates, Inc. ("Quality") moves to dismiss plaintiff Vanessa E. Noles' ("Noles'") claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The court denies the motion.
Noles also sues to recover under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.
The Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan adopted by this court provides that "[e]ach judge will continue to give priority to the monitoring and resolution of pending motions." Plan at § XI (2) ( reprinted in Texas Rules of Court: Federal at 282 (West Pamp. Supp. 2003)). To eliminate undue delay and unnecessary expense to the parties to this and other civil actions pending on the court's docket, and because the court has determined that the motion is suitable for resolution in this manner, the court is deciding this motion by order rather than by a more detailed memorandum opinion.
Noles maintains that Quality violated the ADA by discriminating against her based on her association with her mother, who is terminally ill with cancer. See Compl. ¶¶ 5, 8. Quality moves to dismiss the ADA claim on the ground that Noles' mother's cancer is not a disability under the ADA because, although it is terminal, it is temporary. Quality may be able to demonstrate on motion for summary judgment that Noles' ADA claim should be dismissed. At the Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) stage, however, it has not met its burden.
"`[T]he motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.'" Kaiser Aluminum Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Charles A. Wright Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357, at 598 (1969)). "[D]ismissal of a claim on the basis of barebones pleadings is a `precarious disposition with a high mortality rate.'" Id. (quoting Barber v. Motor Vessel "Blue Cat," 372 F.2d 626, 627 (5th Cir. 1967)). "The court may dismiss a claim when it is clear that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (Rule 12(c) decision) (citing Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1990)). "In analyzing the complaint, [the court] will accept all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id. (citing Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 1395, 1401 (5th Cir. 1996)). "Thus, the court should not dismiss the claim unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts or any possible theory that he could prove consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Id. (citing Vander Zee v. Reno, 73 F.3d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1996)).
"The question of whether plaintiff's cancer is a qualifying disability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry to be determined on a case-by-case basis." Alderdice v. Am. Health Holding, Inc., 118 F. Supp.2d 856, 863 (S.D. Ohio 2000). Under such circumstances, the court cannot dismiss this claim based on the allegations of the complaint alone, which provide insufficient details concerning the specific circumstances of Noles' mother's cancer. Additionally, viewing the complaint favorably to Noles and drawing all inferences in her favor, the court cannot say that the duration of her mother's illness is sufficiently brief that it does not qualify as a disability.
In Alderdice the court held on motion for summary judgment that the plaintiff's cancer was a temporary condition that did not qualify as a disability under the ADA. Alderdice, 118 F. Supp.2d at 864.
Noles' response to Quality's motion to dismiss was due June 16, 2003. See N.D. Tex. Civ. R. 7.1(e). Her failure to respond deprived the court of her assistance in understanding the basis for her ADA claim. Despite that failure, the court holds that Quality's motion must be denied.
Accordingly, Quality's May 27, 2003 motion to dismiss is denied.