Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3261-14T2
06-24-2016
YANERIS MERCEDES NOLASCO, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, and MIRACA LIFE SCIENCES, Respondents.
Yaneris Mercedes Nolasco, appellant pro se. Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review, (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Nicole M. DeMuro, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent Miraca Life Sciences has not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Simonelli and Gooden Brown. On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Docket No. 040,627. Yaneris Mercedes Nolasco, appellant pro se. Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review, (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Nicole M. DeMuro, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent Miraca Life Sciences has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Yaneris Mercedes Nolasco (Nolasco) appeals the February 13, 2015 agency decision of the Board of Review (Board) finding her ineligible for extended unemployment benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-60(c) and N.J.A.C. 12:23-5.1(b) on the ground that she failed to receive approval from a qualified counselor before enrolling in a training program. Because the Board's decision comports with governing statutes and is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record, we affirm.
I.
Nolasco was employed as an Accessioner at Miraca Life Sciences (Miraca) from December 31, 2013 to August 26, 2014, when she was terminated from her position. According to Nolasco, she was terminated because her employer refused to adjust her work schedule to accommodate her childcare needs. Following her termination, Nolasco applied for and received unemployment benefits.
On October 27, 2014, Nolasco visited the One Stop Career Center in East Orange to obtain information about the unemployment training program. During her visit, she spoke with an office clerk who "explained how it works." After speaking with the clerk, Nolasco understood that if she wanted to attend school, and she "didn't need [] funds," she could "just go [on her] own." According to Nolasco, she was only required "to go through the training . . . if they were going to give [her] the funds and [she believed] it was like $4,000[]."
Without obtaining prior approval from a qualified counselor, Nolasco self-enrolled in a full-time, two-year, cardiovascular ultrasound technician program at Iswick College in Nutley. Thereafter, Nolasco exhausted her benefit entitlement under the initial claim and applied for additional benefits. The Deputy of the Division of Unemployment and Disability Insurance (Deputy) later denied her claim stating that she was ineligible for additional unemployment benefits during training. Subsequently, Nolasco tried to obtain the requisite pre-approval by attending the "orientation" but was told "that there was nothing that they could do" and that "they could not give [her any] funds or anything like that because [she] was already going to school."
On December 8, 2014, Nolasco appealed the Deputy's decision to the New Jersey Department of Labor Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal). On January 2, 2015, a telephonic hearing was conducted before an appeals examiner, after which the Tribunal affirmed the Deputy's determination pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-60(c) and N.J.A.C. 12:23-5.1(b) on the ground that Nolasco self-enrolled in training without the prior approval of a qualified counselor. On January 13, 2015, Nolasco appealed the Tribunal's decision to the Board and on February 13, 2015, the Board affirmed. On March 2, 2015, Nolasco filed a Notice of Appeal. This appeal followed.
II.
Our review of an administrative agency's final decision is limited. Frazier v. Bd. of Review, Dep't of Labor, 439 N.J. Super. 130, 133 (App. Div. 2015). "[I]n reviewing the factual findings made in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the test is not whether an appellate court would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was its to make, but rather whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs." Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997) (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)).
Thus, "[a]n administrative agency's final quasi-judicial decision will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record." In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007) (citing Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963)). As the Court noted in Herrmann, "[t]hree channels of inquiry inform the appellate review function . . . ." Id. at 28. These are:
(1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law;
(2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and"When an agency's decision meets [these] criteria, then a court owes substantial deference to the agency's expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field." Ibid.
(3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
[Ibid. (quoting Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995) (citing Campbell, supra, 39 N.J. at 562)).]
In 1992, the Legislature established the Workforce Development Partnership Program (WDP) in response to its findings that many individuals were permanently displaced from the workforce, that employers were experiencing serious difficulties in finding skilled workers, and that the shortage of skilled labor would continue throughout the 1990s and beyond. N.J.S.A. 43:21-57. The WDP was created to "increase the effectiveness of programs which provide retraining to displaced workers." N.J.S.A. 43:21-57(f). Under the WDP, eligible individuals may receive up to twenty-six weeks of additional benefits equal to their regular weekly unemployment rate while they take part in approved retraining programs. N.J.S.A. 43:21-61.
To be eligible for the extended benefits, the individual must meet certain enumerated criteria and must adhere to procedural requirements. Alexander v. Bd. of Review, 405 N.J. Super. 408, 411 (App. Div. 2009). N.J.S.A. 43:21-60(c) authorizes the payment of extended benefits during education and training to an individual who "[e]nters into the counseling made available [by the Department of Labor and Workforce Development (Department)] as soon as possible following notification by the Department [] of its availability."
The purpose of the counseling is to assist the individual in obtaining the employment and training services most likely to enable the individual to obtain employment providing self-sufficiency for the individual and also to provide the individual with the greatest opportunity for long-range career advancement with high levels of productivity and earning power.The implementing regulation, N.J.A.C. 12:23-5.1(b), provides that "[n]o additional benefits shall be payable to an individual who self-enrolls in a training program without the prior approval of a qualified counselor unless the individual was previously enrolled in such training prior to lay-off . . . ."
[N. J.S.A. 43:21-59.]
In Alexander, this court determined that N.J.A.C. 12:23-5.1(a)(2) was inconsistent with N.J.S.A. 43:21-60(a). Alexander v. Bd. of Review, supra, 405 N.J. Super. at 416. As a result, the court invalidated the regulatory provision and considered appellant's eligibility for additional benefits in light of the statutory language contained in N.J.S.A. 43:21-60. Id. The court did not, however, address the section of the regulation that is the subject of this appeal. --------
Here, relying on N.J.S.A. 43:21-60(c) and N.J.A.C. 12:23-5.1(b), the Board determined that Nolasco was ineligible for additional benefits because, by her own admission, she failed to participate in Workforce training following her termination from Miraca and she neither met with, nor obtained prior approval from, a qualified counselor prior to enrolling in a training program. Although Nolasco attempted to rectify this error by subsequently attending the orientation training, Workforce staff informed her "there was nothing they could do [since] [she] was in school already." On this record, we are satisfied that the Board properly interpreted the statute and applicable rule in denying Nolasco additional benefits.
Nolasco argues that she was misinformed by a clerk in the Unemployment Office and that she was unaware of the rules and regulations to be followed before enrolling in school. We reject both claims. The statute and the applicable rule are clear regarding the eligibility requirements and Nolasco's ignorance of the requirements, while unfortunate, does not vitiate those requirements. It would obviously have an adverse impact on the orderly management of the unemployment compensation system were the agency required to consider ignorance of the law to be good cause for failing to comply with regulatory strictures of the program. See State v. Moran, 202 N.J. 311, 320 (2009) ("[N]oting, 'common maxim, familiar to all minds, that ignorance of the law will not excuse any person, either civilly or criminally.'" (quoting Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 404, 411, 8 L. Ed. 728, 731 (1833))).
Further, Nolasco was not misinformed by the clerk because an individual can attend a training program on their own without counselor approval as long as the individual is not seeking benefits. According to Nolasco, her understanding after speaking to the clerk was just that, namely, that if she wanted to attend school, and she "didn't need [] funds," she could "just go [on her] own," which she did. Since the findings of fact and conclusions of law are in accord with the applicable statutes and supported by substantial credible evidence in the record, we discern no basis to disturb the Board's decision. Messick v. Bd. of Review, 420 N.J. Super. 321, 330 (App. Div. 2011).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION