Thus, the court in Leese agreed with the Third Circuit's characterization of employment discrimination as an injury to property rights and therefore applied the statute of limitations applicable to tortious injury to property rights. The Appellate Division first considered the issue in Nolan v. Otis Elevator Co., 197 N.J. Super. 468, 485 A.2d 312 (App.Div. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 102 N.J. 30, 505 A.2d 580, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 820, 107 S.Ct. 84, 93 L.Ed.2d 38 (1986). The court in Nolan adopted the six-year statute of limitations of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 without any analysis of the issue.
Every New Jersey lower court that has decided the issue has found the six-year statute of limitations to be applicable. See Id. at 644; see e.g., Fisher v. Quaker Oats Co., 233 N.J. Super. 319, 320, 559 A.2d 1 (App.Div.), cert. denied, 117 N.J. 628, 569 A.2d 1331 (1989); Nolan v. Otis Elevator, 197 N.J. Super. 468, 473-74, 485 A.2d 312 (Law Div. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 102 N.J. 30, 505 A.2d 580, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 820, 107 S.Ct. 84, 93 L.Ed.2d 38 (1986); Leese v. Doe, 182 N.J. Super. at 321, 440 A.2d 1166. Moreover, subsequent lower court decisions in New Jersey have held the six-year statute of limitations should be applied to NJLAD claims without relying on the decision in Leese.
Every New Jersey state court to address this issue has applied the six-year statute of limitations to claims under the NJLAD. See Nolan v. Otis Elevator Co., 197 N.J. Super. 468, 473-74, 485 A.2d 312 (App.Div. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 102 N.J. 30, 505 A.2d 580, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 820, 107 S.Ct. 84, 93 L.Ed.2d 38 (1986); Leese v. Doe, 182 N.J. Super. 318, 321, 440 A.2d 1166 (Law Div. 1981); see also Fisher v. Quaker Oats Co., 233 N.J. Super. 319, 320, 559 A.2d 1 (App.Div.), cert. denied, 117 N.J. 628, 569 A.2d 1331 (1989); Skadegaard v. Farrell, 578 F. Supp. 1209, 1213-14 (D.N.J. 1984).
Although there are no New Jersey decisions which have specifically addressed the question, it appears that the New Jersey courts do apply the six year statute of limitations. In Nolan v. Otis Elevator Co., 197 N.J. Super. 468, 485 A.2d 312 (App.Div. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 102 N.J. 30, 505 A.2d 580 (1986), cert. den., 479 U.S. 820, 107 S.Ct. 84, 93 L.Ed.2d 38 (1986), a case decided before Goodman, the Supreme Court, in reversing the Appellate Division held that the federal age discrimination in employment act preempted a state court action which was brought under NJLAD after the expiration of the statute of limitations governing the federal act. Although the Supreme Court did not specifically state the statute of limitations applicable to NJLAD claims, the Appellate Division did do so but did it in dicta and without explanation.
Minn.Stat. ยง 363.03, subd. 9. The parties strenuously dispute whether ERISA preempts Minn.Stat. ยง 363.03, subd. 9, see 29 U.S.C. ยง 1144(a) and (d); Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1214 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968, 102 S.Ct. 512, 70 L.Ed.2d 384 (1981); Nolan v. Otis Elevator Co., 197 N.J. Super. 468, 485 A.2d 312, 314-15 (App.Div. 1984). The Court, however, need not reach this issue since plaintiff's state cause of action for interference with pension rights fails for the same reason that his federal claim based on ERISA fails. (To the extent that plaintiff's count 9 is actually seeking to redress age discrimination, plaintiff still has a remedy in count 1 (ADEA) and count 2 (MHRA).)
N.J.S.A. 10:5-18. That limitation does not apply to Superior Court actions. Nolan v. Otis Elevator Inc., 197 N.J. Super. 468, 473, 485 A.2d 312 (App.Div. 1984), rev'd on othergrounds, 102 N.J. 30, 505 A.2d 580, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 820, 107 S.Ct. 84, 93 L.Ed.2d 38 (1986). To discern the legislative intent on the applicable statute of limitations in a judicial action, we must look beyond the words of the statute.
Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 306-307, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 238-239, 448 N.E.2d 86, 92 (1983). See also Nolan v. Otis Elevator Co., 197 N.J. Super. 468, 485 A.2d 312 (1984), reversed on other grounds, 102 N.J. 30, 505 A.2d 580, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 820, 107 S.Ct. 84, 93 L.Ed.2d 38 (1986); Morris v. Kaiser Engineers, Inc., 14 Ohio St.3d 45, 14 O.B.R. 440, 471 N.E.2d 471 (1984). In summary, we think it is clear that the circuit court erred in concluding that the appellant's civil action was barred by his failure to file his complaint within ninety days of the alleged act of discrimination.
On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, finding that a sufficient interrelationship exists between the NJLAD and the ADEA so that enforcement of the federal law would be hampered if the state law were preempted. The court therefore concluded that even a limited preemption of a right of direct suit under the NJLAD would impair the ADEA. 197 N.J. Super. 468, 472-73. We granted the defendant's petition for certification.
Petition for certification granted. (See 197 N.J. Super. 468)
The limitations period applicable to an action does not depend on the historical antecedents of the cause of action pleaded, but on the nature of the damages claimed. Burns v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 20 N.J. 37, 39-40, 118 A.2d 544 (1955); Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 118 N.J. Super. 116, 119-20, 286 A.2d 718 (App.Div. 1972), aff'd, 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973); Nolan v. Otis Elevator Co., 197 N.J. Super. 468, 473-74, 485 A.2d 312 (App.Div. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 102 N.J. 30, 505 A.2d 580 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 820, 107 S.Ct. 84, 93 L.Ed.2d 38 (1986); Montells v. Haynes, 258 N.J. Super. 563, 567-78, 610 A.2d 898 (App.Div.), certif. granted, 130 N.J. 601, 617 A.2d 1223 (1992).