Defendant contends the trial court erred in awarding Plaintiff attorney fees without considering the child support payments received by Plaintiff. In support of this contention, Defendant cites Nolan v. Nolanand Theokas v. Theokas.In Nolan v. Nolan,20 N.C.App. 550, 202 S.E.2d 344 (1974), this Court held the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to the defendant on her motion for increased alimony and child support. There, although we found the trial court failed to make sufficient findings on the defendant's ability to defray the expense of suit, we suggested that, under different circumstances, an income calculation that included child support and alimony awards would be proper.
We have uniformly rejected claims by or on behalf of adult children for support for college education. See Nolan v. Nolan, 20 N.C. App. 550, 202 S.E.2d 344, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 234, 204 S.E.2d 24 (1974); Crouch v. Crouch, 14 N.C. App. 49, 187 S.E.2d 348, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 314, 188 S.E.2d 897 (1972). We note that the General Assembly has recently established an obligation for support for children 18 and older, but only to complete secondary schooling.
See also Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 190, 261 S.E.2d 849, 860 (1980) (construing related statute G.S. 50-16.3: "purpose of the allowance of counsel fees is to enable the dependent spouse, as litigant, to meet the supporting spouse, as litigant, on substantially even terms by . . . [enabling] the dependent spouse to employ adequate counsel"). Cf. Nolan v. Nolan, 20 N.C. App. 550, 202 S.E.2d 344, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 234, 204 S.E.2d 24 (1974) (evidence that plaintiff received $1,825 per month for alimony and support of the parties' three minor children would not have supported a finding of fact concerning her inability to defray the expenses of the action). A trial judge is permitted to exercise considerable discretion in allowing or disallowing attorney's fees in child custody or support cases, Brandon v. Brandon, 10 N.C. App. 457, 179 S.E.2d 177 (1971), and we find no abuse of that discretion here.
The Court of Appeals held that the father's legal obligation for support of the four children ceased when the children became 18 and that there was no evidence showing that the needs of the children had increased. Nolan v. Nolan, 20 N.C. App. 550, 202 S.E.2d 344, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 234, 204 S.E.2d 24 (1974). On 8 December 1975 Mrs. Nolan instituted a second action against Dr. Nolan in the District Court of Forsyth County. Her amended complaint, filed 5 January 1976, sought a declaratory judgment proclaiming that Mrs. Nolan had an exclusive right, under Paragraph 6(c) of the separation agreement, to sell the house and lot located at 1150 Arbor Road. The particular language in the amended complaint was as follows:
Defendant further contends that the court erred in awarding counsel fees since there was no finding of fact that the plaintiff was unable to defray the expense of the suit. In Nolan v. Nolan, 20 N.C. App. 550, 202 S.E.2d 344, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 234, 204 S.E.2d 24 (1974), this court held that where the trial court failed to make a finding of fact as to the wife's ability to defray the expense of the suit as required by G.S. 50-13.6, the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the wife. See also, Roberts v. Roberts, 38 N.C. App. 295, 248 S.E.2d 85 (1978); Lindsey v. Lindsey, 34 N.C. App. 201, 237 S.E.2d 561 (1977); In re Cox 17 N.C. App. 687, 195 S.E.2d 132, cert. denied 283 N.C. 585, 197 S.E.2d 809 (1973).
" In light of this statute, the authority of the court to require support for a normal child as a ward of the court ceases when the child becomes eighteen. Shoaf v. Shoaf, 282 N.C. 287, 192 S.E.2d 299 (1972); Nolan v. Nolan, 20 N.C. App. 550, 202 S.E.2d 344 (1974), cert. denied 285 N.C. 234, 204 S.E.2d 24 (1974). Thus, nothing else showing, where an order of the court for support entered prior to 5 July 1971 provides for support of the children until the age of majority, maturity, or emancipation, it has been interpreted, in light of G.S. 48A-2, to impose the legal obligation of support only to the child's eighteenth birthday.
Since the enactment of G.S. 48A in 1971, our appellate division has concluded that a father's legal obligation to support his child ceases when the child reaches age 18, absent a showing that the child is insolvent, unmarried, and physically or mentally incapable of earning a livelihood. Shoaf v. Shoaf, 282 N.C. 287, 192 S.E.2d 299 (1972); Nolan v. Nolan, 20 N.C. App. 550, 202 S.E.2d 344 (1974), cert. den. 285 N.C. 234 (1974); Taylor v. Taylor, 17 N.C. App. 720, 195 S.E.2d 355 (1973); Choate v. Choate, 15 N.C. App. 89, 189 S.E.2d 647 (1972); and Crouch v. Crouch, 14 N.C. App. 49, 187 S.E.2d 348 (1972), cert. den. 281 N.C. 314 (1972). While the order indicates that plaintiff's daughter might have reached age 18, there is no finding to that effect or that the other facts that would relieve plaintiff of her support exist.