1 (a) (1), (3) (authorizing impeachment of a witness with evidence of any crime involving dishonesty or false statement, or a felony); [cit.]Noellien v. State, 298 Ga. App. 47, 49-50 (3) (a) (i) ( 679 SE2d 75) (2009). A criminal defendant does have "`the right to cross-examine a witness concerning pending criminal charges against the witness for purposes of exposing a witness' motivation in testifying, e.g., bias, partiality, or agreement between the government and the witness.

A person commits the offense of sexual battery when he or she intentionally makes physical contact with the intimate parts of the body of another person without the consent of that person.").See Harris v. State , 322 Ga. App. 87, 88 (1), 744 S.E.2d 82 (2013) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in preventing testimony that could confuse the jury); Noellien v. State , 298 Ga. App. 47, 48 (2), 679 S.E.2d 75 (2009) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it limited defense counsel’s closing argument when it determined that the argument requested by counsel was more likely to confuse than enlighten the jury).See Cochran v. State , 276 Ga. App. 840, 841, 625 S.E.2d 92 (2005) (holding that there was no reversible error when the trial court sua sponte gave an additional unrequested charge to the jury during deliberations and defense counsel asked that the charge be stricken, contending that he would have argued the issue during closing arguments because, even if the trial court erred, the error was harmless in light of the evidence presented at trial); Roberts v. State , 223 Ga. App. 167, 169 (5), 477 S.E.2d 345 (1996) (holding that the trial court’s failure to inform defense counsel which requests to charge would be given before closing argument was not reversible error when the defendant failed to show harm from the court’s failure to comply with O

A trial court may not consider a pending indictment or charges resulting in dismissal or acquittal in imposing sentence. See Noellien v. State , 298 Ga. App. 47, 51 (3) (c), 679 S.E.2d 75 (2009) ; McIntosh v. State , 287 Ga. App. 293, 295, 651 S.E.2d 207 (2007). But, "there is a presumption, in the absence of a strong showing to the contrary, that the trial judge, when sitting without a jury, separates the legal evidence from facts not properly in evidence in reaching his decision."

However, any such bias must arise from a "motive that could be reasonably inferred to cause testimony to be shaded or distorted." Noellien v. State , 298 Ga.App. 47, 50 (3) (a) (i), 679 S.E.2d 75 (2009) (citation omitted; emphasis supplied). There is no evidence in the record from which it could be reasonably inferred that the victim had any such bias or motive.

See, e.g., Lee v. State, 306 Ga. App. 144, 147-48 (3) ( 701 SE2d 582) (2010); Mote v. State, 297 Ga. App. 13, 16 (2) ( 676 SE2d 379) (2009).See Noellien v. State, 298 Ga. App. 47, 50 (3) (a) (i) ( 679 SE2d 75) (2009) ("[B]ias must be specific to the case, arising from a self-interest or self-preservation motive that could be reasonably inferred to cause testimony to be shaded or distorted." (punctuation omitted)).