And although there is some contrariety among the cases respecting the question, the rule with which we are in accord is that unless a controlling statute provides otherwise, the cancellation of a pre-existing debt constitutes sufficient consideration for the conveyance of property; and that one who cancels and extinguishes a pre-existing debt as consideration for the conveyance to him of property becomes a purchaser for value. State Bank of St. Louis v. Frame, 112 Mo. 502, 20 S.W. 620; Hallett v. Alexander, 50 Colo. 37, 114 P. 490, 34 L.R.A., N.S., 328; Noe v. Smith, 67 Okla. 211, 169 P. 1108, L.R.A. 1918C, 435; Lee Tire Rubber Co. v. Gay, 164 Wn., 569, 4 P.2d 503; Sutton v. Ford, 144 Ga. 587, 87 S.E. 799, L.R.A. 1918D, 561; Sansom v. Warren, 215 N.C. 432, 2 S.E.2d 459; Orphanoudakis v. Orphanoudakis, 199 Va. 142, 98 S.E.2d 676; Dietsch v. Long, 72 Ohio App. 349, 43 N.E.2d 906. Fraud on the part of the defendant Drew in the procuring of the assignment of the overriding royalty interest was an issue of fact joined between plaintiff and the defendant Chandler. Plaintiff resided at Billings, Montana, and the defendant Drew resided at Calgary, Alberta, Canada. Some time prior to the transaction giving rise to this litigation, the defendant Drew employed plaintiff to acquire for him federal oil and gas leases.
Another rule equally well settled is that where the true owner of property allows another to appear as the owner of or as having full power of disposition over the property and innocent third persons are thus led into dealing with such apparent owner or person having such apparent power of disposition, they will be protected, regardless of whether the true owner has been negligent in trusting the property to the wrongdoer. In Noe v. Smith, 67 Okla. 211, 169 P. 1108, 1110, L.R.A. 1918C, 435, the court quoted with approval from McNeil v. Tenth National Bank, 46 N.Y. 325, as follows: "`Where the true owner holds out another, or allows him to appear, as the owner of, or as having full power of disposition over, the property, and innocent third parties are thus led into dealing with such apparent owner, they will be protected. Their rights in such cases do not depend upon the actual title or authority of the party with whom they deal directly, but are derived from the act of the real owner, which precludes him from disputing as against them, the existence of the title or power, which, through negligence or mistaken confidence, he caused or allowed to appear to be vested in the party making the conveyance.'"
This is equity. See Noe v. Smith, 67 Okl. 211, 169 P. 1108, L.R.A. 1918C, 435. If constructive trusts are raised by equity for the purpose of working out right and justice and is remedial in character, this court cannot in good conscience say that a party guilty of no wrong, collusion or fraud must suffer a loss by reason of the imprudence and negligence of another whose only remedy is in a court of equity and governed by these precepts of the law.
In this connection, however, it is noted that the plaintiff and her sister, Lee Nora Mayor, each, after the judgment quieting title against them, admittedly gave W.R. Downard a quitclaim deed to the ten-acre tract and thus clothed him with indicia of title. Under such circumstances we have said that "the equities of innocent purchasers are protected." Noe v. Smith, 67 Okla. 211, 169 P. 1108, 1109, L.R.A. 1918C, 435. The plaintiff's contention that Wilson was not an innocent purchaser for value or bona fide purchaser is, in our opinion, without merit.
City National, in this court, relies solely upon the rule of law that where one of two innocent persons must suffer by the act of a third person, he who put it in the power of the third person to inflict the injury must bear the loss. It asserts that by permitting Lowry to retain the certificate of title, which he exhibited to its officer at the time it made the loan to Lowry, Finch put it in Lowry's power to obtain the loan from the City National, and that therefore Finch should bear the loss. In support of its contention it cites First Nat. Bank of Holdenville v. Kissare, 22 Okla. 545, 98 P. 433; Noe v. Smith, 67 Okla. 211, 169 P. 1108; Kuykendall v. Lambert, 68 Okla. 258, 173 P. 657; Joy v. Farmers Nat. Bank of Chickasha, 158 Okla. 1, 11 P.2d 1074, and a number of cases from other jurisdictions. In all the Oklahoma cases cited above it appears that the real owner of the property had clothed another with evidence of title to the property, and with possession thereof, thus permitting such other party to hold himself out as the owner, and we held that in such case the real owner was estopped, as against an innocent purchaser or mortgagee, to deny the title of the apparent owner.
That such cases do not relate to purchasers at execution or judicial sale is of no consequence, as relates to whether value has passed, we have already shown. In Noe v. Smith, 67 Okla. 211, 169 P. 1108, paragraph 2 of the syllabus, it is held: "(a) The complete satisfaction and discharge of an antecedent debt is a valuable consideration for the conveyance of real estate. . . ."
But all the authorities hold that where the purchaser of land is in a worse position after the purchase than before because of the transaction, then the purchaser is protected as a bona fide purchaser of said lands. See Noe v. Smith, 67 Okla. 211, 169 P. 1108, and authorities therein cited. In the case at bar, after Allen had purchased the land he paid off or assumed and agreed to pay a mortgage of $400 to the Citizens National Bank, which Fred Payne owed to said bank; at the time the deed was made by G.W. Payne to Allen, Payne also delivered to Allen as a part of the consideration certain livestock, and Allen was forced to pay off a prior mortgage on the livestock in order to retain the same.
We, therefore, hold that the plaintiffs are not entitled to cancellation of the oil and gas lease under the statutory provision first above quoted. We approve the conclusion of the trial court that T.B. Slick was an innocent purchaser in good faith without notice, and hold that his interest must be protected even though the deed from the plaintiffs to Stevens was, in fact, executed as security only, since by the execution of such deed the plaintiffs held Stevens out and allowed him to appear as the owner of the land with full power to dispose of same. Noe v. Smith, 67 Okla. 211, 169 P. 1108. The judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendant T.B. Slick is, therefore, affirmed.
"A deed in which the name of a grantee is left blank, and otherwise lawfully executed, will vest title in a person whose name is subsequently inserted therein by one having authority from the grantor to do so; but where the agent inserts the name of the grantee and delivers the deed, without authority, to a purchaser who has knowledge of the facts, or of circumstances sufficient to put him upon inquiry, such deed is voidable as between the grantor and such purchaser." See, also, Noe v. Smith, 67 Okla. 211, 169 P. 1108: Friend v. Yahr. 126 Wis. 291, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 891; Montgomery v. Dresher (Neb.) 134 N.W. 251; Hall v. Kary (Ia.) 110 N.W. 930; Garland v. Wells (Neb.) 18 N.W. 132; Hallwill v. Weible (Colo.) 171 P. 372, and 2 C. J. 1250. Under the rule stated therein the trial court did not err in holding that the instruments were not void.
Real owner is estopped by vesting apparent title in another as against creditor, who has relied on such record ownership. Noe v. Smith (Okla.) 169 P. 1108; Havel v. Costello (Minn.) 175 N.W. 1001.