Pengilly, 116 Nev. at 650, 5 P.3d at 571-72.See Noble v. Noble, 86 Nev. 459, 463, 470 P.2d 430, 432 (1970), overruled on other grounds by Westgate v. Westgate, 110 Nev. 1377, 1381, 887 P.2d 737, 739 (1994).Pengilly, 116 Nev. at 650, 5 P.3d at 571-72.
The district court vacated its own order and directed the referee to once again make findings and recommendations. Following a number of recusals and formation of the district court's family court division ("family court"), the family court reviewed the issue of child support and refused to modify the district court's orders, basing its opinion primarily on Noble v. Noble, 86 Nev. 459, 470 P.2d 430 (1970), a case which predated modern child support guidelines and noted that a district court has broad discretion to modify child support awards. The family court calculated child support arrearages based upon a $200 per month figure until the time that the district court ordered support cut in half, and then $100 per month thereafter.
Since All Minerals violated the preliminary injunction when it relocated its claims, the court certainly had power to punish All Minerals for contempt. NRS 22.100 provides that the penalty for contempt is a fine of up to $500 or imprisonment for up to twenty-five days or both. While the statutes provide no other penalty for contempt, we have held that a court may take other measures to insure that the parties obey the court's order. Noble v. Noble, 86 Nev. 459, 470 P.2d 430 (1970) (remanded on other grounds). In Noble, a divorced mother ignored the orders of the court granting visitation of the child to the father.
While a district court has wide discretion in child support matters, we are unable to determine if the district court properly exercised its discretion under these circumstances.See Noble v. Noble, 86 Nev. 459, 464, 470 P.2d 430, 433 (1970) (reversing a district court's child support decision because it failed to make supporting findings and the record was unclear to imply such, and remanding for it to make sufficient findings), overruled on other grounds by Westgate v. Westgate, 110 Nev. 1377, 887 P.2d 737 (1994). Accordingly, we reverse the decree as to the child support determination and remand for the district court to make sufficient factual findings under NAC 425.125.
The district court failed to set forth any findings to support its declaration that appellant is willfully underemployed, and thus, we are unable to determine whether the district court abused its discretion. Compare Wallace v. Wallace, 112 Nev. 1015, 1019, 922 P.2d 541, 543 (1996) (holding that a district court's order concerning child support will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion), with Noble v. Noble, 86 Nev. 459, 464–65, 470 P.2d 430, 433–34 (1970) (explaining that while a district court has wide discretion in cases involving the care, custody, maintenance and control of a minor child, when there are no findings made with regard to the district court's decision, and the record is unclear, this court is unable to determine if the district court abused its discretion, and reversal and remand to the district court is warranted), overruled on other grounds by Westgate v. Westgate, 110 Nev. 1377, 887 P.2d 737 (1994). Accordingly, we remand this portion of the district court's order to the district court to enter its findings.
Because Tracy clearly did not comply with the district court's orders, we conclude that the district court's decision to hold Tracy in contempt did not constitute an abuse of discretion. See Noble v. Noble, 86 Nev. 459, 463, 470 P.2d 430, 432 (1970) (holding that courts have inherent power to protect and defend their decrees by way of contempt proceedings); EDCR 7.60(b)(5). We conclude that Tracy's remaining contentions lack merit.
In turn, if the district court in its broad discretion finds that a parent's relocation to another state does not serve the best interest of the child, then the court should be able to consider the relocation in resolving the custody matter. Noble v. Noble, 86 Nev. 459, 470 P.2d 430 (1970) (the district court enjoys discretion in determining what constitutes the child's best interest); see NRS 125.480(4). Additionally, the record reveals that the district court considered factors other than Primm's relocation in determining the best interest of Thomas.
Even if we were to believe that the act of recording the property settlement agreement was in violation of the court's order, NRS 22.030(2) specifically requires that an "affidavit be presented to the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt." While courts have inherent power "to protect and defend their decrees by contempt proceedings," Noble v. Noble, 86 Nev. 459, 463, 470 P.2d 430, 432 (1970), they are nevertheless bound by statute. Brown v. Brown, 101 Nev. 144, 146, 696 P.2d 999, 1000 (1985).
As a result, in addition to fining and incarcerating appellant, the district court imposed a per diem charge of $70 to cover the costs of confinement. While the courts have inherent power "to protect and defend their decrees by contempt proceedings," Noble v. Noble, 86 Nev. 459, 463, 470 P.2d 430, 432 (1970), courts are, nevertheless, bound by statute. Nevada's statutes provide for imposition of fines or confinement, or both, but do not provide for a per diem award to cover the costs of confinement.
Ordinarily, we would remand this matter for findings and conclusions on the merits of the reformation action. See, e.g., Noble v. Noble, 86 Nev. 459, 470 P.2d 430 (1970); Pease v. Taylor, 86 Nev. 195, 467 P.2d 109 (1970). However, we are unable to do so in this case because the district court judge who heard the case is now deceased.