Opinion
2D23-1062
08-16-2023
N.N.R., Petitioner, v. JASON GRICE, Superintendent, Hillsborough Juvenile Detention Center, Respondent.
Julianne M. Holt, Public Defender, and Lauren Danielle Nagy, Assistant Public Defender, Tampa, for Petitioner. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Laura Dempsey, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Respondent.
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus to the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Robert A. Bauman, Judge.
Julianne M. Holt, Public Defender, and Lauren Danielle Nagy, Assistant Public Defender, Tampa, for Petitioner.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Laura Dempsey, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM
N.N.R., a dependent juvenile accused of delinquent acts while on postcommitment probation, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the order placing her in secure detention without a release date. We previously granted the petition by an order advising that this opinion would follow.
N.N.R. was on postcommitment probation in case numbers 20-CJ-2340B, which involved burglary of an unoccupied conveyance, and 20-CJ-2341B, which involved burglary of a conveyance, petit theft, and minor in possession of a firearm. She had also served twenty-one days in secure detention in case number 23-CJ-467, which involved possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of a controlled substance, and providing a false name to a law enforcement officer. On March 10, 2023, N.N.R. was arrested on her current charges of grand theft of a motor vehicle, seven counts of burglary of an unoccupied conveyance, and petit theft in case number 23-CJ-659A, and she was placed in secure detention for twenty-one days with a release date of March 31, 2023.
On March 30, 2023, the trial court placed N.N.R. in secure detention until a hearing on April 4, 2023, "due to [her] being a danger to herself and others." At the April 4 hearing, the trial court reviewed N.N.R.'s substantial history, including eight instances of running away, since her release from secure detention on January 20, 2023. At this hearing, N.N.R. raised the issue of competency. The court ruled that N.N.R. would remain in secure detention until she could be placed in a Statewide Inpatient Psychiatric Program (SIPP). That placement appears to have been recommended in N.N.R.'s concurrent dependency proceeding. The court reasoned that N.N.R.'s competency was now at issue, so her prosecution was stayed under section 985.19(1), Florida Statutes (2022); she was on postcommitment probation; she was awaiting placement in a SIPP; she posed a danger to herself due to her multiple instances of running away; she posed a danger to the community because of her new charges; and there were no least restrictive means appropriate for N.N.R. other than a Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) facility or a detention facility. The court ordered the family support worker who was present during the hearing to "get her SIPP placement ASAP." N.N.R.'s counsel objected arguing that there was no statutory basis for the court to continue N.N.R. in secure detention pending her placement in a SIPP. The court issued a detention order memorializing its findings and clarifying that N.N.R. was being held pursuant to section 985.26(4) and A.T. v. State, 341 So.3d 351, 351 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022). See § 985.26(4) (providing that the time limits for a child's detention do not include periods of delay resulting from a continuance granted for good cause); A.T., 341 So.3d at 351 (holding that when the proceeding was stayed because of A.T.'s incompetency, it was "effectively continued, allowing the trial court to extend detention for cause" under section 985.26(4)).
Subsequently, the trial court issued orders staying the proceedings and directing that N.N.R. be evaluated for competency but not releasing her from secure detention. This is where things stood at the time N.N.R. filed her petition for writ of habeas corpus. N.N.R. has since provided this court with a copy of a May 31, 2023, order finding her incompetent to proceed due to mental illness and committing her to the Department of Children and Families (DCF) with the goal of restoration of her competency. The order states that N.N.R. does not meet the criteria for secure placement under section 985.19(3) and directed DCF to place her in a community treatment program that is the least restrictive and most appropriate program available for her consistent with public safety. Nevertheless, the trial court has retained N.N.R. in secure detention because DCF has not yet found an appropriate placement.
In her petition, N.N.R. challenges her placement in secure detention without a release date. See A.M.W. v. Portesy, 714 So.2d 1170, 1171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (stating that it is an established principle that a juvenile cannot be detained for more than twenty-one days on the same offense). She argues that the case upon which the trial court relied to detain her indefinitely, A.T., was wrongly decided. We conclude that A.T. is distinguishable and not applicable to N.N.R.'s situation.
A.T. was charged with several felonies, including discharge of a firearm, and he was later arrested while on home detention for a reason not explained in the opinion. A.T., 341 So.3d at 352. The proceedings against him were stayed when he was found incompetent to proceed. Id. at 351. The trial court found that he was a danger to the community and extended his home detention beyond the expiration of his twenty-one-day detention based on section 985.26(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2021), which provided in pertinent part: "The time limits in subsections (2) and (3) [regarding length of detention] do not include periods of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court for cause on motion of the child or his or her counsel or of the state." 341 So.3d at 351 (alteration in original). The Fourth District agreed that the statute provided authority for the trial court's further detention of the juvenile, holding that the stay of the proceedings as a result of the juvenile's incompetency was effectively a continuance and that the trial court's finding that he was a danger to the community provided good cause for allowing the court to extend his home detention. Id. at 352.
The legislature has expressed a policy of strictly controlling the detention of juveniles, and the detention of juveniles is governed entirely by statute. See S.B. v. Parkins, 10 So.3d 207, 208 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); B.M. v. Dobuler, 979 So.2d 308, 312, 318 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). Section 985.24(3)(d), Florida Statutes (2022), which was numbered 985.24(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2021), at the time A.T. was decided, prohibits placement of a child alleged to be delinquent in secure or supervised release detention care due to a lack of more appropriate facilities. See B.S. v. State, 134 So.3d 1126, 1126 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (holding that once the child was committed to DCF after being declared incompetent, the trial court lost authority to direct where and when she should be placed by DCF and that it was error under section 985.24(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2013), to order her to be held in secure detention pending placement). Section 985.24(3)(d) squarely addresses the situation in this proceeding-N.N.R. is alleged to be delinquent and the trial court has placed her in secure detention because there are no more appropriate facilities available. By contrast, the court in A.T. did not discuss the prohibition against placement into secure or supervised release detention care based on the lack of more appropriate facilities, and there is no indication that A.T. was continued on home detention because no more appropriate facility was available for the child.
Here, the trial court was understandably concerned about N.N.R.'s safety and expressed a desire to remove her from detention as soon as an appropriate placement became available. See Dobuler, 979 So.2d at 318 ("Although this might have been done for the best of motives, a decision to detain a child must be made according to the strict statutory criteria established by the legislature for this purpose."). But the legislature has decreed that secure detention may not be used due to the unavailability of a more appropriate facility. As a result, we granted N.N.R.'s petition for writ of habeas corpus and ordered that she be released from secure detention in the custody of DJJ and placed in the custody of DCF as called for in the May 31, 2023, order.
Petition for writ of habeas corpus granted.
SILBERMAN, VILLANTI, and BLACK, JJ, Concur