The district court should enforce the Board's subpoena if the information sought is relevant to an investigation being conducted by the Board and is described with sufficient particularity. See NLRB v. G.H.R. Energy Corp., 707 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 1982); accord EEOC v. City of Norfolk Police Dep't, 45 F.3d 80, 82 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that district court's review of administrative subpoena is limited to determining whether the agency is authorized to conduct the investigation, whether the agency "has complied with statutory requirements of due process," and whether the information sought is relevant). We, in turn, review the district court's decision to enforce the subpoena for abuse of discretion; we may reverse the district court's enforcement order "only in the most extraordinary of circumstances." G.H.R. Energy Corp., 707 F.2d at 113 (footnote omitted).
A district court's review of an NLRB subpoena is "extremely limited," "extremely narrow," and of "a summary nature." NLRB v. G.H.R. Energy Corp., 707 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Frederick Cowan and Co., Inc., 522 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1975). See also EEOC v. Bay Shipbuilding Corp., 668 F.2d 304, 310 (7th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Suburban Transit System, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 530, 532 (N.D.Ill. 1982).
We review a district court's order enforcing an NLRB subpoena for abuse of discretion. NLRB v. G.H.R. Energy Corp., 707 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 1982). III.
Administrative subpoenas are subject only to limited review. See, e.g., NLRB v. G.H.R. Energy Corp., 707 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 1982) (interpreting a statute granting subpoena power identical to that of the EEOC). Upon petitioning for enforcement of an administrative subpoena, the issuing agency must make a threshold showing that the subpoena is within the agency's authority, that the agency has satisfied statutory requirements of due process, and that the information' sought is relevant and material to the investigation.
In any event, Judge Waxse correctly concluded that the subject matter of the investigation is whether J Cubed and MHCP are successors of MHAC. The subpoenas seek documents and information concerning the business structure, assets and customers of J Cubed and MHCP — information vital for the NLRB to determine whether J Cubed and MHCP are legal successors to MHAC. See NLRB v. G.H.R. Energy Corp., 707 F.2d 110, 113-14 (5th Cir. 1982) (to determine whether companies constitute single employer, one must look at interrelation of operations, which involves "fairly wide-ranging investigation into affairs" of companies). The Court finds that the subpoenas do not request evidence which is unrelated to the subject matter of the investigation.
Because agency subpoena power is essentially a discovery tool, our review is limited to abuses of trial court discretion. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n v. City of Des Moines, 313 N.W.2d 491, 497 (Iowa 1981); see also NLRB v. G.H.R. Energy Corp., 707 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 1982) (district court's enforcement order to be affirmed unless discretion abused). That does not mean, however, that the court's discretion is unlimited. Enforcement is the rule, not the exception, so long as the four-factor test we adopted in Roadway is met.
Under this standard of review, we will reverse the district court's ruling "only in the most extraordinary of circumstances." Id. (quoting NLRB v. G.H.R. Energy Corp., 707 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 1982)). A party asserting privilege has the burden of demonstrating its applicability.
I concur in the Court's opinion and write separately to consider the standard of review applicable to appellate consideration of a district court's determination of the relevance of information sought by an administrative subpoena. Preliminarily I note that with respect to review of the ultimate decision of a district court whether to enforce an administrative subpoena, it is generally said that the standard for appellate review is abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Ratliff v. Davis Polk Wardwell 354 F.3d 165, 168 (2d Cir. 2003); FTC v. GlaxoSmithKline, 294 F.3d 141, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2002); FDIC v. Wentz, 55 F.3d 905, 908 (3d Cir. 1995); NLRB v. Carolina Food Processors, 81 F.3d 507, 510 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting NLRB v. G.H.R. Energy Corp., 707 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 1982)). A Sixth Circuit opinion has said that the appellate task is "to weigh the likely relevance of the requested material to the investigation against the burden to Ford of producing the material."
B. A subpoena enforcement order is reviewed for abuse of discretion. E.g., N.L.R.B. v. G.H.R. Energy Corp., 707 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 1982). "[I]t is settled that the requirements for judicial enforcement of an administrative subpoena are minimal."
This approach comports with the standard employed by the majority of the circuits. See, e.g., FDIC v. Wentz, 55 F.3d 905, 908 (3d Cir. 1995); In re McVane, 44 F.3d 1127, 1135 (2d Cir. 1995); Reich v. National Eng'g Contracting Co., 13 F.3d 93, 98 (4th Cir. 1993); Linde Thomson Langworthy Kohn Van Dyke, P.C. v. RTC, 5 F.3d 1508, 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing FTC v. Lonning, 539 F.2d 202, 210 n. 14 (D.C. Cir. 1976)); United States v. Medlin, 986 F.2d 463, 466 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 347 (1993); NLRB v. G.H.R. Energy Corp., 707 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Packard Elec. Div., 569 F.2d 315, 317-18 (5th Cir. 1978). But see Reich v. Montana Sulphur Chem. Co., 32 F.3d 440, 443 (9th Cir. 1994) ("We review de novo the district court's decision regarding enforcement of an agency subpoena.") (citing EPA v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 836 F.2d 443, 445-46 (9th Cir. 1988)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1355, (1995).