N.L.R.B. v. Dallas Gen. Drivers, L. No. 745

16 Citing cases

  1. Superior Derrick Corporation v. N.L.R.B

    273 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1960)   Cited 37 times

    In N.L.R.B. v. Local 926 (Columbus Construction Co.), 5 Cir., 1959, 267 F.2d 418, 419 at note 2, the signs were changed to make specific reference to "See our leaflet," but we held this undecisive. In N.L.R.B. v. Dallas General Drivers, Local 745 (Associated Grocery), 5 Cir., 1959, 264 F.2d 642, the picket signs were ostensibly directed to the public and urged the public not to buy goods distributed by the primary employer to the picketed retail stores. Nonetheless, we affirmed a Board injunction and recognized that the "normal purpose of a picket line is to persuade employees not to cross it."

  2. Kinty v. United Mine Workers of America

    544 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1976)   Cited 11 times
    In Kinty, such a rule would have meant that "the utility which provided power for the struck plant could be picketed at the power plant miles away from the situs of the labor dispute and its employees be induced thereby to discontinue work without implicating the statute."

    Thus, at the conclusion of plaintiffs' testimony, counsel for the defendant, in a colloquy with the trial judge on the status of the parties, said that "it [ i.e., the independent status of Kinty and Kittle] is a jury question."See, N.L.R.B. v. Dallas General Drivers, Etc., Local No. 745 (5th Cir. 1959), 264 F.2d 642, 647, cert. denied 361 U.S. 814, 80 S.Ct. 54, 4 L.Ed.2d 61 (1959).See, Appendix pp. 443-4 and 456.

  3. Burr v. N.L.R.B

    321 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1963)   Cited 17 times

    This "effects" test interjected by the Fruit Vegetable case is contrary to the long established doctrine under § 8(b) (4) that a violation of this provision does not depend upon the success or failure of the union efforts in achieving the prohibited objective. "If the intended effect of the picketing be a prohibited one, the lack of success in coercing the neutral employees is immaterial. * * *" N.L.R.B. v. Dallas General Drivers, Local 745, 5 Cir., 1959, 264 F.2d 642, 648, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 814, 80 S.Ct. 54, 4 L.Ed.2d 61. Likewise, when Congress made the "effects" of an activity significant, it specifically said so. See, e.g., Second Proviso to § 8(a)(4) and Second Proviso § 8(b)(7)(c). We are equally firm that constitutional considerations do not require any such reading.

  4. Ramey Const. Co., Inc. v. Local U. No. 544

    472 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1973)   Cited 16 times

    But this fact alone is not enough to reverse as clearly erroneous the finding of clear disclosure. Aside from the signs themselves, the trial court had the following evidence before it: (a) Whenever questioned, the strikers either pointed to the signs or clearly told all neutrals that the dispute was only with the P.D.C. of A. Cf. Superior Derrick Corp. v. N.L.R.B., supra; (b) of the several secondary employees who testified, no one said he was misled in any way, and the reason, if any, given for not crossing the picket line was union "solidarity," not confusion, coercion, or threats; (c) the pickets did not block any entrance or in any way affirmatively encourage secondary work stoppage.Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Dallas General Drivers, 5 Cir. 1959, 264 F.2d 642, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 814, 80 S.Ct. 54, 4 L.Ed.2d 61. Further, although not explicitly set out, the record clearly gives rise to a strong inference that the workers on all of the sites knew full well what the signs meant — that the dispute involved only the painters. There is no evidence to the contrary.

  5. Laborers' Int. Un. of No. Am. v. N.L.R.B

    446 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1971)   Cited 4 times

    Any customer could order the stone, before or after the strike, and by reason of the protection afforded by § 8(b)(4) of the Act be free from any pressure directed to his own employees to cause them to cease handling the stone. National Woodwork Mfg. Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 635, 87 S.Ct. 1250, 18 L.Ed.2d 357 (1967); NLRB v. Dallas General Drivers, etc., Local No. 745, 264 F.2d 642 (5 Cir. 1959); NLRB v. Wine, Liquor Dist. Wkrs., 178 F.2d 584 (2 Cir. 1949). By buying the stone a customer does not become an ally of the supplier nor does he forfeit his § 8(b)(4) rights.

  6. Vulcan Materials Co. v. United Steelworkers of America

    430 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1970)   Cited 61 times

    In determining whether the relationship of a secondary employer and a primary employer is such as to destroy neutrality, the court must look to the essence of the relationship, and not to its incidental trappings. See Sheet Metal Wkrs. Int. Ass'n Loc. 223 v. Atlas Sheet Metal Co., supra; Truck Drivers H. Local U. No. 728 v. Empire State Express, supra; Local No. 24, Inter. Bro. of Teamsters, etc. v. N.L.R.B., 1959, 105 U.S.App.D.C. 271, 266 F.2d 675; N.L.R.B. v. Dallas General Drivers, etc., Local No. 745, 5 Cir., 1959, 264 F.2d 642, cert. den. 361 U.S. 814, 80 S.Ct. 54, 4 L. Ed.2d 61; Retail Fruit Veg. Clerks U. v. National Labor Rel. Bd., supra. Furthermore, there is authority that the fact that two companies share a common bookkeeper, use the same stationery at the main office; that one performs minor services for the other and bills the other; that both companies are listed in the telephone directory at the same address and with the same telephone number is insufficient to establish that both companies are operated as a single, integrated business enterprise so as to destroy neutrality. Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local No. 639, 158 NLRB 1281, (1966).

  7. Amalgamated Clothing Wkrs. of Am. v. N.L.R.B

    424 F.2d 818 (D.C. Cir. 1970)   Cited 36 times
    Affirming Board determination that employer's evidence was not new because "no explanation was offered as to why this evidence was not discovered or could not have been discovered by the exercise of due diligence"

    The Company's conclusory allegation, unsupported by evidence, that in certain instances the Company's employees who were alleged to have made threats or promises were "speaking for the Union" was not sufficient to demonstrate, even prima facie, that the Union was responsible for their utterances. See Intertype v. N.L.R.B., 401 F.2d 41, 45-46 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. den., 393 U.S. 1049, 89 S.Ct. 686 (1969); Manning, Maxwell Moore, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 324 F.2d 857, 858 (5th Cir. 1963); N.L.R.B. v. Dallas General Drivers, Warehousemen Helpers, Local No. 745, 264 F.2d 642, 648 (5th Cir.), cert. den., 361 U.S. 814, 80 S.Ct. 54, 4 L.Ed.2d 61 (1959). THE DENIAL OF A HEARING

  8. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Golden Age Beverage Co.

    415 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1969)   Cited 95 times
    In NLRB v. Golden Age Beverage Company, 415 F.2d 26, 30 (5th Cir. 1969), this court apparently considered hearsay evidence at this stage of proceedings to set aside an election.

    The Company has made no such showing here, and the Board's refusal to set aside the election because of alleged threats of physical violence was well within its discretion. We deem it immaterial that the incidents cited by the Company involved rank-and-file employees, none of whom were alleged to be Union officials. Though the conduct in question cannot be attributed to the Union absent proof that it was authorized, participated in, condoned, ratified, or adopted by Union officials, N.L.R.B. v. Dallas General Drivers, Warehousemen Helpers, Local No. 745, 264 F.2d 642, 648 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 361 U.S. 814, 80 S.Ct. 54, 4 L.Ed.2d 61 (1959), such conduct will nevertheless warrant setting aside the election if it disrupted the voting procedure or destroyed the atmosphere necessary to the exercise of a free choice in the representation election. Hometown Foods, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 379 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1967).

  9. Brown Transport Corporation v. N.L.R.B

    334 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1964)   Cited 12 times
    In Brown Transport Corp. v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1964), in which the picket signs made clear that picketing was directed only to the employees of the primary employer and no one else, see id. at 31, the court held that "[t]here is simply no excuse for picketing where the message is seen by neutral employees of neutral employers but is not seen at all by the employees of the primary employer," id. at 39.

    If any object of the picketing is to subject the secondary employer to forbidden pressure then the picketing is illegal. N.L.R.B. v. Truck Drivers Helpers, Local 728 (National Trucking Co.), 5 Cir., 1956, 228 F.2d 791, 795; N.L.R.B. v. Dallas General Drivers, Local 745 (Associated Groceries), 5 Cir., 1959, 264 F.2d 642, 647-648. It need not be the sole or even main purpose."

  10. N.L.R.B. v. Teamsters

    314 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1963)   Cited 3 times

    Obviously respondent did not "induce" the employees to strike. We agree that even an unsuccessful attempt may "encourage" employees to strike, N.L.R.B. v. Dallas General Drivers, Warehousemen Helpers, Local No. 745, 5 Cir., 1959, 264 F.2d 642, cert. den. 361 U.S. 814, 80 S.Ct. 54, 4 L.Ed.2d 61, but having in mind the rather clear evidence that the great majority of the employees were disgruntled with SIU, and that many had signed respondent's cards, it is hard to say this is what happened here. If respondent already had the men it would seem that a bona fide encouragement would have been readily successful.