Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4052-11T1
04-03-2013
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. W.P., Defendant-Appellant. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF N.P., E.P., A.P., and L.P., Minors.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant W.P. (Anastasia P. Winslow, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Jeffrey S. Chiesa, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Division of Youth and Family Services (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Reid Adler, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minors (Mona S. Prakash, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Messano and Kennedy.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Cape May County, Docket No. FG-05-08-11.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant W.P. (Anastasia P. Winslow, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Jeffrey S. Chiesa, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Division of Youth and Family Services (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Reid Adler, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minors (Mona S. Prakash, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant W.P. appeals from the Family Part's judgment terminating his parental rights to his four children, N.P., E.P., A.P. and L.P. (fictitiously referred to as Neal, Eden, Ann and Lisa, respectively). On appeal, defendant argues that "the record below lacks adequate, substantial and credible evidence to support the trial court's findings that the four prongs of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1 were met[,]" and that the trial judge erred in his legal analysis because he did not render particularized findings as to each child and each parent.
The judgment also terminated the parental rights of the children's mother, J.Z., who previously voluntarily surrendered her parental rights. Defendant and J.Z. were never married, but lived together for seven years, before separating prior to this appeal.
After considering the arguments presented in light of the record and the applicable law, we are satisfied that the trial judge's findings were firmly supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record as a whole and fully supported his legal conclusions. See, e.g., N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R.G., 361 N.J. Super. 46, 78 (App. Div. 2003), aff'd in part, modified in part and remanded, 179 N.J. 264 (2004), certif. denied, 186 N.J. 603 (2006). Consequently, we affirm, substantially for the reasons stated by Judge John C. Porto, in his comprehensive, 313-page written opinion dated February 28, 2012.
I.
The facts are reviewed at length in Judge Porto's opinion and need not be repeated here in the same level of detail. To summarize, defendant is forty-two years old and has been employed sporadically throughout his adult life. As noted, he and J.Z. had four children: Neal, born in 2004; Eden, born in 2006; Ann, born in 2007; and Lisa, born in 2009. Defendant was confirmed as the biological father of the four children through paternity testing.
Defendant has one other child, who resides with defendant's mother and is not a subject of this litigation.
The family has been known to the Division of Youth and Family Services, now known as the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (the Division), since February 12, 2008, through a referral by Ann's nurse, who was concerned that Ann was "fail[ing] to thrive[.]" The nurse was also concerned because she observed Neal with an injury on his forehead and a bruise and a scrape under his eye.
On June 29, 2012, the Governor signed into law A-3101, which reorganized the Department of Children and Families, and renamed the Division as the Division of Child Protection and Permanency. L. 2012, c. 16, eff. June 29, 2012 (amending N.J.S.A. 9:3A-10(b)).
In March 2008, the Division opened an administrative case to provide services to the family. Thereafter, the Division referred the family to Family Preservation Services (FPS). An appointment with a gastroenterologist was scheduled for Ann. That appointment was never kept, however. FPS also arranged for Neal to attend counseling for possible Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).
The Division remained concerned about the children's lack of supervision and unsafe living conditions, and the "poor parenting" of defendant and J.Z., as well as their failure to keep medical appointments for the children. The family also had minimal income, which caused problems with purchasing food and other items necessary to the children's welfare. The Division claimed further that defendant's profligacy — evidenced by his purchase of a video game system and large-screen television, as well as season passes to an amusement park — exacerbated the family's financial difficulties. At one point, in fact, their Families First card had been stolen or lost, and neither defendant nor J.Z. contacted any agency or foodbank for assistance.
At the time of the Division's initial involvement, the family lived in a motel room. In March 2008, with the support of FPS, the family moved to a two-bedroom apartment. The Division made unannounced visits thereafter, and reported the home to be in "decent order" at times, but on other occasions the home was found to be unclean and without adequate food. Also, on occasion, the home was infested with bed bugs, and smelled of human waste, with laundry, dirty diapers and trash strewn about. In October 2008, the family was asked to leave their apartment because defendant and J.Z. were behind on their rent and the building was without heat. In November 2008, they moved back into the motel, where defendant was able to barter maintenance services in exchange for a room.
The Division also became concerned over defendant's lack of understanding of age appropriate behavior for his children and his inappropriate discipline of them. Three of the children also suffered from behavioral and physical problems: Ann had "special needs" and suffered from speech delay and an eye problem; Neal was diagnosed with ADHD and also was afflicted with bipolar and impulse control disorders; Eden was diagnosed with ADHD and Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD), as well as post-traumatic stress disorder. Both Eden and Neal were diagnosed with these disorders and prescribed medication for treatment after they were placed in foster care.
The Division filed its complaint for custody on June 17, 2009, the day after Lisa was born, and the children were removed on June 24, 2009, pursuant to court order, after the court determined that the removal was required because of imminent danger to the children's life, safety, or health. All were placed with foster parents. The court found that reasonable efforts were made to prevent placement, and defendant was ordered to attend parenting classes, submit to psychological evaluations, and cooperate with in-home parenting.
The Division offered defendant and J.Z. a variety of remedial services, including psychological evaluations, individual counseling, couples counseling, multiple parenting skills training, substance abuse assessment and urine screens, Robin's Nest therapeutic visits, visitation, bus passes, transportation, and a parenting capacity evaluation. Services provided by FPS were unsuccessful due to defendant's general unavailability and his failure to spend time with his children.
During supervised visits and during the bonding evaluations with Dr. Joanne Schroeder, a psychologist, defendant appeared unable to appropriately care for the children, often yelled at them, and permitted them to misbehave and hurt themselves and each other. Division workers also observed defendant talking on his cell phone, while leaving the children unattended, and trying to arrange dates for himself. After initially refusing to attend parenting classes, defendant attended some parenting classes and participated sporadically in supervised visitations.
Dr. Schroeder undertook a parenting and psychological evaluation of defendant, and a bonding evaluation between defendant and all four children. She diagnosed defendant as having Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, Antisocial Personality Disorder, and difficulty admitting his problems or taking responsibility for his actions. Dr. Schroeder expressed concern regarding defendant's ability to respond to the behavior and medical needs of his children. She opined that he could not safely parent Neal, specifically, or all of his four children together. Similarly, Margaret Laurito, the Division caseworker, stated that defendant "displays inadequate parenting skills, . . . doesn't have a reliable source of income, . . . doesn't have reliable transportation," and could not handle "four very active children going in four different directions at any given time . . . ."
Judge Porto found Dr. Schroeder and the Division caseworker to be credible witnesses at trial. However, he found that defendant's testimony was inconsistent with respect to the Division's involvement with the family, his living arrangements and his current employment, and ultimately determined that his testimony lacked credibility. Judge Porto, in a lengthy opinion, determined that the Division met its burden of proving the elements of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15(a) by clear and convincing evidence, and concluded that termination of defendant's rights was in the children's best interests.
II.
Defendant contends on appeal that the Division failed to prove each prong of N.J.S.A. 30:14C-15.1(a) by clear and convincing evidence, and that the court erred by failing to render particularized findings as to each child and each parent. We are not persuaded by these arguments.
The Division must adduce clear and convincing evidence of four elements in order to terminate parental rights:
(1) The child's safety, health or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;These four factors are not independent of each other; rather, they are "interrelated and overlapping[,] . . . designed to identify and assess what may be necessary to promote and protect the best interests of the child." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.L., 388 N.J. Super. 81, 88 (App. Div. 2006) (citing In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 348 (1999)), certif. denied, 190 N.J. 257 (2007)). Application of the test is "extremely fact sensitive," requiring "particularized evidence that addresses the specific circumstances of the individual case." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm . . . .;
(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).]
Defendant's argument that the judge failed to "particularize" the findings as to the four children is not supported by the record. After hearing four days of testimony, and reviewing approximately seventy trial exhibits, the judge conscientiously analyzed the facts as to each child and each prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), and concluded that termination of defendant's parental rights was warranted. See N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. A.R., 405 N.J. Super. 418, 444 (App. Div. 2009) (holding that "the four prongs must be evaluated separately as to each child."); N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. F.H., 389 N.J. Super. 576, 611-13, 624 (App. Div. 2007).
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Our scope of our review of a Family Part judge's factual findings is limited. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 278-79 (2007) (citing In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002)). Those findings may not be disturbed unless they are "'so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'" Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974) (quoting Fagliarone v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 40 N.J. 221 (1963)); see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J. 494, 511 (2004). "A reviewing court should uphold the factual findings undergirding the trial court's decision if they are supported by 'adequate, substantial and credible evidence' on the record." M.M., supra, 189 N.J. at 279 (quoting In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993)). Applying that standard, we discern sufficient support in the record to support the trial judge's decision.
We address prongs one and two together. See In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 379 (1999) (stating, regarding prongs one and two, "evidence that supports one informs and may support the other"). Under the first prong of the termination statute, the trial court must assess whether there is clear and convincing evidence of harm arising out of the parent-child relationship. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1); see K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 348 ("Harm, in this context, involves the endangerment of the child's health and development resulting from the parental relationship."). Defendant argues that there was no credible evidence in the record to conclude that he has or will harm the children within the meaning of the statute. We disagree.
The Supreme Court "has made clear that 'the focus is on the effect of harms arising from the parent-child relationship over time on the child's health and development.'" Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 170 (2010) (quoting K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 348). Under this prong, "[t]he harm shown . . . must be one that threatens the child's health and will likely have continuing deleterious effects on the child." K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 352. There are situations where "[t]he potential return of a child to a parent may be so injurious that it would bar such an alternative." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 605 (1986). Accordingly, the "absence of physical abuse or neglect is not conclusive"; indeed, serious emotional and developmental injury should be regarded as injury to the child. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, trial courts must consider the potential psychological damage that may result from reunification with a parent. Ibid. "[T]he psychological aspect of parenthood is more important in terms of the development of the child and [her] mental and emotional health than the coincidence of biological or natural parenthood." Sees v. Baber, 74 N.J. 201, 222 (1977); see also In re Guardianship of K.L.F., 129 N.J. 32, 44 (1992) ("Serious and lasting emotional or psychological harm to children as the result of the action or inaction of their biological parents can constitute injury sufficient to authorize the termination of parental rights." (citing In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 18 (1982)).
Here, the trial judge found that the Division met its burden by clear and convincing evidence that the children's safety, health and development had been, and would continue to be, endangered by their relationship with defendant. Judge Porto opined at length about defendant's mental health issues, his failure to participate in the ample services made available to him to remedy the concerns that gave rise to the children's removal from his custody, his numerous parenting deficits, his abdication of his role as a parent, his lack of insight, and his unwillingness to provide for his children and put their needs over his own. Overall, he found that compelling evidence supported the conclusion that Neal, Eden, Ann, and Lisa's health and development was, and would continue to be, endangered by the relationship with defendant, and that defendant was unwilling to participate in the Division's proffered rehabilitation services.
The second prong focuses on whether the parent has "cured and overcome the initial harm that endangered the health, safety, or welfare of the child, and is able to continue a parental relationship without recurrent harm to the child." K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 348. The court is not required to wait "until a child is actually irreparably impaired by parental inattention or neglect." D.M.H., supra, 161 N.J. at 383. Under the second prong, a trial court determines whether it was "reasonably foreseeable that the parents can cease to inflict harm upon" the child. A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 607. "No more and no less is required of them than that they will not place their children in substantial jeopardy to physical or mental health." Ibid. We have noted that instability and lack of permanency adversely affect the development of a child, and the child's best interests cannot be sacrificed because of a parent's inability to address potential future harms, despite his willingness to try. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. C.S., 367 N.J. Super. 76, 111 (App. Div.) ("[T]he New Jersey statute[] reflect[s] reforms acknowledging the need for permanency of placements by placing limits on the time for a birth parent to correct conditions in anticipation of reuniting with the child."), certif. denied, 180 N.J. 456 (2004).
Here, the record amply supports the conclusion that defendant is unable to overcome the significant obstacles to his ability to parent. Judge Porto found:
[Defendant] has not corrected the harm that caused [Neal, Eden, Ann, and Lisa] to be
placed in the Division's custody, care, and supervision. Due to his mental health issues, [defendant] is unable to provide a minimal level of safe parenting.
Dr. Schroeder's testimony is revealing as it specifically addresses [defendant's] minimizing view of how the Division became involved with the family and that the history was very clear to her that there has been inadequate care of the children. Dr. Schroeder testified that the test results indicated that [defendant] is satisfied with himself. Dr. Schroeder was concerned with that testing data[,] as is this court. It is clear to this court that [defendant] does not appreciate the individualized needs of his children nor is he in a position to put his children's needs in front of his own. To his credit, [defendant] informed Dr. Schroeder that he wished he had been more available to take his children to their doctor's appointments but at the same time tempered that statement by stating they were taking good care of the children prior to the removal. This court does not find any consistency in [defendant's] statement. [Defendant's] actions speak volumes in this case such as not spending time with his children, punishing them all day and wanting a two story home so he could lock them upstairs.
Dr. Schroeder was also concerned about [defendant's] lying, particularly as it related to a job . . . . In addition, Dr. Schroeder was concerned that [defendant] was unable to attempt to secure housing. . . .
As to participation in services, [defendant] refused to participate in services prior to the children's removal. [defendant's] progress in services since that time is marginal at best. [Defendant] is unable to parent all of the children during supervised visits and was unable to
parent the children during the bonding evaluations with Dr. Schroeder.
Also, [defendant's] current business venture of scrapping metal is lacking in credibility. [Defendant] does not own a truck and simply drives around looking for metals or awaits telephone calls. The timing of [defendant's] securing a residence is curious in that it was "secured" only days before this trial. [Defendant] had plans to build a home and that never materialized.
Most notably, Dr. Schroeder testified that there are no services available for [defendant] to rehabilitate himself. [Defendant] has not benefited from the four or five attempts at parenting classes, including in-home classes, on-on-one and supervised visitation. This court finds that [defendant] has not eliminated the harm that endangered the children's health and development.
. . . According to Dr. Schroeder, [defendant] cannot provide a safe and stable home for [his children].
. . . .
. . . Dr. Schroeder testified that he was not even able to safely parent his children for two hours during her bonding evaluation. As noted earlier, this court found Dr. Schroeder's testimony credible, and if [defendant] could not safely parent his four children for two hours while supervised, this court has grave doubts that [defendant] is capable of safely parenting his children, unsupervised, twenty-four hours per day fifty-two weeks a year. There are no further services available for [defendant] to participate; and any further delay in a permanent placement will cause further harm to the children. Accordingly, this court finds that the Division has met the burden
of proof for prong two by clear and convincing evidence as to [defendant]
Turning to prong three, defendant challenges the court's finding that the Division made reasonable efforts to provide services to help defendant correct the circumstances that led to his children's placement outside the home. We disagree.
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(c) defines "reasonable efforts," which consist of actions by the Division "to assist the parents in remedying the circumstances and conditions that led to the placement of the child and in reinforcing the family structure." Provision of services under the third prong "contemplates efforts that focus on reunification," K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 354, and "may include consultation with the parent, developing a plan for reunification, providing services essential to the realization of the reunification plan, informing the family of the child's progress, and facilitating visitation." M.M., supra, 189 N.J. at 281. The reasonableness of the Division's efforts "is not measured by their success." D.M.H., supra, 161 N.J. at 393.
Judge Porto found that the Division offered a host of reasonable and appropriate remedial services, both prior to and after removal of the children. Despite these services, defendant was unable to care for the children, or to provide them with a safe and stable home. The record is replete with instances of the services provided, which defendant failed to successfully or fully complete. Defendant's claim that the visitation schedule was intended for defendant to fail, or that the Division failed to prepare a particularized case plan are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
The third prong also requires that the court consider "alternatives to termination of parental rights." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3). Defendant argues that Judge Porto failed to consider alternatives to termination of parental rights, including kinship legal guardianship. Where a relative caregiver agrees to raise a child to adulthood, the court may award kinship legal guardianship to that relative pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-6. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. S.V., 362 N.J. Super. 76, 87 (App. Div. 2003). However, this option is not appropriate where adoption is feasible and likely. Id. at 88 (citing N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-6(d)(3)); see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. S.F., 392 N.J. Super. 201, 213 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 192 N.J. 293 (2007).
Judge Porto found that
The Division has looked into all relatives provided by either [defendant] or [J.Z.]. The Division looked into a family friend, [R.R.]. Ms. [R.] withdrew her name as a possible placement. The Division looked into a paternal aunt, [A.P.], and she was
ruled out. Mr. [J.B.], a maternal uncle was ruled out because the children's Medicaid would not follow them and they would not be eligible for services. The Division also looked into [D.R.], the paternal grandmother who indicated she was not able to care for the children. Lastly, [L.Z.] had a history with Pennsylvania Protective Services.
The court also considered Kinship Legal Guardianship, and finds that it is not appropriate in this instance. [Neal], [Ann], and [Lisa's] foster families wish to adopt the children if they become legally free for adoption. The Division's plan for [Eden] is Select Home Adoption following his completion of his therapeutic resource home program. There is also a possibility that [Eden] could be adopted by either of the foster parents for [Ann] or [Neal]. Since adoption is feasible, this court finds Kinship Legal Guardianship is not an appropriate alternative to termination of [defendant's] parental rights.
Thus, it is clear that the judge considered alternatives to the termination of defendant's parental rights and concluded that none existed. In addition, Judge Porto was correct in finding that kinship legal guardianship was not appropriate because the foster parents of Neal, Ann and Lisa are willing to adopt. See P.P., supra, 180 N.J. at 509 ("A kinship legal guardian may only be appointed when 'adoption of the child is neither feasible not likely.' N.J.S.A. 30:4C:15.1(3)(b)"). Eden was also not a viable candidate for a kinship legal guardianship because he was in a therapeutic resource home and not placed with any person who was willing to be a kinship legal guardian, and a child must be in placement for twelve months before an application for kinship legal guardianship can be made. See M.F. v. Dep't of Human Servs., Div. of Family Dev., 395 N.J. Super. 18, 31 (App. Div. 2007) (citing N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-2, -5).
Further, "in light of the goal of achieving a stable and permanent home for the child, there are 'limits on the amount of time a parent may have to correct conditions at home in anticipation of reunification.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.R., 405 N.J. Super. 418, 442 (2009) (quoting K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 358). Further delay would run counter to the central consideration for "the child's need for permanency and stability . . . ." K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 357 (citing J.C., supra, 129 N.J. at 26 (recognizing the need children have for permanent and defined parent child relationships)); Matter of Adoption of Child by P.S., 315 N.J. Super. 91, 116 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that permanency is paramount). We discern no error in Judge Porto's analysis.
Lastly, we shall not disturb the court's finding, under prong four, that termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4). The fourth prong "cannot require a showing that no harm will befall the child as a result of the severing of biological ties." K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 355. It is, concededly, a "painfully difficult" decision that is vested in the trial judge who is most familiar with the case. Ibid. (quoting J.C., supra, 129 N.J. at 25). "[W]here it is shown that the bond with foster parents is strong and, in comparison, the bond with the natural parent is not as strong, that evidence will satisfy the requirement of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4)." K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 363. In balancing harms, the court must be mindful of New Jersey's strong public policy interest in permanency. Id. at 357 ("In all our guardianship and adoption cases, the child's need for permanency and stability emerges as a central factor.").
There was sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the court's conclusion that terminating parental rights would not do more harm than good. The court found the testimony of Dr. Schroeder to be credible. That testimony supported the court's prong four analysis. Judge Porto stated:
In this case, the children's need for permanency, a stable home and the fact that Dr. Schroeder's testimony concluded that [defendant] cannot safely parent his children have been critically considered by this court.
. . . [Dr. Schroeder] was the only expert to testify at trial and Dr. Schroeder testified to the need for the children's permanency. Dr. Schroeder also performed bonding evaluations on all of the children with [defendant] and the foster parents.
. . . .
. . . upon balancing [Neal], [Ann], and [Lisa's] relationships with [defendant] and their foster parents, this court concludes that termination of [defendant's] parental rights will not do more harm than good. [Ann] and [Lisa] have significant positive bonds and attachments to their foster parents. [Neal] is in the process of developing a positive bond with his foster parents. [Eden] is not in an adoptive home, but it is quite possible that adoption could occur as stated by this court above. Nonetheless, this court concludes that termination of [defendant's] parental rights regarding [Eden] will not do more harm than good. Moreover, [defendant] is not capable of providing a safe, permanent and stable home for his children and continues to harm his children during visits with them.
. . . [Defendant] is an un-rehabilitated parent that cannot benefit from any further services. In further balancing the children's need for permanency, the bond and the possible severance of any bond with the foster parents, the children's relationship with their natural parent and the severance of that relationship, this court is satisfied that it is in the best interests of [Neal], [Eden], [Ann], and [Lisa] to remain in their current placements and that termination of [defendant's] parental rights would not do more harm than good.
We find no error in the court's conclusion that prong four was met. Dr. Schroeder was "a well qualified expert who has had full opportunity to make a comprehensive, objective, and informed evaluation of the child's relationship with [defendant and] the foster parent." J.C., supra, 129 N.J. at 19.
The remainder of defendant's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION