Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-6083-11T3 DOCKET NO. A-6117-11T3
06-20-2014
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. P.W. and M.C.W., Defendants-Appellants. IN THE MATTER OF M.W. and C.W., Minors.
Michael R. Ascher argued the cause for appellant P.W. (Einhorn, Harris, Ascher, Barbarito & Frost, attorneys; Mr. Ascher, of counsel and on the brief; James M. DeStefano, on the brief). John A. Albright, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant M.C.W. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Albright, on the brief). Victoria A. Galinski, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent Division (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, Ms. Galinski, on the brief). Lisa M. Black, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for minors (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Ms. Black, on the brief).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Sapp-Peterson, Lihotz and Maven.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Sussex County, Docket No. FN-19-23-11.
Michael R. Ascher argued the cause for appellant P.W. (Einhorn, Harris, Ascher, Barbarito & Frost, attorneys; Mr. Ascher, of counsel and on the brief; James M. DeStefano, on the brief).
John A. Albright, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant M.C.W. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Albright, on the brief).
Victoria A. Galinski, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent Division (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, Ms. Galinski, on the brief).
Lisa M. Black, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for minors (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Ms. Black, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendants, M.C.W. (Meredith) and P.W. (Patrick), appeal from the trial court order determining that they abused their adoptive daughter, M.W. (Mimi), born in September 2003. We affirm.
To protect the confidentiality of the parties, the names of the parties, as well as all children referenced in this opinion, are fictitious.
The Division of Youth and Family Services (Division) placed Mimi with defendants in 2006. Since her birth, until placement with defendants, Mimi was placed in five different foster homes. The placements were unsuccessful for a number of reasons, including disputes with Mimi's biological mother, environmental safety concerns, an unaccommodating work schedule, and the belief that Mimi ate and drank too much.
Meredith had reservations about Mimi's placement with her and Patrick at the outset. Patrick, however, was excited. The Division provided defendants with all of the requisite background information related to Mimi, including details about her motor abilities and behavioral issues. After being given an opportunity to think about the placement, Meredith contacted the Division and advised that she and Patrick wanted Mimi placed with them. The Division placed Mimi with defendants on November 14, 2006, and the following month defendants expressed their desire for Mimi to have a sibling and requested that a younger child be placed with them.
In February, the Division placed six-week-old Christine with defendants. Christine's history revealed she screamed daily, had temper tantrums, experienced eating difficulties and had a variety of medical issues, including cerebral palsy and agenesis of the corpus callosum. In addition, it was reported she exhibited symptoms of autism, suffered from asthma, sleeping problems, night terrors, and seizures.
"Agenesis of the corpus callosum (ACC) is a birth defect in which the structure that connects the two hemispheres of the brain (the corpus callosum) is partially or completely absent." NINDS Agenesis of the Corpus Callosum Information Page, http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/agenesis/agenesis.htm (last updated February 14, 2014).
Over the next three years, defendants reported no significant problems with either girl. Also during this period, defendants provided foster care to other children. In June 2007, defendants adopted Mimi, and in December 2008, they adopted Christine.
Beginning the summer of 2010 and continuing in early fall of that year, defendants reportedly experienced marital problems, allegedly precipitated by Meredith's allegations related to Mimi, including that she had sexually abused Christine. Patrick apparently dismissed these allegations, to Meredith's dismay. Patrick obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Meredith after claiming that on September 12, 2010, Meredith had an altercation with him, which caused him to fall down a flight of stairs and she also threw Mimi down the stairs. He later expressed regret that he filed for restraints, and the TRO was ultimately dismissed.
The Division became aware of the alleged incident and conducted its own investigation, but did not substantiate any abuse stemming from the incident. Defendants, however, underwent an evaluation with the Center for Evaluation and Counseling (CEC) on October 21, 2010. The preliminary CEC report raised concerns defendants were unable to provide a safe and stable home for all of the children in their care at that time. The report expressed the fear that domestic violence, physical abuse, and emotional abuse were possibly occurring in the home. Based upon this preliminary report, the Division effectuated an emergency removal of Mimi, Christine and the other two children who were in foster placement with defendants at that time. The Division filed a verified complaint for custody, care, and supervision. The court granted the application on November 3, 2010. Thereafter, the Division provided services to defendants, specifically, individual and family counseling.
Christine has been returned to defendants' custody and is not a part of this appeal.
On November 22, 2010, CEC submitted a final report in which the assessment team concluded Meredith was emotionally unstable and fixated on having Mimi removed from the home. The team found Patrick to be defensive and reluctant to disclose information. The team concluded neither Meredith nor Patrick could parent their adoptive daughters or foster children.
The fact-finding hearing commenced on August 2, 2011 and continued for fifteen, non-consecutive days over the next seven months, concluding on March 28, 2012. The Division presented eighteen witnesses, including Division caseworkers, specialists, supervisors, clinicians, therapists, a psychiatrist, teachers and school staff. The Law Guardian presented testimony from the resource parent with whom Mimi had been placed following her removal from defendants' custody. Patrick testified on his own behalf. Meredith did not testify nor produce witnesses on her own behalf.
Upon completion of the hearing, the court placed its findings orally on the record, concluding the Division established by the preponderance of the evidence that defendants had abused and neglected Mimi and Christine. The court specifically found that both defendants had isolated Mimi from the rest of the family beginning September 5, 2010, and continued to so until her removal October 29, 2010. The court also found defendants forced Mimi to walk to school, refused to allow her to play with or to ride in vehicles with Christine and her other foster siblings, and also forced her to eat alone, away from the rest of the family.
Focusing specifically upon Patrick's conduct, the court found that he placed the children in danger by accepting Meredith's "preposterous nonsense" almost immediately, joined forces with Meredith to ostracize Mimi, and instructed school officials to keep Mimi away from other children. The court rejected defendants' assertions that other children feared Mimi and, instead, credited the testimony of other witnesses who observed Mimi having loving relationships with the children with whom she lived and interacted well with other children once she was removed from defendants' care and custody. As a result of defendants' conduct, the court found Mimi was negatively impacted in that her sense of safety and security had been impaired because she was being taught that she, not her alleged behaviors, was the problem.
On appeal, Patrick raises the following points for our consideration:
POINT I
THE COURT'S FINDING OF ABUSE AND NEGLECT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE, SUBSTANTIAL OR CREDIBLE EVIDENCE EXISTING IN THE RECORD REQUIRING A REVERSAL OF THE COURT'S FINDING OF ABUSE AND NEGLECT AGAINST [PATRICK].
A. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A PLAN BY THE PARENTS IN THIS MATTER DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN ACT OF EITHER ABUSE OR NEGLECT SINCE THE SOLE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY DYFS RESULTED IN [MIMI] FEELING SAD AND/OR SEGREGATED.
B. THE PROTECTIVE PLAN AND SERVICES OBTAINED BY THE PARENTS IN RESPONSE TO THE AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR OF [MIMI] WERE REASONABLE AND COULD NOT CONSTITUTE ABUSE OR NEGLECT UNDER THE STATUTE.
POINT II
THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS BELOW WERE FLAWED DUE TO THE COURT'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK CONCERNING DODD REMOVALS AND ABUSE AND NEGLECT FACT FINDINGS.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT CHANGED DYFS'S BURDEN OF PROOF FROM CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.
On appeal, Meredith raises the following points for our consideration:
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE CHILD WAS ABUSED OR NEGLECTED BECAUSE THE PARENTAL DECISION TO SEPARATE HER FROM THREE YOUNGER CHILDREN IN THE HOUSEHOLD, FOR THE PROTECTION OF ALL THE CHILDREN, FALLS SQUARELY WITHIN THE PARENTS' FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO AUTONOMY IN PARENTING.
A. PARENTAL DECISION-MAKING IN CHILD-REARING DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN EMOTIONAL IMPAIRMENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE STATUTE, AND THE ILLUSORY EMOTIONAL IMPAIRMENT FOUND WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED BY HEARSAY THAT THE CHILD "FELT SAD" OR "FELT SEGREGATED."
B. THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE PARENTS WERE AN OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE RESPONSE TO THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD OF [MIMI'S] AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR TOWARD OTHER CHILDREN.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFERENCING AND RELYING ON AN ALLEGED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INCIDENT AS A BASIS FOR
ITS FINDINGS, BECAUSE THE DIVISION'S INVESTIGATIVE DETERMINATION WAS THAT ANY CLAIMS OF ABUSE OR NEGLECT STEMMING FROM THIS INCIDENT WERE UNFOUNDED.
POINT III
THE COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE PARENTS ACTED RECKLESSLY, INTENTIONALLY, OR GROSSLY NEGLIGENTLY IS SUBSTANTIALLY MEANINGLESS AND DOES NOT COMPLY WITH R[ULE] 1:7-4(A), BECAUSE THERE IS NO NEXUS BETWEEN THE
STANDARDS CITED AND THE FACTS OF THE CASE. Our standard of review on appeal is narrow. A reviewing court must defer to the Family Part's findings of fact and conclusions of law based on those findings. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R., 405 N.J. Super. 418, 433 (App. Div. 2009). "[F]indings by the trial judge are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Z.P.R., 351 N.J. Super. 427, 433 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). We adopt this approach in our review because the trial court "has the opportunity to make first-hand credibility judgments about the witnesses who appear on the stand; it has a 'feel of the case' that can never be realized by a review of the cold record." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008); accord, N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 293 (2007). Even where there are alleged errors in the trial court's evaluation of underlying facts, a reviewing court "will accord deference unless the trial court's findings went so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made." M.M., supra, 189 N.J. at 279 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The adjudication of abuse and neglect complaints is governed by Title 9, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.73. The statute is designed to protect children who suffer serious injury inflicted other than by accidental means. G.S. v. Dep't of Human Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 171 (1999) (citing N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.8). An "abused or neglected child" is defined in N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c), and the proofs necessary to establish abuse or neglect are measured by a preponderance of evidence standard. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.W.R., 205 N.J. 17, 32 (2011); see also N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b) ("In a fact-finding hearing (1) any determination that the child is an abused or neglected child must be based on a preponderance of the evidence and (2) only competent, material and relevant evidence may be admitted."). Under this standard, "something more than ordinary negligence is required to hold the actor liable[,]" such as "conduct that is grossly or wantonly negligent, but not necessarily intentional." Id. at 178. Such conduct "implies that a person has acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others." Id. at 179.
Proceedings brought under Title 9 begin with the filing of a complaint alleging "facts sufficient to establish that a child is . . . abused or neglected . . . ." N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.33. In pertinent part, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4) defines an "abused or neglected child" as a
child whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as the result of the failure of his parent or guardian . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care . . . in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof, including the infliction of excessive corporal punishment; or by any other acts of a similarly serious nature requiring the aid of the court[.]A court does not have to wait until a child is actually harmed or neglected before it can act on behalf of the welfare of that minor. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. V.M., 408 N.J. Super. 222, 235-36 (App. Div.) (citing In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 383 (1999)), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 505 and 201 N.J. 272 (2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3502 and 3537, 117 L. Ed. 2d 1095 (2010). Nor does harm to the child need to be intentional in order to substantiate a finding of abuse or neglect. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 344 (2010). Whether a parent has engaged in acts of abuse or neglect involves a totality of the circumstances analysis. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. V.T., 423 N.J. Super. 320, 329 (App. Div. 2011). In V.T., we recognized that "the elements of proof are synergistically related. Each proven act of neglect [or abuse] has some effect on the [child]. One act may be substantial or the sum of many acts may be substantial." Id. at 329-30 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Applying these standards to this matter, we are satisfied the court relied upon competent, credible evidence in the record to support its determination that defendants engaged in a course of deliberate conduct, which placed Mimi in imminent risk of substantial harm. We reject defendants' contention that their actions were appropriate exercises of parental autonomy under New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. P.W.R., 205 N.J. 17, 37 (2011). There, the Court held that occasional physical discipline was not "excessive corporal punishment." Ibid. Here, defendants' discipline through isolation and segregation was continuous with no competent evidence in the record to justify this form of discipline. Beyond Meredith's allegations, there was no evidence that Mimi sexually assaulted or otherwise acted aggressively towards other children. Patrick never witnessed any of the alleged occurrences; nor did school officials, Division workers, or Mimi's new caregiver witness any such behavior.
The impact of defendants' social isolation and physical segregation of Mimi was reflected in testimony presented by school personnel, who explained that during the first part of the 2010 school year, while living with defendants, Mimi displayed a lack of confidence, experienced temper tantrums, had poor hygiene and often appeared disheveled. Following her removal, Mimi's hygiene improved and her behavior stabilized. A court "need not wait until a child is actually irreparably impaired by parental inattention" before stepping in to protect the welfare of a child. See D.M.H., supra, 161 N.J. at 383 (stating that "[c]ourts need not wait to act until a child is actually irreparably impaired by parental inattention or neglect"); see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. S.S., supra, 372 N.J. Super. 13, 24 (App. Div. 2004). Moreover, Patrick's failure to protect Mimi was also harmful because he acquiesced in allowing Meredith to subject Mimi to isolation and emotional abuse, notwithstanding he had never witnessed any of the conduct on the part of Mimi as alleged by Meredith.
Finally, post argument on our plenary calendar, Meredith's trial counsel brought to our attention our recent decision from another panel, New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. M.C., ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. May 5, 2014). In response to this submission, the Division contends M.C. is distinguishable. We agree. R. 2:6-11(d). In M.C. we reversed the trial court's determination that M.C.'s children were neglected and abused. Id. at 2. We found the trial court erred in finding the children were in imminent danger, based solely upon the defendant's past conduct. Id. at 22. We held "[w]ithout evidence permitting a finding of likely repetition of past conduct creating a substantial risk of harm, a finding based on past conduct cannot be sustained. The statute permits a focus on past conduct alone only when the child's condition has been impaired." Id. at 19 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, there was evidence of ongoing harm to Mimi. Thus, the court's determination was not based solely upon past conduct. Moreover, despite evaluations and recommendations, defendants' conduct did not remediate and was not likely to have remediated in the future. In fact, the record reflects defendants intended to continue the emotional and physical isolation of Mimi from the family through some form of institutionalization, an alternative not warranted, in light of evidence in the record that Mimi underwent a dramatic change, for the better, in her personality and appearance once removed from defendants' custody.
Next, the record does not support defendants' contention the court erred by failing to comply with the statutory framework for emergency removal of the children and in conducting its subsequent fact-finding hearing. The Dodd Act, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.82 (Act), authorizes the Division to remove a child from the home on an emergent basis without a court order. P.W.R., supra, 205 N.J. at 26 n.11. Such removals are justified when a child's health or life are in imminent danger. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.27(a); N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.29.
The name Dodd refers to former Senate President Frank J. Pat Dodd in 1974 who authored the Act. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. N.S., 412 N.J. Super. 593, 609 n.2 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 204 N.J. (2010).
Prior to the children's removal, the Division launched an investigation, after being advised Mimi had been pushed down the stairs during a domestic violence incident involving defendants. Although allegations of abuse were not substantiated, Meredith told the Division worker that Patrick had a history of domestic violence. Patrick, during this time period, reportedly told a therapist from St. Clare's Hospital that he and Meredith engaged in sexual activity with each other while Christine slept with them and that Meredith threatened to accuse him of molesting Mimi if he didn't support her claim that Mimi was abusing Christine. During a visit from a caseworker, it was discovered that defendants assigned chores to Mimi, such as cleaning the bathroom, despite being told by the caseworker that she was too young to perform such tasks. The worker encouraged Meredith to treat Mimi with affection to correct her earlier cold treatment of Mimi. Nonetheless, Meredith continued to treat Mimi in the same negative manner and continued to allege that Mimi was abusing Christine, as well as animals, and urged the Division to remove her from the home and place her in a residential home. She also accused Mimi of inserting toys in Christine's rectum, blamed Mimi for night terrors and seizures Christine experienced, and refused to allow Mimi to be transported in the family car. Based upon the above information, gathered during the course of its investigation, along with concerns raised in a preliminary report authored by the CEC, the Division removed all four children in defendants' custody.
In granting care, custody, and supervision of the children to the Division, the court had the benefit of this evidence before it and we discern no basis to conclude the court's determination that the children's emergency removal was not justified. Because the children were being removed on an emergency basis, the Division was not required to implement a safety plan, as it had previously done during its initial investigation in response to allegations of domestic violence and child abuse. See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.2 (relieving the Division of the obligation to explore reasonable efforts to prevent removal from parents' care, custody, and supervision under certain circumstances).
We turn now to Patrick's contention he was prejudiced because the court initially stated it would be guided by the "clear and convincing" standard of proof, but ultimately reached its decision based upon the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. At the outset of the fact-finding hearing, the court referenced that it would preside over the fact-finding proceeding utilizing the "clear and convincing" standard as enunciated in New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services v. R.D., 207 N.J. 88 (2012). The court did so, however, in accordance with R.D., explaining to the parties that
[t]his is a fact-finding case. I am putting everybody on notice that I am going to proceed as if the standard of proof is clear and convincing, recognizing that under [s]tate law for this proceeding that the burden of proof is, in fact, only the preponderance of the evidence. But if I can reach the clear and convincing to save judicial economy I will do that. So everybody's on notice that that's the standard I'm proceeding on.
In R.D., the Court opined that a Title 9 proceeding could ripen into a Title 30 case during the proceedings themselves. R.D., supra, 207 N.J. at 120. As a result, the Court instructed that a trial court conducting an abuse or neglect fact-finding hearing could provide notice at the outset of the proceeding that a clear and convincing proof standard may be employed, if applicable, to shortcut the duplication of proof in a later Title 30 proceeding. Ibid. Here, the record reveals Meredith was adamant that she no longer wanted Mimi in the home. Thus, a Title 30 action was likely in this case. Therefore, while acknowledging the proper standard to apply for the abuse or neglect allegations was preponderance of the evidence, the court placed the parties on notice that it would apply a higher standard if the matter ripened into a Title 30 proceeding. Ultimately, the court did not employ the higher standard, and decided the abuse and neglect allegations using a preponderance of the evidence standard.
Patrick complains he was prejudiced by the court's failure to apply the "clear and convincing" standard in that he did not present expert testimony pertaining to Mimi because he relied upon the court's application of the higher burden of proof standard. Notably, Patrick failed to raise this issue when the judge announced his decision utilizing the preponderance of the evidence standard in making his ultimate findings. Thus, in considering whether the court erred by initially advising the parties that if it could do so, "to save judicial economy," it was going to "proceed as if the standard of proof is clear and convincing," we do so under the plain error standard. R. 2:10-2. The plain error rule requires that we ask whether the complained—of error was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." Ibid. Where "a case is fortified by substantial credible evidence," it is unlikely that plain error occurred. State v. Irving, 114 N.J. 427, 448 (1989).
We find no error, let alone plain error. The court did not announce its intention to employ the clear and convincing standard until the first day of the fact-finding hearing. Presumably, during the course of the pre-fact-finding proceedings, defendants prepared their defense based upon the preponderance of the evidence standard. Consequently, had Patrick intended to produce expert testimony, he would have sought leave to do so prior to the commencement of the fact-finding hearing. See R. 5:12-3 (permitting discovery in Division matters "by any party . . . only by leave of court for good cause shown"). Having made no such application, we find no merit to Patrick's contention now that he did not produce expert testimony based upon his reliance upon the court's application of the higher burden of proof, about which he first received notice on the first day of trial. Nor has he made any proffer as to what any anticipated expert testimony would have disclosed.
The remaining arguments advanced by Meredith that the court erred in relying upon the September 2010 domestic violence event and failed to make appropriate findings of facts and conclusions of law in reaching its determination defendants acted recklessly, intentionally, or in a grossly negligent manner, are without sufficient merit to warrant extensive discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A),(E). We add the following brief comments.
In determining whether abuse or neglect has occurred, a court may consider a parent's past behavior as it relates to the likelihood that harm can befall the child in the future. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 616 (1986); see also N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. I.H.C., 415 N.J. Super. 551, 573-74 (App. Div. 2010) (holding that the predisposition that an individual can harm a child is expressly admissible in an abuse and neglect case); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Robert M., 347 N.J. Super. 44, 66-67 (App. Div.) (explaining that the court cannot ignore relevant events), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 39 (2002). Here, the court considered the alleged domestic violence incident as the event which triggered the Division's involvement with defendants. In the domestic violence complaint, Patrick referenced Meredith's increasingly aggressive demeanor towards Mimi. The fact that the TRO was dismissed did not preclude the court from considering Patrick's factual allegations set forth in his complaint seeking issuance of a TRO. He certified to the truth of the factual allegations he set forth in the complaint. Therefore, his statement was admissible, as a statement by a party opponent, N.J.R.E. 803(b)(2), and as background providing context to the circumstances surrounding defendants' deliberate isolation of Mimi from the rest of the family, which continues to put the child at risk.
In its findings, the court, in detail, explained why it concluded defendants' actions were reckless and, at a minimum, grossly negligent. The court found defendants intentionally segregated and isolated Mimi from the rest of the children in the family and detailed the specific instances of defendants' conduct in this regard. Thus, there was ample evidence to support the conclusions the court reached, which were not so wide of the mark to warrant our intervention and correction of an injustice. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448 (2012) (holding "[w]e will not overturn a family court's factfindings unless they are so wide of the mark that our intervention is necessary to correct an injustice") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION