Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3139-14T3 DOCKET NO. A-3140-14T3
02-19-2016
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. S.J.T., SR. and B.Y.H., Defendants-Appellants. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF S.J.T., JR. and S.L.A.H., Minors.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant S.J.T., Sr. (Gilbert Miller, Designated Counsel, on the briefs). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant B.Y.H. (Richard Sparaco, Designated Counsel, on the briefs). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Michelle D. Perry-Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minors, S.J.T., Jr. and S.L.A.H. (Joseph Hector Ruiz, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Sabatino, O'Connor and Suter. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County, FG-04-0181-14. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant S.J.T., Sr. (Gilbert Miller, Designated Counsel, on the briefs). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant B.Y.H. (Richard Sparaco, Designated Counsel, on the briefs). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Michelle D. Perry-Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minors, S.J.T., Jr. and S.L.A.H. (Joseph Hector Ruiz, Designated Counsel, on the brief). PER CURIAM
After a Title 30 guardianship trial, the Family Part terminated the parental rights of the appellants B.Y.H. ("the mother") and S.J.T., Sr. ("the father") concerning their biological children S.J.T., Jr. ("the son") and S.L.A.H. ("the daughter"). At the time of trial, the son was age seven and the daughter was age three. Both children have special needs, particularly the son, who is fed by a gastronomy tube and is not able to eat or drink independently.
The court terminated appellants' rights after an extensive six-year history of involvement of the Division of Child Protection and Permanency ("the Division") with this family. During that time, both parents repeatedly demonstrated their inability to serve as capable caretakers. Both parents have long-standing substance abuse problems. The father has been incarcerated for substantial intervals of time. The mother was convicted of criminal assault and endangerment of the son after beating him with a belt so severely that she fractured two of his ribs and caused fractures in both of his hands.
Both parents were offered a host of services by the Division and did not complete them, even those that were court-ordered. Neither parent was drug-free for any lengthy period of time. The Division appropriately ruled out several relatives who were proposed as alternative caretakers, including the wife of the maternal grandfather who had not visited the children in about two years, was not aware of the son's physical conditions, and who had fire damage in her residence.
After the children were each removed from the parents' care, they were ultimately placed with resource parents. According to the testimony of the Division's psychological experts, both children have bonded well with the resource parents, who wish to adopt them. Neither parent testified at trial, although the mother did present testimony from her ruled-out relative. The mother also presented expert testimony from a psychologist, who diagnosed her with significant deficits but optimistically contended that she could become a capable parent with additional counseling.
After considering the evidence, Judge Linda G. Baxter issued a detailed oral opinion concluding that the Division had proven the statutory criteria for termination by clear and convincing evidence as to both parents. The judge credited the expert witnesses presented by the Division and the Law Guardian in favor of termination, and found unpersuasive the defendant's expert's contention that the mother could attain a safe level of parenting capability in the near future. The judge agreed with the Division's plan to have the children continue in the care of the foster parents, finding that if they were removed from that care "they would suffer severe and enduring harm." By contrast, the judge found that the children have not been securely attached to either parent, and that terminating appellants' parental rights would cause no significant harm.
The applicable substantive law and our scope of review is well established. When petitioning for the termination of parental rights, the Division must establish the following four elements under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) by clear and convincing evidence:
(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include evidence that separating the child from his resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child;
(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the
child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and"These four factors are not 'discrete,' but rather 'relate to and overlap with one another to provide a comprehensive standard that identifies a child's best interests.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 103 (2008) (citing In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 348 (1999)).
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.
[N. J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).]
Appellate review of a trial court's decision to terminate parental rights is limited. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 278-79 (2007) (citing In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002)). The reviewing court should not disturb the factual findings of the trial court if they are supported by "adequate, substantial and credible evidence[.]" Id. at 279 (quoting In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993)). Moreover, we accord substantial deference to the expertise of judges sitting in the Family Part who preside over Title 30 guardianship trials. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 427 (2012).
The father argues that the trial court erred in finding that the Division's evidence met all four prongs of the statute. The mother confines her own appeal to contentions that the Division failed to prove prongs two (concerning her future ability to eliminate the harm) and three (concerning the adequacy of services provided to her).
Applying our deferential scope of review to these arguments, we affirm the final judgment of termination entered against both parents, substantially for the detailed reasons articulated in Judge Baxter's bench opinion of February 5, 2015. The judge carefully considered the proofs, which overwhelmingly show that both parents bear responsibility for the conditions that led to the removal of both children, that neither parent is capable of providing stable and adequate care for them in the near future, that both parents were offered an abundance of services but did not take sufficient advantage of them, and that termination of their parental rights is in the children's best interests and will help them achieve permanency with their foster parents.
The judge had the prerogative to adopt the opinions of the experts marshalled by the Division and the Law Guardian and reject testimony of the mother's expert, who in several respects echoed the concerns presented by the other experts. Angel v. Rand Express Lines, Inc., 66 N.J. Super. 77, 85-86 (App. Div. 1961) (recognizing the well-established principle that a trier of fact may accept the opinions of a testifying expert and reject those of the opposing experts).
The relatives proposed as alternative caretakers were ruled out with ample substantive justification, particularly given the results of the home inspection and the children's special needs. Cf. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. J.S., 433 N.J. Super. 69, 81-83 (App. Div. 2013) (describing the rule-out factors), certif. denied, 217 N.J. 587 (2014).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION