Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3279-12T4
01-31-2014
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. R.O.J., Defendant-Appellant. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF M.R.J., Minor.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Dianne Glenn, Designated Counsel, on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; James D. Harris, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor (Todd Wilson, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Fuentes, Simonelli and Fasciale.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County, Docket No. FG-04-181-12.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Dianne Glenn, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; James D. Harris, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor (Todd Wilson, Designated Counsel, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant R.O.J. appeals from the February 28, 2013 judgment of guardianship, which terminated his parental rights to his daughter, M.R.J., born in September 2008. Defendant contends that plaintiff New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) failed to prove prongs one, two, and three of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a by clear and convincing evidence. After reviewing the evidence presented to the trial court, and in light of prevailing legal standards and the arguments presented, we affirm.
The judgment also terminated the parental rights of M.R.J.'s biological mother, H.S. H.S. executed a voluntary surrender of her parental rights on January 23, 2013, and is not involved in this appeal.
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We will not recite in detail the history of the Division's involvement with defendant. Instead, we incorporate by reference the factual findings and legal conclusions contained in Judge Linda Baxter's February 28, 2013 oral opinion. We add only the following comments.
We are satisfied that commencing with the Division's first contact with defendant in March 2008, when H.S. was three months pregnant with M.R.J., and continuing up to and including the start of trial in January 2013, the Division provided multiple opportunities for him to reunify with his child and address his mental health issues and drug and alcohol addiction. None of these interventions proved successful.
Judge Baxter carefully reviewed the evidence presented and thereafter concluded the Division had met by clear and convincing evidence all of the legal requirements for a judgment of guardianship. The judge found that defendant's failure to demonstrate a consistent commitment to M.R.J., coupled with his "significant" cocaine addiction and unresolved mental health issues, endangered and will continue to endanger the child's safety, health, or development. The judge found that defendant's "profound lack of insight" into his drug addiction, his "adamant refusal" to participate in drug treatment, and his unresolved mental health issues proved he was unwilling to eliminate the harm caused by the parental relationship. The judge also determined that the Division "tried very hard to provide services to [defendant], but he spurned the Division's efforts," and the Division evaluated maternal and paternal relatives as alternatives to termination of parental rights, but rejected them for valid reasons.
Judge Baxter's opinion tracks the statutory requirements of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a, accords with In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337 (1999), In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365 (1999), and N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591 (1986), and is supported by substantial and credible evidence in the record. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012). We affirm substantially for the reasons the judge expressed in her comprehensive and well-reasoned oral opinion.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION