Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4540-12T1
02-24-2014
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. M.H., Defendant-Appellant. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF S.H., A Minor.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (John A. Albright, Designated Counsel, on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Liana Dinallo, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for the minor (Tracye Wilson Elliot, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Alvarez and Carroll.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket No. FG-07-189-12.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (John A. Albright, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Liana Dinallo, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for the minor (Tracye Wilson Elliot, Designated Counsel, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant M.H. appeals from the Family Part's May 14, 2013 final judgment terminating her parental rights to her daughter, S.H., born in January 2010. Defendant contends that plaintiff New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) failed to prove prongs one, two and four of the best interests standard, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a, by clear and convincing evidence. She also claims that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay documents and testimony. After reviewing the evidence presented to the trial court, and in light of prevailing legal standards and the arguments presented, we affirm.
I.
We recently recounted much of the facts and procedural history of this case in an unpublished opinion on M.H.'s appeal from a final order terminating the Title 9 proceeding. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.H., No. A-5367-11 (App. Div. December 18, 2013). We will not repeat those findings here, but incorporate them in this opinion. Suffice it to say, we found that M.H. placed her then nine-month old child at substantial risk of harm when she left the child unsupervised on a twin size bed without rails for a prolonged period while fighting with another resident in the hallway of a homeless shelter where she and S.H. were residing. Instead, we focus on Judge Stephen J. Bernstein's careful summary of the proofs at the guardianship trial conducted on May 13 and 14, 2013, and his evidence rulings as to which M.H. claims error.
M.H. suffered from a variety of mental health issues which, if not properly treated, impeded her ability to properly care for her young child. On October 5, 2010, M.H. underwent a psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Alexander Iofin. Dr. Iofin diagnosed M.H. with several disorders, including: impulse control disorder; affective disorder, NOS (not otherwise specified); bipolar disorder, NOS; provisional psychotic disorder; and related mental health problems. His report stated that if the Division decided to keep S.H. in M.H.'s care, he would recommend "extremely close supervision of [M.H.]," which could include a program where M.H. would be "under [twenty-four] hour supervision" to determine her actual parenting abilities.
Dr. Iofin also recommended an intensive therapy schedule, including "individual therapy, family therapy sessions, anger management treatment, and parental training in a heavy-duty parental fitness program, which could be at least [twenty-six] weeks in duration." Ultimately, Dr. Iofin opined that the Division should "follow common sense that says that it is better to be safe than sorry, and make sure that the welfare and safety of the child is not compromised, [while] at the same time protecting to the fullest possible extent all rights of [M.H.]."
M.H. was frequently antagonistic, threatening, and hostile toward others. As noted, she had previously engaged in a fight at the homeless shelter while leaving S.H. unattended. On November 4, 2010, the Division investigated that incident, substantiated child neglect, and executed an emergency Dodd removal, placing S.H. in foster care.
An emergency removal of a child from his or her home without a court order, pursuant to the Dodd Act, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to - 8.82.
Following the removal, the Division arranged for visits between M.H. and S.H. The first visit occurred on November 8, 2010, but was terminated due to M.H.'s disruptive behavior. M.H. yelled and screamed and became very upset, which resulted in her being escorted out by the Human Services Police (police). A few days later, M.H. met with a caseworker to discuss visits, and to request a meeting with the foster parents. M.H. again began to yell and curse at the worker. A subsequent visit with S.H. was similarly terminated when M.H. began to berate the Division workers, prompting another escorted exit with the assistance of the police. Thereafter, a court order required her visits to be supervised by the police.
On January 18, 2011, the Division learned that S.H. had sustained a small burn on her hand while in foster care. A Division nurse attempted to assess the injury in M.H.'s presence. As soon as M.H. was notified, she began cursing, crying and yelling. She threatened the nurse and prepared to fight her, while holding S.H. in her other hand. M.H. was subsequently arrested and charged with endangering the welfare of a child, aggravated assault, and resisting arrest. Although S.H. did not witness her mother's fighting with the police, she heard the yelling and screaming as the police intervened to stop M.H. from attacking the nurse. "The commotion caused [S.H.] to become extremely upset and cry uncontrollably." As a result of this incident, on February 3, 2011, the Division suspended M.H.'s visitation privileges. Visitation was reinstated on May 26, 2011.
Despite the arrest and suspended visitation, the Division continued to provide M.H. with services, such as mental health treatment, individual therapy, substance abuse referrals, and parenting skills classes. However, the parenting skills program discharged M.H. "due to her out of control behavior." The program cited M.H.'s incorrigible use of profanity, her verbally aggressive behavior, and mental instability as factors for its inability to work with her. Another mental health service provider terminated M.H. for her non-attendance. By September 2011, a third therapy program closed services to M.H. due to her poor attendance record. The following month, a counseling agency also ceased serving M.H. due to her excessive absenteeism. However, as the Division later learned, M.H. had been arrested and incarcerated since August 2011, on charges of aggravated assault and resisting arrest. M.H. remained incarcerated until April 2012. However she was again incarcerated from June 6, 2012 to July 24, 2012, for throwing bodily fluids on a corrections officer and resisting arrest.
Following her release, the Division assisted M.H. in enrolling in a mental health program in which she had displayed interest, and assisted her with transportation. However, M.H. again failed to attend her appointments, and was discharged from the program due to excessive absenteeism. Though the Division continued its efforts to arrange therapy and other classes for M.H., it later learned that she had moved to Pennsylvania in late December 2012, without providing any notice.
In early November 2011, the Division located a maternal aunt, E.H-R., and began assessing her as a placement resource. Soon, E.H-R. began visiting S.H. at her foster care placement, and also began to complete the licensing requirements needed for the child's placement. S.H. was then placed with E.H-R. on August 24, 2012, with the goal of adoption.
The Division presented two witnesses at the guardianship trial, one being psychologist Dr. Eric Kirschner, who had evaluated M.H. on November 26, 2012. The Division also presented Janelle Bullock, the case worker who was assigned to M.H.'s case since March 2012.
Bullock recounted the Division's long history with M.H. and her persistent noncompliance with its services. She testified about the Division's involvement when S.H. was born, and the action plan that provided M.H. with home health aides. She enumerated the assistance provided to M.H., including counseling, therapy, transportation, baby clothing, and money for food. Bullock listed the additional services provided to M.H. in light of the Division's concerns about her parenting, such as parenting classes, anger management and individual therapy classes. She testified to the Division's assistance in finding M.H. a shelter, and M.H.'s subsequent discharge due to her combative behavior. Bullock further recapped the Division's efforts to provide services and visitation to M.H., after S.H. was removed, and M.H.'s continued noncompliance.
Bullock also recounted her observations of S.H. at E.H-R.'s home, and indicated that she had no concerns about the care S.H. received there. She reported:
[E.H-R.] is very patient with [S.H.]. When [S.H.] was first placed in her home, she was not potty trained. [E.H-R.] took the time out to thoroughly . . . potty train [S.H.] . . . . [E.H-R.] spends a lot of one on one time with her. They do a lot of . . . learning things together, [like] art work. In fact, if you go to the home, [S.H.] will invite you [to] her room and show you the pictures on the wall that her [sic] and [E.H-R.] actually did together. [E.H-R.]'s very over protective of [S.H.]. She doesn't allow any one in her home, whether it's a relative or a friend after certain hours . . . . She takes excellent care of her. [And] [a]s far as her son, [J.], and [S.H.], they're already acting as if they're brothers and sisters . . . . She's in a great home. She's thriving well. She's well cared for and all [of] [her] needs are being met.Bullock testified that the Division had no concerns about E.H-R.'s ability to continue to provide care for S.H., and that E.H-R. had expressed a willingness to adopt her. In the caseworker's opinion, S.H. needed to be adopted as M.H. was unable to provide for her.
Dr. Kirschner reported that M.H. was a "psychologically immature individual" with poor coping skills, who "tended to externalize responsibility for her actions onto others." Moreover, she lacked poor insight about her own mental illness and her resulting ability to parent, and had a poor history of complying with the recommended treatment and medication. He found that M.H. had effectively abandoned S.H., as she had not visited her daughter since July 2011, and had failed to accept responsibility for not doing so. Overall, M.H.'s profile suggested an "impaired . . . capacity to emphatically respond to the needs of a child." The doctor found that M.H. would place her child's needs secondary to her own.
Dr. Kirschner concluded his report by stating that M.H. "[was] not fit to parent[,]" and "based on a reasonable degree of psychological certainty [he opined] that [M.H.] would pose a heightened risk of harm to a child placed in her care." He recommended that before any visitation could be established, M.H. needed to demonstrate compliance "with no less than [a five] day a week intensive outpatient treatment which can closely monitor her . . . ." At trial, he conceded that someone with M.H.'s diagnoses "could potentially parent a child." However he emphasized that M.H. was unable to do so at the present time:
[M.H.] has a history of not just — we're not just talking about . . . an adjustment disorder that might be a . . . response to a situational event that in theory with a short term type of therapy a person can be sort of back to their baseline functioning . . . .
[With] [M.H] we're talking about someone with serious mental illness . . . . This is someone that is on a long term basis in order to be able to parent going to need to participate in . . . fairly intensive services . . . .
[T]here's been a history of . . . psychiatric hospitalizations, a history of partial hospitalization, and intensive outpatient treatment. And those are the level of intensity of services . . . that she would need in conjunction with . . . oftentimes medication management is incorporated into that. And by and large her history says that she has done little to engage in treatment . . . .
When asked about M.H.'s future ability to parent, Dr. Kirschner opined:
[T]he best predictor of future behavior is past behavior. And while we obviously can't predict the future with any sort of guarantee . . . , in [M.H.]'s case here there's very little track record to suggest that she's [] grasped the [] extent or the seriousness of her mental illness and the need for treatment . . . .
I would say in terms of the foreseeable future there's not much in the way of reason to think that would be the case for her being able to parent at that point down the road . . . .
So between her primitive level of . . . psychological functioning combined with the lack of any services to sort of improve it or [] address it there's just not much in the way from a prognosis standpoint to say that there's much hopefulness as far as her future from a parenting standpoint for this child at least.
Although Dr. Kirschner administered a series of tests in the course of evaluating M.H., he did not conduct a bonding evaluation. He explained:
Given the pretty substantial duration of time that would have transpired if that had occurred, in my experience it — that long stretch of time like that between contact makes the bonding evaluation kind of morph into something else in a way because there can be a lot of different directions it can go, but in some respects it's almost a sort of hello/welcome back visit . . . .
At the same time obviously the child is not really familiar with the parent and the long stretch of time between contact if there was a bonding evaluation the bonding evaluation doesn't always reflect what you would anticipate to see in [one] . . . . The duration of — the lack of contact becomes really more the issue than [] what you would typically have in the [] evaluation.
So [] that length of time that passes without any contact becomes sort of part of the bonding evaluation and it really in many ways sort of colors or kind of becomes a factor in things and isn't sort of a clean straightforward bonding evaluation as would typically be the case.
Regarding the importance of S.H. finding permanency with E.H-R., Dr. Kirschner opined:
[T]his is a child . . . about eight or nine months at the point that she was removed from her mother's care. So, [] a young child doesn't have much of a memory as far as [] that point in their life, but this is a child who was in multiple foster homes and now has seemingly [] not just found someone to adopt her, but a relative that will allow
her to maintain . . . contact as far as biological ro[ots] are concerned.
And for a child of this age I would say permanency is arguably at the utmost of importance on the list of things in her life.
Shortly prior to trial, counsel for M.H. submitted a letter to the court, objecting to 92 of the Division's 115 proposed exhibits. The primary objection was hearsay, as many of the exhibits were prepared by individuals who were not going to be called to testify - either Division employees, home health aides, or caseworkers from the various programs in which M.H. had been enrolled. Counsel subsequently withdrew her objection to 30 of the Division's proposed exhibits.
Judge Bernstein admitted the many screening summaries, "merely for the purposes of indicating that there was a complaint to the Division." He allowed them "to the extent that they indicate that the [] [Division] had a referral and this is what they're investigating . . . . That does not [prove] that referral occurred . . . . [The court] ha[s] to rely upon the statement . . . in the investigative summaries, [and to] the extent there's any hearsay statements of people who are not parties or not Division workers, that would also be excluded, unless those people come in and testify."
In response to M.H.'s objections about expert evaluations by those individuals who were not going to testify, the judge ruled that he would admit the expert reports "for purposes of reasonable inference regarding services the [] [Division] ha[s] provided and with regard to any allegation the Division might make that there were recommendations for services that [M.H.] failed to comply with. For those purposes only, [the court will] allow the other psychological reports. [The court will not] allow it for diagnosis without testimony."
Ultimately, the court allowed most of the hearsay exhibits describing M.H.'s disturbing behavior as a parent "for purposes of history, with the understanding that with regard to [p]rong [one] [of the parental rights termination test], the Division still has to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was this harm to the child."
In a comprehensive oral opinion, Judge Bernstein found that the Division had proven all four prongs of the best interests test by clear and convincing evidence, and terminated M.H.'s rights to S.H.
Regarding the first prong, the court found that though the Division "bent over backwards not to the remove this child, despite the warnings and concerns from [the time of her] birth," M.H. did not complete any services. He found that M.H.'s bizarre behavior included abandoning a nine-month old child "locked up in a room alone [] on a bed without anybody watching her. Not because of some emergency that she had to run to . . . [but to] fight with . . . one of her neighbors . . . ." The court found that such behavior indicated that M.H. was incapable of recognizing and taking responsibility for her problems.
The judge cited M.H.'s continued history of noncompliance with the plethora of services provided to her to enable functional parenting. He found it telling that M.H. had not taken any steps to address the situation despite not having seen her child for two years. The judge credited Dr. Kirschner's testimony that M.H. would most likely continue to be noncompliant in the future, as well as the child's need for stability and permanency.
Judge Bernstein considered the second prong in conjunction with the first, finding:
[I]t seems clear to me that the defendant is unwilling or unable to provide a safe, stable environment. She's not had stable housing. She has not had stable income. She's in Pennsylvania some place who won't even give her a home. She can't stay at any shelter, because she fights with everybody and gets into arguments. She can't be any place where she could be stable, because she's not — she has to take care of that stability in her own life.
The court found that the Division satisfied the third prong because of the "unbelievable amount of efforts" it made to provide M.H. with services. Also, the Division made diligent efforts to find placements for the child, who was "doing extremely well" since being placed with E.H-R.
Finally, the court was satisfied that the Division met the fourth prong of the test, that the termination of M.H.'s rights would not do more harm than good. Citing S.H.'s need for permanency, the judge found that she was thriving in her current, stable environment, in a family that cared for her, met all her needs, and wished to adopt her. In contrast, she had no relationship with her mother. The judge noted, "[M.H.] hasn't seen the child in two years. If the child walked by her on the street, I doubt [S.H.] would know who [M.H.] is or what she looks like at this particular point." Further, the judge opined that "doing a bonding evaluation with someone who's a complete stranger, . . . that the child wouldn't even know, makes no sense. And I'm satisfied that was not a necessity in this particular case."
II.
The law governing termination of parental rights is well settled. The standards are set forth in the four-prong best interests test of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a. The statute provides "an integrated multi-element test that must be applied to determine whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child." In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 375 (1999). These factors are as follows:
(1) The child's safety, health or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include evidence that separating the child from his resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child;
(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).]
The four factors "are not discrete and separate; they relate to and overlap with one another to provide a comprehensive standard that identifies a child's best interests." In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 348 (1999). The Division bears the burden of establishing each enumerated prong by clear and convincing evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J. 494, 506 (2004).
Our review of the trial court's application of the above standards to the facts of record is limited. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012). We "must determine whether a trial court's decision in respect of termination of parental rights was based on clear and convincing evidence supported by the record before the court." P.P., supra, 180 N.J. at 511. We may not disturb the trial court's findings "unless they are so wholly unsupportable as to result in a denial of justice." Ibid. (quoting In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002)). Even where the appellant "allege[s] error in the trial judge's evaluation of the underlying facts and the implications to be drawn therefrom," deference must be afforded unless the court "went so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007) (citations omitted).
In the present matter, we are satisfied that Judge Bernstein's findings, related to each of the four prongs, are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record and are entitled to our deference. We are additionally persuaded that the judge correctly evaluated the competent evidence and applied the correct legal principles in reaching the conclusion from those facts that the Division established, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was in S.H.'s best interests. We add the following comments.
The appropriate test under the first prong is not whether M.H. has actually harmed S.H., as M.H. would urge, but "whether the child's safety, health or development will be endangered in the future and whether the parents are or will be able to eliminate the harm." N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. A.G., 344 N.J. Super. 418, 440 (App. Div. 2001), certif. denied, 171 N.J. 44 (2002). Causing harm and the inability to eliminate it are related factors. Thus, the evidence that supports one, informs and may support the other. D.M.H., supra, 161 N.J. at 379. The record supports Judge Bernstein's finding that the Division satisfied its burden of proof as to the first prong of the best interests test.
M.H. clearly placed S.H. at risk of harm while leaving her unattended on a bed without guardrails for a period of up to one hour while proceeding to fight another resident of the homeless shelter. This irresponsible behavior further caused the expulsion of mother and child from the shelter. M.H. undoubtedly suffers from bipolar disorder and severe anger management issues. Nonetheless, M.H. failed to complete any treatment programs, was frequently discharged for non-attendance, and demonstrated no desire to change. Proof of M.H.'s persistent hostile and threatening behavior against Division workers, therapists, neighbors and police amply demonstrated the substantial risk of harm to which S.H. was subjected under the first prong, by clear and convincing evidence.
The same evidence also clearly and convincingly demonstrated M.H.'s inability to prevent harm to her child's physical or emotional health, thereby supporting the judge's findings under the second prong. See K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 353. Dr. Kirschner's unrefuted expert testimony established that M.H. was not presently fit to safely parent S.H., and that it was highly unlikely that she would ever be able to do so given her previous history. She has lived in shelters, from which she has been evicted due to her hostile and combative behavior. She then moved to Pennsylvania, without first advising the Division, and has not demonstrated that she can provide secure and stable housing either for herself or her young child. Since M.H. is unable to ameliorate the risk of harm to S.H., and S.H. would suffer substantially from disruption with her foster family, the requisite proofs to establish the second prong were satisfied.
Since M.H. does not challenge the sufficiency of the Division's proofs as to the third prong, we thus turn to the fourth prong, which requires the court to determine whether termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good to the child. This prong "serves as a fail-safe against termination even where the remaining standards have been met." Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 609 (2007). "The question ultimately is not whether a biological mother or father is a worthy parent, but whether a child's interest will best be served by completely terminating the child's relationship with that parent." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 108 (2008).
The ultimate determination to be made under the fourth prong is "whether, after considering and balancing the two relationships, the child will suffer a greater harm from the termination of ties with [the] natural parents than from the permanent disruption of [the] relationship with [the] foster parents." K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 355. When a termination action is based on parental unfitness rather than bonding, the proper inquiry under the fourth prong focuses on the child's need for permanency and the parent's inability to care for him or her in the foreseeable future. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. B.G.S., 291 N.J. Super. 582, 593 (1996).
In the present case, the Division's guardianship action was predicated on M.H.'s parental unfitness, which, as Judge Bernstein correctly found, was established by clear and convincing evidence. In finding that the Division satisfied prong four, the court also accepted Dr. Kirschner's testimony that "permanency [was] arguably [of] the utmost [] importance [] in [S.H.'s] life."
M.H. faults Dr. Kirschner's failure to conduct a bonding evaluation, despite having the opportunity to do so. In establishing this prong, the Division should normally adduce testimony from a "well qualified expert who has had full opportunity to make a comprehensive, objective, and informed evaluation" of the child's relationship with the biological and foster parents. In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 19 (1992). While it may have been more desirable for the judge to order a bonding evaluation, ultimately we agree with his conclusion that it was not necessary under the facts of this case.
Here, the judge rationally relied on Dr. Kirschner's expert opinion that a bonding evaluation would not be fruitful given the substantial lapse in time from when M.H. had last seen S.H. Moreover, the record did not support the possibility that S.H. was sufficiently bonded to M.H. because M.H. had not seen the child since July 2011, and her visits had also been suspended from February 2011 to May 2011. The bonding evaluation likely would have only prolonged the inevitable.
We therefore conclude that the only harm that M.H. can conceivably claim would befall S.H. from termination of parental rights is harm which naturally inures from severing a relationship with a biological parent. That harm is insufficient to defeat termination of the parent's rights. See K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 357.
Finally, we reject M.H.'s argument that the trial court's findings were improperly tainted by the introduction in evidence of various inadmissible hearsay documents offered by the Division. Rule 5:12-4(d) permits the Division to submit in evidence "reports by staff personnel or professional consultants," but it must do so "pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) and 801(d)," which refer to the business record exception. Nonetheless, reports admitted pursuant to Rule 5:12-4(d) are still subject to other hearsay limitations, including those imposed by N.J.R.E. 805 concerning embedded hearsay statements, and N.J.R.E. 808, concerning expert opinion included in a hearsay statement admissible under an exception. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Cope, 106 N.J. Super. 336, 343 (App. Div. 1969) (holding "the [Division] should be permitted to submit into evidence, pursuant to [former] Evidence Rules 63(13) and 62(5), reports by [Division] staff personnel (or affiliated medical, psychiatric, or psychological consultants), prepared from their own first-hand knowledge of the case") (emphasis added).
Applying these principles, we discern no error in the court's admission of the various reports and documents. Here, the trial court expressly suppressed those portions of the non-testifying expert reports that dealt with subjective diagnoses. The court only allowed expert evaluations for the limited "purposes of reasonable inference regarding services the [] Division ha[s] provided and with regard to any allegation the Division might make that there were recommendations for services that [M.H.] failed to comply with." The only unredacted expert evaluation the court admitted was that of Dr. Kirschner, who testified and was subject to extensive cross-examination at trial.
Similarly, Bullock was properly allowed to testify regarding events chronicled in the Division's documents in the ordinary course of business, especially as they pertained to steps taken by the Division based on information it received. Again, the judge ruled that he would allow those reports only "to the extent that they indicate that the [] [Division] had a referral and this is what they're investigating," rather than as proof of the information received. Moreover, the judge allowed the defense to raise Bullock's lack of personal knowledge on cross-examination to attack the weight of her testimony.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION