Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4045-14T4
05-03-2016
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. M.E., Defendant-Appellant, and Q.M.R. and T.C., Defendants. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF M.S.E. and M.M.-M.R., Minors.
Howard B. Tat, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Tat, on the brief). Cristina E. Ramundo, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ms. Ramundo, on the brief). Lisa M. Black, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for minors (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Ms. Black, on the brief).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Fisher and Currier. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket No. FG-07-167-14. Howard B. Tat, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Tat, on the brief). Cristina E. Ramundo, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ms. Ramundo, on the brief). Lisa M. Black, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for minors (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Ms. Black, on the brief). PER CURIAM
In this appeal, defendant M.E. (defendant) argues the trial judge erred in terminating his parental rights to his son, M.S.E., who was born on August 27, 2009. Defendant was imprisoned on a robbery conviction at the time of M.S.E.'s birth; he, in fact, will remain incarcerated until at least July 2017. In appealing, defendant contends the trial judge placed too much emphasis on his incarceration. We disagree and affirm.
The judge also terminated the parental rights of this child's mother, defendant Q.M.R., not only as to M.S.E., but also her daughter M.M.-M.R., who was born in 2011; the judge also terminated the parental rights of defendant T.C., the natural father of M.M.-M.R. Neither Q.M.R. nor T.C. have appealed. The sole issue in this appeal concerns the propriety of the termination of defendant M.E.'s parental rights to M.S.E. --------
Parents have a constitutionally protected right to the care, custody and control of their children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394-95, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 606 (1982); In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 346 (1999). "The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed 'essential,' 'basic civil rights . . .,' and 'rights far more precious . . . than property rights.'" Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 558 (1972) (internal citations omitted). "[T]he preservation and strengthening of family life is a matter of public concern as being in the interests of the general welfare." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-1(a); see also K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 347.
The constitutional right to the parental relationship, however, is not absolute. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 553 (2014); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 599 (1986). At times, a parent's interest must yield to the State's obligation to protect children from harm. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.M., 198 N.J. 382, 397 (2009); In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 10 (1992). To effectuate these concerns, the Legislature created a test for determining when a parent's rights must be terminated in a child's best interests. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) requires that the Division prove by clear and convincing evidence the following four prongs:
(1) The child's safety, health or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of
permanent placement will add to the harm . . .;See also A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 604-11.
(3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.
All the issues posed in this case, including the claims against M.S.E.'s mother and the father of her other child, were the subject of a two-day bench trial, during which no defendant testified or presented witnesses. The judge concluded the Division presented clear and convincing evidence that all four prongs supported termination of defendant's parental rights. After careful review, we are satisfied the judge's findings were fully supported by evidence the judge found credible and are entitled to our deference. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012); Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998).
Defendant chiefly argues the judge too greatly emphasized the fact of his incarceration and failed to adequately consider the Court's holding in In re Adoption of Children by L.A.S., 134 N.J. 127, 140 (1993). We disagree. Contrary to defendant's forceful argument, the trial judge did not view defendant's incarceration as the sole determinative factor; the judge recognized, in quoting from N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 556 (2014), that "[i]ncarceration alone — without particularized evidence of how a parent's incarceration affects each prong of the best interest-of-the-child standard — is an insufficient basis for terminating parental rights." As L.A.S. and R.G. make clear, the judge was obligated to look beyond the mere fact of incarceration and consider the entire picture. In applying these authorities, the judge adhered to the principle that an incarcerated parent's ability "to provide significant nurturing and to maintain an emotional relationship with the child can be substantially constricted by" the parent's imprisonment. In looking beyond the mere fact of incarceration, the judge found defendant was "[n]ever significantly involved in [the child's] life" and that he had not previously offered and was unable to "offer a safe and stable home for [the child] or a plan to prevent any harm that might come to his son now or in the foreseeable future." The judge observed that defendant was incarcerated when the child was still in utero and that he met the child for the first time when the child was four years old. Defendant, as the judge found, "never parented [the child] nor provided for his needs" and has:
made choices that have severely impacted his ability to be a parent to his son. He admits
to an extensive criminal history and to the use of illegal substances. Consequently, [the child] was never able to develop a bond with his father.In these and the many other circumstances thoroughly discussed by the trial judge, we find no reason to second guess the determination that the child's right to permanency should not await defendant's release from prison or whatever additional time thereafter defendant would require to develop a plan for the care and support of this child.
In short, we reject defendant's arguments and affirm substantially for the other findings and reasons set forth by Judge Linda Lordi Cavanaugh in her comprehensive and thoughtful written opinion.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION