Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4840-14T4
03-10-2016
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. K.L., Defendant-Appellant, and R.M., Defendant. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF A.A.L., Minor.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Albert M. Afonso, Designated Counsel, on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor (Karen Ann Lodeserto, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Yannotti, St. John and Guadagno. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket No. FG-07-232-14. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Albert M. Afonso, Designated Counsel, on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor (Karen Ann Lodeserto, Designated Counsel, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant mother K.L. appeals from an order entered by the Family Part on June 12, 2015, which terminated her parental rights to the minor child, A.A.L. We affirm.
We use initials to protect the confidentiality of the parties.
I.
K.L. gave birth to her daughter, A.A.L., on February 26, 2002. K.L. has one older child, N.W., born May 10, 1995, who is not the subject of this litigation. R.M., A.A.L.'s father, surrendered his parental rights to A.A.L. and is not a party to this appeal.
On June 15, 2012, the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) received a referral that K.L. had left A.A.L. at a friend's house and had not returned for over a month, leaving A.A.L. with a bag of clothes, but no food or money. The referent alleged that K.L. was "out doing drugs" and smoking cigarettes dipped in embalming fluid. The Division investigated the allegations. First, they spoke to K.L.'s friend who explained she made an agreement with K.L. to care for A.A.L., but had not been expecting A.A.L. to stay for so long. The friend was unaware of any previous drug use by K.L. and did not have concerns for A.A.L. in the care of K.L. Next, the Division spoke with K.L., who denied the allegations of drug use and agreed to take a drug assessment. K.L. explained that A.A.L. was staying there because it was closer to her school and A.A.L. likes being at the friend's house because she has daughters. K.L. also alleged that she had visited A.A.L. and brought her food.
Until June 29, 2012, the Division was known as the Division of Youth and Family Services. See L. 2012, c. 16, effective June 29, 2012.
The next day, a Division caseworker spoke with A.A.L. at K.L.'s home. A.A.L. did not know how long she had been at the friend's house and said she had never seen her mother "acting silly" or unable to "speak normally." The Division concluded the allegations were unfounded, but had K.L. sign a family agreement, agreeing to comply with Certified Alcohol and Drug Counseling (CADC) and undergo a urine screening.
K.L. was referred to a substance abuse assessment on June 20, 2012. Her first appointment was to be July 3, 2012, but K.L. informed CADC that she could not attend and rescheduled for two days later. She again rescheduled, and ultimately attended on July 11, 2012, where it was recommended she attend Air Mid outpatient services. On July 19, 2012, K.L. tested positive for PCP and cocaine. On September 6, 2012, K.L. appeared without an appointment at Air Mid and tested positive for oxycodone, marijuana and PCP. The Division investigated and determined that K.L. was using drugs and had tested positive on multiple occasions. As a result, the Division executed an emergency Dodd removal of A.A.L. on September 7, 2012.
A "Dodd removal" is the removal of a child from a home, on an emergent basis and without a court order, pursuant to the Dodd Act, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.82. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. S.I., 437 N.J. Super. 142, 149 n.4 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.W.R., 205 N.J. 17, 26 n.11 (2011)).
Upon removing A.A.L., the Division worker allowed K.L. to say goodbye to A.A.L. When the worker lowered the car window to allow K.L. to speak with her daughter, K.L. ordered her to exit the vehicle. Once A.A.L. exited the car, K.L. instructed her to run, and they ran away together. After several hours, and the Division telling K.L. that she could face criminal charges, K.L. returned A.A.L. to the Division later that night.
On September 11, 2012, the Division filed a verified complaint for custody of A.A.L. An order to show cause was also entered on that day. The court granted care, custody, and supervision to the Division and found that emergency removal had been necessary to avoid an ongoing risk to the life, safety, and health of A.A.L. K.L. tested positive for marijuana that day.
N.W., the son of K.L., was included in this complaint, however, he was subsequently dismissed from the litigation as he was incarcerated and was to turn eighteen within the next month. --------
On September 26, 2012, K.L. was given a drug screen at Bethel Counseling which tested positive for oxycodone and PCP. She continued to test positive for PCP on October 1, 10, and 17, 2012. It was recommended she participate in a residential treatment program.
On November 14, 2012, the Division met with K.L. to discuss the possibility of entering Family Drug Court and gave her bus tickets to attend visits with A.A.L. In December, K.L. informed the Division she was no longer interested in entering Family Drug Court, without further explanation.
On November 28, 2012, the Division received a substance abuse update from Substance Abuse Initiative (SAI) explaining that K.L. was absent from treatment about sixty percent of the time. She was discharged for poor attendance and sanctioned, but SAI agreed to continue working with her. K.L. was scheduled to be admitted to Turning Point Substance Abuse Treatment Facility, an inpatient program, on December 14, 2012. She never made it to the facility, despite transportation being provided for her.
K.L. was incarcerated at the Essex County Jail from January through March 2013. Following a fact-finding hearing on January 11, 2013, the judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that K.L. abused or neglected A.A.L. through her continued use of illegal drugs, her failure to attend substance abuse treatment, and her irrational and negligent behavior on the day of the removal, which placed A.A.L. at substantial risk of harm. The court ordered that K.L. was to attend inpatient drug treatment and a psychological evaluation after she was released from incarceration.
After her release, the Division re-referred her for substance abuse treatment. The Division also referred her to Family Connection's Reunify House for supervised visitation and parenting skills training. The Division scheduled K.L. for a psychological evaluation with Elizabeth Groisser, Ph.D., after she had missed two previously scheduled appointments.
On April 12, 2013, the Division received a referral from Newark Beth Israel Medical Center that K.L. was nineteen weeks pregnant and had reported to the emergency room for fetal demise. K.L. admitted to current use of PCP, with the last use being that day.
At a permanency hearing on August 5, 2013, the court approved the Division's plan of reunification with A.A.L.'s father, R.M., within a six-month timeframe. The court noted that R.M. had been successfully completing services through parole, however, his recent visitations had been inconsistent and he would need to secure larger housing to accommodate A.A.L. The court also noted that K.L. had a chronic drug problem, and had not engaged in any treatment or services, despite the Division's efforts.
K.L. was consistently non-compliant with substance abuse treatment, scheduled psychological evaluations, and submitting urine for drug/alcohol assessment until September 2013. On September 20, 2013, K.L. attended a substance abuse evaluation, where it was recommended she attend a long-term residential treatment program. At the evaluation, K.L. admitted to continually using drugs despite the negative consequences it was having on her life. She began using drugs at sixteen and alcohol at eighteen years old. She reported drinking three glasses of Hennessy about two times a month. K.L. said her daily use of marijuana was about two blunts, which continued until she was thirty, when she was introduced to PCP. She confirmed presently using PCP, which recently escalated from occasional to daily use. K.L. also admitted to smoking crack cocaine about two or three times, beginning at age thirty.
From October 2013 to June 2014, K.L. was incarcerated on charges of aggravated assault and violation of probation charges. While incarcerated, K.L. completed a psychological evaluation with Eric Kirschner, Ph.D. During the evaluation, she explained her PCP use and acknowledged that losing custody of A.A.L. was the most significant impact of her drug use. She also said she was attending AA/NA meetings, parenting skills classes and anger management classes while incarcerated. Dr. Kirschner opined that K.L. lacked the psychological capacity to adequately meet her child's need for safety, nurturance, stability, and guidance, and was unfit to parent A.A.L. at that time.
On February 24, 2014, the court approved the Division's new plan of termination of parental rights followed by adoption. The court found it was unsafe to return A.A.L. to K.L. because she had not engaged in any substance abuse treatments, and was presently incarcerated, with an outstanding warrant for theft charges in Pennsylvania. Before the arrest, K.L. did not consistently visit with her daughter or participate in the Division's offered services. In regard to R.M., the court found that despite the time extension to provide appropriate housing for A.A.L., he had not made any progress towards doing so. Lastly, the court found that termination and adoption were appropriate because A.A.L. had been in placement for eighteen months and deserved the permanency and stability adoption offers.
On April 7, 2014, the Division filed a guardianship complaint as to A.A.L. On April 29, 2014, the court heard the return of the order to show cause. Both K.L. and R.M. had counsel present. The protective services litigation was dismissed.
After release from incarceration in June 2014, K.L. was re-referred to another CADC assessment. Over the next year, K.L. did not cooperate with any substance abuse assessments; she would schedule and skip appointments, then reschedule for a later date.
The Division scheduled psychological and bonding evaluations for both R.M. and K.L. with Mark Singer, Ed.D. R.M. was evaluated on July 28, 2014. Following the evaluation, Dr. Singer opined that A.A.L. requires consistency and stability, and R.M. was aware he could not offer those things. R.M. was not a viable parenting option and would not become a viable option in the foreseeable future.
In September 2014, K.L. was incarcerated in Pennsylvania. After her release, she was again referred to CADC assessment, however, she did not comply. K.L. never successfully completed any drug treatment program nor attended an inpatient treatment program during the Division's involvement.
Throughout the litigation, the Division assessed family members for relative care placement. In September 2012, K.L. provided two family member resources, her cousin, J.B., and her great-aunt, L.L. L.L. was initially ruled out because her home lacked enough space for A.A.L. However, she was later reassessed and a bonding evaluation between her and A.A.L. was conducted in June 2014. Dr. Singer observed the bonding evaluation and recommended the two begin visitation. L.L. completed training to be licensed as a resource placement and identified back-up caregiver. In September 2014, after L.L. was evicted and lost her job, the Division found that L.L. was unable to maintain stable housing and income to permit placement of A.A.L.
The Division did not immediately assess J.B., as her own schooling and employment would not permit her to be a relative resource for A.A.L. Additionally, J.B. would need a larger home to accommodate A.A.L. and did not want to be penalized for breaking the lease on her current apartment.
Two other relatives, R.L. and Y.L., contacted the Division as prospective resources, but were both ruled out in February 2013. The Division provided many services to reunify R.M. with A.A.L., and until February 24, 2014, the permanency plan was reunification.
In October 2014, K.L. again offered J.B. as a prospective relative placement. The Division began reassessing J.B. in early 2015. J.B. needed to move to a bigger home, however, she expressed that she was willing to adopt A.A.L. once she was placed in her home.
In December 2014, A.A.L. began to express that she no longer wanted to continue visitation with her parents, as a result of their inconsistency.
On January 8, 2015, K.L. was evaluated by Dr. Singer. During this appointment, she refused to complete the psychological evaluation. Similarly, K.L. prematurely terminated the bonding evaluation because she refused to be watched with A.A.L. in front of Dr. Singer. Dr. Singer concluded that K.L. sabotaged herself, precluding A.A.L. from spending time with her, raising concerns as to K.L.'s ability to place her child's needs before her own. During this bonding evaluation, A.A.L. expressed that "adoption means somebody adopts you and you live with them instead of your parents" and indicated she did not want to be adopted, though she did not explain why. The Division provided individual therapy two hours a week to help her accept and understand why she was in foster care and that the future result may be adoption.
On January 29, 2015, Division caseworker Tanya Enyoasah made an unscheduled visit to A.A.L.'s resource home, where A.A.L. said she was looking forward to the possibility of being placed with J.B. The Division provided J.B. with a security deposit for a larger home with adequate room for A.A.L. The Division worked with J.B. to complete PRIDE licensing classes. On August 13, 2015, A.A.L. moved into J.B.'s home, where she remains today.
A permanency hearing was held on February 9, 2015. The court again approved the Division's plan of termination of parental rights followed by adoption. The court found it was not currently safe and would not be safe in the foreseeable future to return A.A.L. home because K.L. continually failed to engage in treatment and was incarcerated in both New Jersey and Pennsylvania during the litigation. K.L. had failed to consistently visit A.A.L. during the litigation, and had only seen A.A.L. once over several months. As for R.M., he recently tested positive for marijuana and had failed to attend treatment. As a result, his visitation was changed to supervised, but he had not attended any supervised visits with A.A.L.
A two-day guardianship trial commenced on May 5, 2015, and continued on June 4, 2015. On May 22, 2015, R.M. executed a voluntary identified surrender of his parental rights to A.A.L. so that a prospective relative caregiver could adopt her.
On the first day of trial, R.M. appeared with counsel; K.L. was not in attendance and could not be reached. First, the Division called Dr. Singer to testify as an expert in the field of psychology and bonding. He testified as to his bonding evaluation between K.L. and A.A.L. He explained he was unable to conduct the evaluations because K.L. refused to comply.
Dr. Singer opined this behavior was consistent with her past behavior of confirming visits with A.A.L. and then not showing up, disappointing A.A.L. He opined that K.L. put her needs before A.A.L.'s needs. He supported the Division's plan of adoption because it would provide A.A.L. with the basic sense of security and stability that she will likely need as she gets older. He acknowledged A.A.L.'s previous statement that she did not want to be adopted, but found it notable that she no longer wanted to visit with her parents.
On cross-examination, Dr. Singer was asked if A.A.L.'s decision to no longer visit with her parents was unusual and testified that he has rarely seen children of her age no longer want to participate in visits. Additionally, he opined that this may be a mitigation factor to the potential harm of termination.
On June 4, 2015, K.L. again failed to attend and could not be contacted. The Division presented caseworker Enyoasah. She gave the background of K.L.'s involvement with the Division. She testified as to the circumstances of K.L.'s positive drug tests and A.A.L.'s removal. She outlined K.L.'s failure to visit with A.A.L., explaining the only time she consistently visited was during her incarceration when a caseworker took A.A.L. to visit her mother in jail. The caseworker testified that A.A.L. was tired of being disappointed by her parents, had begun to isolate herself, and said she did not want to continue visitation.
Enyoasah testified that the Division's plan was adoption of A.A.L. by J.B. She noted J.B.'s completion of PRIDE training classes and her relocation to a bigger home. The unsupervised visits between A.A.L. and J.B. were "wonderful," and A.A.L. was able to see other extended family members during the visits. The caseworker testified that A.A.L. wants to be adopted by J.B. Moreover, it would not be safe to return A.A.L. to K.L. and it was in A.A.L.'s best interest to be adopted by J.B. On cross- examination, the caseworker testified that the Division did not assess J.B. when originally presented as an option because her schooling and employment would not permit her to be a resource.
Neither the Law Guardian nor defendant put forth any witnesses. The Law Guardian, defense counsel, and the Division gave oral summations, with the Law Guardian supporting the Division's application for termination of K.L.'s parental rights.
On June 12, 2015, the court issued its oral decision. The court found both witnesses to be credible. As to prong one, the judge found "[K.L.'s] unfortunate, unabated drug use, her frequent periods of incarceration, her unstable housing and her inconsistent visitation . . . all [present] significant threat of harm to [A.A.L.'s] safety, health and development." He noted defendant's "chronic and ongoing" drug use and the lack of "indication in this record that she has either addressed or ceased [it]". Her "unstable housing and employment . . . further poses a risk of harm." Moreover, "her recurring periods of incarceration and her limited visitation with [A.A.L.] through the almost three years of litigation has harmed and continue to harm her child." The judge pointed out, "as of the date of trial [defendant had] not seen [A.A.L.] for approximately 8 months despite having the right to do so." The judge concluded, "the message to the child, although perhaps not intended by [K.L.], is one where the child does not receive the love, the care, the respect, the knowing that she's special, the concern . . . from a parent who doesn't visit."
As to prong two, the judge referenced defendant's continued drug use over the years, despite the fact that "the Division informed her that compliance with services was necessary to gain care of [A.A.L.]." The judge found "she has not attended a substance abuse evaluation let alone participated in [a] drug treatment program since . . . nearly two years ago." Further, this was "after acknowledging during her evaluation . . . that the drug abuse was interfering with her ability to parent [A.A.L.]. . . . Her unwillingness . . . or her inability to address the substance abuse is consistent with Ms. Enyoasah's testimony. . . ." The judge concluded "a delay in permanent placement caused by [defendant's] failure to address her substance abuse issues would add to the harm. [A.A.L.] does not have to wait around . . . . She deserves permanency."
Under the third prong, the judge found that the Division "made reasonable efforts to provide services to help [defendant] correct the circumstances that led to [A.A.L.'s] removal from her care." The judge detailed the various attempts and orders for substance abuse treatments over the years that defendant did not participate in. Further, the judge referenced the many services the Division had provided to R.M. and A.A.L. Likewise, he found "the Division considered alternatives to termination." The Division considered placement with multiple relatives and "worked diligently to assess the relative resources provided by the [family]."
As to the last prong, the judge believed the "chance of permanency" in placing her is a "significant good" and the fact that it may be with a relative is even better. Further, A.A.L. has "already distanced herself" and "based on the fact that the mother won't even attend a psychological evaluation . . . indicates her putting her needs above the child's needs." There is always a harm present when considering termination; here, the court found it to be "minimal compared to the good. . . ."
Overall, the judge concluded that the Division had established by clear and convincing evidence all four of the prongs of the best interests of the child standard codified in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). Consequently, the judge terminated the parental rights of K.L. as to A.A.L. and issued a judgment of guardianship freeing the child for adoption. K.L.'s appeal ensued.
II.
K.L. argues that the judge erred by finding that the Division had proven the third and fourth prongs of the best interests standard in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree.
In addressing these issues, we initially note that a parent has a constitutional right to rear his or her child, but that right is not absolute. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 447 (2012) (citations omitted). The parent's right is "tempered by the State's parens patriae responsibility to protect children whose vulnerable lives or psychological well-being may have been harmed or may be seriously endangered by a neglectful or abusive parent." Ibid.
When the State seeks to terminate parental rights, the Division must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, each of the following:
(1) The child's safety, health or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include evidence that separating the child from [her] resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child;
(3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led
to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and"The focus of a termination-of-parental-rights hearing is the best interests of the child," which are evaluated by application of these four statutory standards. F.M., supra, 211 N.J. at 447.
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.
[N. J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a); see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 166 (2010).]
The four prongs "are not discrete and separate; they overlap to offer a full picture of the child's best interests." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 554 (2014). "[T]hey are designed to identify and assess what may be necessary to promote and protect the best interests of the child." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.L., 388 N.J. Super. 81, 88 (App. Div. 2006). The considerations involved "are 'extremely fact sensitive' and require particularized evidence that address the specific circumstances in the given case." In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 348 (1999) (quoting In re Adoption of Children by L.A.S., 134 N.J. 127, 139 (1993)).
In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we must recognize the family court's "specialized knowledge and experience in matters involving parental relationships and the best interests of children." F.M., supra, 211 N.J. at 427. Therefore, "[w]e defer to the family court's findings unless they are so wide of the mark that our intervention is required to avert an injustice. So long as the record contains substantial and credible evidence to support the family court's decision, we may not second-guess its judgment." Ibid.
A. Third Prong
K.L. argues the Division failed to prove N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3) by clear and convincing evidence because the Division did not consider J.B. as a resource option until years after she had originally offered her, and J.B.'s commitment to adopt A.A.L. is unsupported by the record. Further, she contends the Division did not properly consider other options like kinship legal guardian (KLG), as A.A.L. did not want to be adopted. K.L. points to the fact that A.A.L. was not yet adopted at the time of termination. Neither argument has merit.
As noted, the third prong of the best interests standard requires, among other things, that the court consider alternatives to termination of parental rights. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3). Therefore, the Division must show that it considered available relative placements before pursuing termination of parental rights. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. J.S., 433 N.J. Super. 69, 81-82 (App. Div. 2013), certif. denied, 217 N.J. 587 (2014). There is, however, "no presumption favoring the placement of a child with such relatives." Id. at 82.
Here, the trial judge noted that the Division had consistently assessed family members as potential resource options. The Division tirelessly tried to work with both K.L. and R.M. for reunification, which was the plan until February 2014. Further, the Division did not immediately assess J.B. because of her own limitations. In the meantime, however, the Division diligently assessed other family members. After ultimately ruling out L.L. and R.M., the Division then looked to J.B. once again. We are convinced that there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the judge's findings on this issue.
The record shows that in order for J.B. to be approved as a placement resource, she needed a bigger home and to complete any licensing programs. As of the date of trial, J.B. completed the PRIDE licensing classes and had relocated to a larger home, with the Division's assistance.
We also reject K.L.'s contention that the trial judge erred by failing to consider KLG as an alternative to termination of parental rights. KLG may be an appropriate alternative to termination of parental rights when adoption is neither feasible nor likely. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J. 494, 508-09 (2004). However, KLG does not provide the child with permanency, since "[t]he biological parent may seek to regain custody or to reinstate other kinds of involvement in the child's life, such as visitation." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. H.R., 431 N.J. Super. 212, 229-230 (App. Div. 2013).
Here, KLG is not a viable option because adoption of A.A.L. by J.B. is both feasible and likely. Indeed, at the time of trial, A.A.L. was living with J.B. In addition, A.A.L. has stated that she wants to be adopted by J.B. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 112-14 (2008) (court should consider wishes of children of sufficient age, who are capable of forming an intelligent opinion).
B. Fourth Prong
K.L. next argues that the Division failed to establish that termination of her parental rights will not do more harm than good, as required by the fourth prong of the statutory standard. Again, we disagree.
The Supreme Court has recognized that,
a harm arising out of the severing of ties with the biological parent is an inherent danger . . . . The near inevitability of this harm befalling a child is the tragedy
that termination proceedings engender. Nevertheless, the question the courts must answer remains whether the termination will not do more harm than good.
In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 384 (1999).
The question to be addressed is "whether, after considering and balancing the two relationships, the child will suffer a greater harm from the termination of ties with her natural parents than from the permanent disruption of her relationship with her foster parents." K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 355. The overriding consideration under this prong is the child's need for permanency and stability. Id. at 357. "If a child can be returned to the parental home without endangering his health and safety, the parent's right to reunification takes precedence over the permanency plan." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. L.J.D., 428 N.J. Super. 451, 492 (App. Div. 2012). The inquiry required ordinarily entails consideration of expert testimony evaluating the child's relationships with the biological and foster parents. F.M., supra, 211 N.J. at 453 (citations omitted).
"Ultimately, a child has a right to live in a stable, nurturing environment and to have the psychological security that his most deeply formed attachments will not be shattered." F.M., supra, 211 N.J. at 453; see also D.M.H., supra, 161 N.J. at 385 (recognizing "strong policy considerations that underscore the need to secure permanency and stability for the child without undue delay").
Here, there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the trial judge's finding that termination of K.L.'s parental rights would not do more harm than good. Defendant characterizes the decision as premature because A.A.L. was not yet adopted and contends there is no viable prospective home for A.A.L. She is currently placed with J.B., however, who has shown a commitment to the plan of adoption. Although there always exists a harm from the loss of a mother, as Dr. Singer and the caseworker testified, A.A.L. has already distanced herself from K.L., not wanting to visit anymore, as a result of K.L.'s inconsistent visits over the years. Dr. Singer opined that there may already exist some mitigation to the loss and resulting harm.
Furthermore, Dr. Singer and caseworker Enyoasah agreed that A.A.L. had an urgent need for permanency. Both emphasized A.A.L.'s need for security, permanency, and stability, which would never be present with K.L. Dr. Singer referenced K.L.'s inability to put A.A.L.'s needs before her own. Both Dr. Singer and the caseworker testified that it was in A.A.L.'s best interests for the Division to pursue the goal of adoption by J.B.
Thus, the record fully supports the judge's determination that the Division has proven prong four of the best interests standard. The evidence clearly and convincingly showed that, under the circumstances, termination of K.L.'s parental rights would be in the child's best interests and not do more harm than good.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION