Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3578-14T3
01-27-2016
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. C.L., Defendant-Appellant. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF K.T.L. AND T.S.L., Minors.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Kisha M. Hebbon, Designated Counsel, on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ashley Kolata-Guzik, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minors (Lisa M. Black, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Fuentes and Gilson. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, Docket No. FG-14-37-14. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Kisha M. Hebbon, Designated Counsel, on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ashley Kolata-Guzik, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minors (Lisa M. Black, Designated Counsel, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Appellant C.L. (Claire), the biological mother of two minor children, K.T.L. and T.S.L., appeals from the judgment of guardianship entered by the Family Part terminating her parental rights to her children. Claire argues that the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) failed to prove any of the four prongs necessary for a termination of parental rights. Following a trial, Judge Maritza Berdote Byrne issued a thorough written opinion finding that the Division had proven by clear and convincing evidence each of the four prongs in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) and that it would be in the best interest of both children to terminate Claire's parental rights and allow the children to be adopted. Having reviewed the evidence presented at trial and the relevant law, we affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Berdote Byrne in her March 25, 2015 opinion. We add a few comments that summarize the reasons for our affirmance.
We use fictitious names or initials for the parties and children to protect their privacy and the confidentiality of the record. See R. 1:38-3(d)(12).
Effective June 29, 2012, the Division of Youth and Family Services was renamed the Division of Child Protection and Permanency, L. 2012, c. 16.
Claire has been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. She has received mental health treatment for most of her adult life and has had several breakdowns that have required inpatient psychiatric treatment.
The Division became involved with Claire and her children in 2011. Between 2011 and 2013, the Division received five referrals concerning Claire's inability to care for the children. In May 2013, Claire had a mental health breakdown at a ShopRite while she was with her children. As a result of that breakdown, Claire underwent a psychiatric evaluation and was admitted to the psychiatric unit of a hospital. Claire remained in inpatient psychiatric treatment for the next seven months. The psychiatrist and mental health professionals who evaluated and treated Claire reported that she was actively psychotic and that her behaviors included hallucinations, hearing voices, delusions and talking to herself.
The Division filed for and was granted temporary custody of both children when Claire was hospitalized in May 2013. Since then, both children have been in the care of the Division and placed with resource homes. At the time of trial, K.T.L. was pending placement in a therapeutic resource home and T.S.L. was in a pre-adoptive resource home.
The Division provided several years of services to Claire, which included psychological and psychiatric evaluations, counseling, therapeutic visitation with the children and family team meetings. Claire also received extensive assistance from various social services, which provided her with mental health services and housing and living assistance. As part of its efforts to help Claire, the Division monitored and communicated with these other service providers.
Following Claire's hospitalization in May 2013, the Division contacted the children's biological father, R.M. (Richard). At that time, Richard was living in Virginia and had not been living with the children since at least 2011. Richard tested positive for cocaine use and was referred to treatment, but he did not complete substance abuse treatment. The Virginia Department of Social Services conducted an evaluation and did not approve placing the children with Richard. Despite ongoing efforts by the Division to communicate with Richard, he broke off all contact with the Division in November 2013. Richard also stopped all visits with his children in July 2013. He neither attended the trial nor offered any plan for the children. As a consequence, Judge Berdote Byrne found that Richard had abandoned his children to the care of the State.
Richard was named as a defendant in the guardianship litigation and his parental rights were terminated. He did not file an appeal. --------
The Division also explored placing the children with other relatives. In that regard, the Division contacted the children's maternal grandmother, maternal aunt, paternal grandmother and paternal aunt. All of those relatives, however, informed the Division that they could not care for the children.
At trial, two experts testified: Dr. Robert Kanen, who had been retained by the Division, and Dr. Chester Sigafoos, who had been retained by the Law Guardian. Both experts had conducted psychological evaluations of Claire and children-bonding evaluations. Both experts testified that Claire had mental health illnesses, she lacked insight into her mental health conditions, and her lack of insight substantially impeded her ability to control and deal with her illnesses. Both experts opined that Claire's mental health illnesses prevented her from safely caring for the children, the children would be at risk of harm if they were in Claire's care, the children would suffer no negative impact from a termination of parental rights, and the children would be at risk of more harm if they continued to see Claire.
Judge Berdote Byrne comprehensively reviewed the evidence presented at trial and made fact findings and credibility determinations. She found clear and convincing evidence that (1) Claire's mental illnesses posed a continuing risk of imminent harm to the children; (2) Claire is unable to ameliorate the harm she poses to the children; (3) the Division had made reasonable efforts to assist Claire by providing her with various services, but, given Claire's illnesses, she had not made, and was not likely to make, progress in her parenting abilities; and (4) terminating Claire's parental rights would do more good than harm since the children had limited bonding with Claire and had good prospects for adoption.
In short, Judge Berdote Byrne found that all four prongs of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) were met. All of those fact findings were supported by substantial credible evidence. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012). (2009). Judge Berdote Byrne also correctly analyzed the relevant law and concluded that the Division had met by clear and convincing evidence all of the legal requirements for a judgment of guardianship. See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a); In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 347-48 (1999). We agree with all of Judge Berdote Byrne's legal conclusions.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION