Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4663-14T3 DOCKET NO. A-4741-14T3
05-13-2016
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. C.K. AND J.R., Defendants-Appellants. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF J.C., J.R., J.R., AND B.A.R., Minors.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant C.K. (Michele C. Buckley, Designated Counsel, on the joint brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant J.R. (Gilbert G. Miller, Designated Counsel, on the joint brief). Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Lea C. DeGuilo, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minors (Todd Wilson, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges O'Connor and Suter. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Sussex County, Docket No. FG-19-25-14. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant C.K. (Michele C. Buckley, Designated Counsel, on the joint brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant J.R. (Gilbert G. Miller, Designated Counsel, on the joint brief). Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Lea C. DeGuilo, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minors (Todd Wilson, Designated Counsel, on the brief). PER CURIAM
We consolidate these appeals to address the issues raised by the parties. Defendants C.K. (mother) and J.R. (father) are the biological parents of three children, presently eight, seven, and just shy of three years of age. C.K. is also the mother of another child, presently fourteen years of age, whom she had with J.C. The mother and father appeal from the judgment of the Family Part granting the guardianship petitions filed by the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) thereby terminating their parental rights over their three children. That same judgment also terminated the mother's and J.C.'s parental rights to their child, from which the mother also appeals. J.C. did not appeal from this judgment.
Both the mother and the father argue the Division failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the four-prong standard codified by the Legislature in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). We reject these arguments and affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge James A. Farber in his oral decision issued from the bench on June 2, 2015. We make only the following limited comments.
These four prongs are:
(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include evidence that separating the child from his resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child;
(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.
[N. J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).]
The event precipitating the children's removal was that, in 2013, the father twisted the oldest child's arm in anger and fractured the child's humerus. The parents concocted various versions of how the child was injured in an effort to show the injury was accidental, but the father eventually admitted he caused the injury. He was subsequently charged with aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b), and endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). It is not clear from the record to what he pled, but he did plead guilty to an offense arising out of this incident for which he was sentenced to a three-year term of imprisonment.
At the guardianship trial, evidence of the results of cognitive testing to which defendants had submitted revealed they suffer from significant cognitive deficits, which impair their ability to parent their children without endangering the children's safety, health, and development. As for the mother, one of the Division's experts, psychologist Frank J. Dyer, noted the mother's intelligence is commensurate with that of the average six-year old. Further, the mother is without the cognitive ability to learn new skills to become a better parent. Dr. Dyer stated:
She simply does not have the cognitive resources to profit from any type of intervention, such as parenting skills, training, or education, counseling, therapy, coaching to the point where she would assimilate what the programs are trying to impart to her, and then be able to apply those skills independently.
The expert also found the mother was very passive and dependent on others and, consequently,
is not able to place the safety of her children beyond her own needs. That she tends to be accommodating and submissive to
her romantic partner, which includes covering up for anything that the romantic partner may do that would have a negative impact on her children. And that in and of itself is something that I view as a dangerous factor that would pose a substantial risk to any child in her care.
As for the father, psychologist Leslie A. Trott opined he has "very limited cognitive abilities" and can understand life only as he can see it, devoid of any abstract reasoning. Cognitively, he functions "between the range of mild mental retardation and borderline intelligence," and is unable to reason or understand
how [his] behavior . . . might impact on his future or on himself or on his family or on how others see him. He only sees that there's an immediate need and he responds to that immediate need. His long term reason in terms of judgment is very lacking.
The father's impairments substantially limit his ability to handle the demands of parenting. For example,
[j]ust planning through the day, he will struggle to fit a day's activities into [the] time allotted so that for him to be able to make sure his children are bathed and fed and ready for school and washing their clothes and doing all those things that are provided in child care. He's going to struggle to complete that in a planned effective manner. He does not have the capability of taking care of his three youngsters.
Although defendants argue they provided care for three of their four children before the children were removed, in fact defendants and the children either lived with the mother's parents, who provided care and supervision over their grandchildren, or defendants and the children lived within walking distance of the parents' home and continued to receive assistance from the mother's parents and the Division, which has been involved with the mother since 2004.
The youngest child was born soon after the other three children were removed from defendants' home. --------
The degree to which the mother struggled with providing basic care for the children is illustrated by the following example. In October 2012, a Division worker visited defendants' home and noticed one of the children needed a bath. When the worker suggested the mother bathe the child, the mother responded by placing the child fully clothed into the bathtub, turned on the water, and began to bathe the child before removing her clothes.
Parents have a constitutionally protected right to the care, custody and control of their children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394-95, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 606 (1982); In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 346 (1999). "The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed 'essential,' 'basic civil rights . . .,' and 'rights far more precious . . . than property rights.'" Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 558 (1972) (internal citations omitted). "'[T]he preservation and strengthening of family life is a matter of public concern as being in the interests of the general welfare.'" K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 347 (quoting N.J.S.A. 30:4C-1(a)). However, the constitutional right to the parental relationship is not absolute. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Services v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 599 (1986). At times, a parent's interest must yield to the State's obligation to protect children from harm.
We have considered defendants' specific contentions that the Division did not prove each of the four prongs in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) by clear and convincing evidence. After carefully reviewing the record and applicable legal principles, we conclude defendants' arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Judge Farber's opinion tracks the statutory requirements of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) and his findings are supported by substantial and credible evidence in the record mandating our deference. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012); Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION